本文選題：平臺(tái)企業(yè) + 雙邊市場(chǎng)��； 參考：《江蘇大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)信息技術(shù)的飛速發(fā)展,企業(yè)平臺(tái)化的經(jīng)濟(jì)趨勢(shì)已經(jīng)勢(shì)不可擋。從門戶網(wǎng)站(谷歌、雅虎、騰訊、百度等)、購物平臺(tái)(淘寶、京東等)、出行旅游平臺(tái)(攜程、藝龍等)到第三方電子支付平臺(tái)(支付寶、微信支付、PayPal等)、視頻網(wǎng)站(愛奇藝、優(yōu)酷等)等平臺(tái)企業(yè)不斷涌現(xiàn),平臺(tái)企業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日益激烈。如何在激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境中獲得生存并建立競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)成為平臺(tái)面臨的一大難題。其中,用戶規(guī)模作為平臺(tái)成功的關(guān)鍵一直為學(xué)界與業(yè)界所重視,如何在短時(shí)間內(nèi)快速“引爆”用戶規(guī)模成為平臺(tái)管理者的運(yùn)營目標(biāo)。但是,片面追求平臺(tái)用戶規(guī)模的增長極易使平臺(tái)用戶良莠不齊,出現(xiàn)用戶質(zhì)量問題,而用戶質(zhì)量水平關(guān)乎平臺(tái)聲譽(yù),是決定平臺(tái)成敗的另一個(gè)重要指標(biāo)。相對(duì)而言,國內(nèi)外關(guān)于用戶質(zhì)量對(duì)平臺(tái)定價(jià)及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略的影響研究比較匱乏,因此本文在引入用戶質(zhì)量維度的基礎(chǔ)上擴(kuò)展了雙邊市場(chǎng)理論對(duì)平臺(tái)企業(yè)的定價(jià)及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問題的研究。本文首先分析了我國平臺(tái)企業(yè)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,指出平臺(tái)企業(yè)在運(yùn)營及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)過程中面臨的問題,并明確了用戶質(zhì)量對(duì)于平臺(tái)企業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展的重要性。其次,詳細(xì)介紹了雙邊市場(chǎng)理論以及交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性理論,并針對(duì)各因素對(duì)平臺(tái)定價(jià)水平及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略的影響進(jìn)行相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)綜述。然后,引入用戶質(zhì)量維度,探討了用戶質(zhì)量對(duì)于單一平臺(tái)定價(jià)策略的影響,研究了用戶質(zhì)量對(duì)雙平臺(tái)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略的影響,進(jìn)一步比較分析了異質(zhì)用戶歸屬性行為對(duì)雙平臺(tái)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略問題的影響。最后,對(duì)本文的研究成果進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并給予了相關(guān)的政策建議,指出了本研究中的不足之處,展望了雙邊市場(chǎng)平臺(tái)企業(yè)未來的研究方向。本文研究表明:(1)平臺(tái)對(duì)一方用戶的要價(jià)與本方及另一方不同質(zhì)量用戶所產(chǎn)生的網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性之間相關(guān)關(guān)系的強(qiáng)弱取決于高質(zhì)量用戶的占比。(2)若任一方高質(zhì)量用戶占比降低,平臺(tái)應(yīng)提高對(duì)該方的定價(jià)水平同時(shí)降低對(duì)另一方的定價(jià)水平,反之則反;提價(jià)與降價(jià)的幅度取決于質(zhì)量水平變化一方與對(duì)方平均交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度的比值。(3)在考慮一方用戶質(zhì)量無差異,而另一方用戶質(zhì)量有高有低時(shí),均衡條件下,平臺(tái)對(duì)異質(zhì)用戶方的要價(jià)與平臺(tái)上本方高質(zhì)量用戶比重負(fù)相關(guān),并且高質(zhì)量的異質(zhì)用戶方占比并不必然影響平臺(tái)對(duì)同質(zhì)用戶方的要價(jià)。(4)雙邊市場(chǎng)平臺(tái)用戶歸屬行為不受限制時(shí),在均衡狀態(tài)時(shí),一般情況下,兩邊用戶均單平臺(tái)接入時(shí),平臺(tái)的收益最高;一邊單平臺(tái)接入一邊多平臺(tái)接入時(shí),平臺(tái)的收益次高;兩邊用戶均多平臺(tái)接入時(shí),平臺(tái)所獲得收益最低。對(duì)于兩邊均多歸屬的情況,高質(zhì)量用戶占比的提高對(duì)于平臺(tái)收益的增加顯得尤為重要,并且當(dāng)平臺(tái)僅聚集其中一方高質(zhì)量用戶時(shí),更有利于平臺(tái)利潤的提升。根據(jù)本文的研究結(jié)果,提出了平臺(tái)應(yīng)重視用戶質(zhì)量、關(guān)注平臺(tái)企業(yè)的排他性行為、提高平臺(tái)差異化等相關(guān)政策建議,為平臺(tái)的發(fā)展提供一定的管理啟示。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet information technology, the economic trend of the enterprise platform has a trend which cannot be halted from portal (Google, YAHOO, Baidu, Tencent, etc.), shopping platform (Taobao, Jingdong), travel platform (Ctrip, eLong) to the third party payment platform (Alipay, WeChat to pay, PayPal etc. video website (Iqiyi), and. The competition among platform enterprises is becoming increasingly fierce. How to survive and build competitive advantage in the fierce market competition environment is a big problem facing the platform. Among them, the key to the success of the platform has always been paid attention to by the academia and the industry, and how to "detonate" quickly in a short time. The size of the user is the operating target of the platform manager. However, the growth of the one-sided pursuit of the platform user size is very easy to make the platform users good and bad, and the quality of the users is a problem. The quality level of the user is related to the platform reputation, which is another important indicator to determine the success or failure of the platform. The research on the impact of competition strategy is scarce, so on the basis of introducing the user quality dimension, this paper extends the research on the pricing and competition of the platform enterprises by the bilateral market theory. This paper first analyzes the development status of the platform enterprises in China, points out the problems faced by the platform enterprises in the process of operation and competition, and makes clear the use of them. The importance of the quality of the household to the sustainable development of the platform enterprise. Secondly, it introduces the bilateral market theory and the cross network externality theory in detail, and makes a literature review on the influence of each factor on the platform pricing level and the competition strategy. Then, the user quality dimension is introduced to discuss the pricing of the user's quality to a single platform. The influence of the strategy is studied. The influence of user quality on the dual platform competition strategy is studied, and the influence of the heterogeneous user attribution on the dual platform competition strategy is further compared and analyzed. Finally, the research results of this paper are summarized, and the relevant policy suggestions are given, and the shortcomings in this study are pointed out, and the bilateral cities are prospected. The future research direction of the field platform enterprise. This paper shows that: (1) the relationship between the price of the platform for one party user and the network externality produced by the different quality users of the other party depends on the proportion of the high quality users. (2) the platform should raise the level of the price of the party if the high quality user ratio of any party is reduced. At the same time, the price level of the other party is reduced, and vice versa. The rate of price raising and price reduction depends on the ratio of the quality level to the average cross network externality of the other side. (3) when the quality of one party is not different, while the other party's quality is low, the price of the platform to the heterogeneous user is in equilibrium under equilibrium conditions. The proportion of high quality users on the platform is negatively correlated, and the high quality heterogeneous user occupation ratio does not necessarily affect the price of the platform to the homogeneity user. (4) when the user ownership behavior of the bilateral market platform is not restricted, in the equilibrium state, when both sides are all single platform access, the platform has the highest income; one side of the platform is connected to the platform. When both sides have multiple platform access, the platform gains the lowest income. As for both sides, the improvement of high quality user account is particularly important for the increase of platform revenue, and it is more beneficial to the platform when the platform is only gathering one of the high quality users. According to the results of this paper, it is suggested that the platform should pay attention to the quality of the users, pay attention to the exclusive behavior of the platform enterprises, improve the platform differentiation and other relevant policy suggestions, and provide some management inspiration for the development of the platform.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：江蘇大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F274

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