本文選題：高管團(tuán)隊(duì) + 薪酬差距��； 參考：《廣東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)是企業(yè)可持續(xù)健康發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵,其有助于提高企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和最大化企業(yè)價(jià)值。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高的企業(yè),不僅對(duì)創(chuàng)新性項(xiàng)目表現(xiàn)出越高的積極性,同時(shí)也會(huì)有更多的固定資產(chǎn)、其他長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)等資本性支出及無(wú)形資產(chǎn)等研發(fā)投入。換句話,企業(yè)有較高的意愿投資于預(yù)期收益為正的長(zhǎng)期性高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目,也更注重企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的形成和戰(zhàn)略性發(fā)展。企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平的影響因素近年來成為研究的熱點(diǎn)。通常地,企業(yè)的重大決策需要公司高層管理團(tuán)隊(duì)共同商議,則高管人員的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)意愿一定程度上決定了企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平。但是現(xiàn)代化企業(yè)中所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離,可能導(dǎo)致高管人員為了自身眼前的利益,而做出損害所有者的決策,基于高管自身對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的規(guī)避取向,可能更容易放棄凈現(xiàn)值為正的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目,而高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部薪酬差距則成為緩解公司所有者和高管之間代理問題的一種有效方式。本文以高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部薪酬差距為出發(fā)點(diǎn),以2007-2014年在滬市或是深市主板發(fā)行A股的非金融類上市公司為研究對(duì)象,研究了高層管理團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部的薪酬差距與企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)之間的關(guān)系,并聯(lián)系我國(guó)公司產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的實(shí)際情況,將上市公司區(qū)分國(guó)有和非國(guó)有兩種情況,進(jìn)一步探討了兩者之間的關(guān)系。通過實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部薪酬差距越大,企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越低,且這種關(guān)系在國(guó)有企業(yè)中更加顯著。本文的研究結(jié)果為補(bǔ)充現(xiàn)有高管薪酬差距的研究成果以及如何為不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的上市公司設(shè)定合理的薪酬差距提供了一個(gè)新的參照點(diǎn),同時(shí)也驗(yàn)證了相較于錦標(biāo)賽理論,行為理論在我國(guó)企業(yè)中的適用性,為高管團(tuán)隊(duì)內(nèi)部薪酬差距負(fù)向的影響企業(yè)績(jī)效找到了一個(gè)合理的思考點(diǎn)。
[Abstract]:Risk taking is the key to the sustainable and healthy development of enterprises, which helps to improve the core competitiveness of enterprises and maximize the value of enterprises. The higher the risk-bearing level, the higher the enthusiasm for innovative projects, but also more capital expenditure such as fixed assets, other long-term assets, intangible assets and other R & D investment. In other words, enterprises have a higher willingness to invest in long-term high risk projects with positive expected returns, and pay more attention to the formation and strategic development of enterprises' competitive advantages. In recent years, the influencing factors of enterprise risk-bearing level have become the focus of research. Usually, the important decision of the enterprise needs the company's senior management team to discuss together, then the executives' willingness to take risks determines the level of the enterprise's risk-taking to a certain extent. However, the separation of ownership and management rights in modern enterprises may lead executives to make decisions that harm their owners for the sake of their immediate interests, based on their own risk aversion. It may be easier to abandon high-risk projects with positive NPV, and the pay gap within executive teams is an effective way to ease agency problems between owners and executives. This paper takes the pay gap within the executive team as the starting point, taking the non-financial listed companies that issued A shares in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2014 as the research objects. This paper studies the relationship between the salary gap and the enterprise risk taking within the senior management team, and according to the actual situation of the property right nature of the company in our country, the listed companies are divided into the state-owned and the non-state-owned situations. The relationship between them is further discussed. The empirical results show that the greater the pay gap within the executive team, the lower the risk-taking level of the enterprise, and this relationship is more significant in state-owned enterprises. The results of this paper provide a new reference point to supplement the existing research results of executive pay gap and how to set a reasonable pay gap for listed companies with different property rights. The applicability of the behavior theory in the enterprises of our country has found a reasonable thinking point for the negative effect of the pay gap within the executive team on the performance of the enterprise.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275

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