本文選題：獨(dú)立董事 + 聲譽(yù)　； 參考：《中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2016年01期

【摘要】：本文利用2005~2012年中國A股市場公開披露的獨(dú)立董事獨(dú)立意見數(shù)據(jù),以聲譽(yù)為維度,分別考察了不同聲譽(yù)水平和不同薪酬與聲譽(yù)匹配狀況下,薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事有效性的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),聲譽(yù)水平中等或較低以及薪酬明顯高于聲譽(yù)的獨(dú)立董事群體,其薪酬對(duì)有效性具有顯著的負(fù)面影響。但是,在高聲譽(yù)水平以及薪酬符合或明顯低于聲譽(yù)的獨(dú)立董事群體中,薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事有效性不具有顯著影響,而且還有證據(jù)顯示,薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事有效性具有較弱的正面激勵(lì)作用。這說明薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事有效性的影響具有兩面性,除現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)揭示的、由獨(dú)立董事制度設(shè)計(jì)缺陷導(dǎo)致的"天生"負(fù)面作用之外,薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事有效性還具有一定的積極作用,這可能是薪酬對(duì)獨(dú)立董事勤勉的工作具有一定的"保障"或正向激勵(lì)作用引起的。
[Abstract]:Based on the independent opinion data of independent directors published in China's A share market from 2005 to 2012, this paper examines the effects of compensation on the effectiveness of independent directors under different reputation levels and different compensation and reputation matching conditions, taking reputation as the dimension. It is found that the compensation of independent directors with moderate or low reputation level and significantly higher compensation than reputation has a significant negative impact on effectiveness. However, compensation has no significant impact on the effectiveness of independent directors in groups of independent directors with high reputation levels and compensation that is consistent with or significantly lower than that of reputations, and there is evidence that, Compensation has a weak positive incentive effect on the effectiveness of independent directors. This shows that compensation has a dual impact on the effectiveness of independent directors. In addition to the "innate" negative effect caused by the defects in the design of the independent director system, compensation also has a positive effect on the effectiveness of independent directors. This may be due to a certain "guarantee" or positive incentives for the diligent work of independent directors.
【作者單位】： 華中師范大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.92

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