我國金融企業(yè)高管薪酬對企業(yè)績效影響的實證研究
本文選題:金融企業(yè) + 高管薪酬 ; 參考:《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文
【摘要】:2008年源于美國的金融危機(jī)席卷全球,造成全球范圍內(nèi)金融資產(chǎn)價格下落、金融機(jī)構(gòu)破產(chǎn)、經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退等一系列惡性連鎖反應(yīng)。除美國政府對金融機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管的缺失及金融機(jī)構(gòu)內(nèi)部風(fēng)險防控機(jī)制的薄弱外,金融企業(yè)高管激進(jìn)的薪酬激勵機(jī)制也是造成危機(jī)的重要原因之一。危機(jī)過后各國政府紛紛出臺相關(guān)政策對金融企業(yè)高管薪酬加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管。薪酬激勵尤其是對高管人員的薪酬激勵已成為金融企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理的重要組成部分,大多數(shù)企業(yè)將經(jīng)營績效作為考察薪酬激勵效果的重要參考因素,因此研究金融企業(yè)高管薪酬對企業(yè)績效的影響作用成為企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理研究中十分有意義的研究課題。本文首先對企業(yè)高管薪酬與績效的關(guān)聯(lián)性進(jìn)行文獻(xiàn)研究,并對我國金融企業(yè)高管薪酬現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析。接著文章選取我國45家上市金融企業(yè)2009年至2015年高管薪酬及績效數(shù)據(jù),運(yùn)用多元面板回歸模型對我國金融上市企業(yè)高管薪酬與綜合績效之間的關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系做實證研究。研究表明,我國金融企業(yè)高管薪酬及管理層持股比例與企業(yè)綜合經(jīng)營績效水平間具有顯著的正向相關(guān)關(guān)系,高管人員與普通員工之間的薪酬差距對企業(yè)績效水平存在負(fù)向影響。最后文章根據(jù)理論研究與實證研究結(jié)果對我國金融企業(yè)現(xiàn)有薪酬激勵機(jī)制提出可能的政策建議,以促進(jìn)國內(nèi)金融企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效水平的提升,推動我國金融業(yè)的持續(xù)穩(wěn)健發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The financial crisis that originated in the United States in 2008 swept the world, causing a series of vicious chain effects such as the fall of financial asset prices worldwide, the bankruptcy of financial institutions and the economic recession. In addition to the lack of government supervision over financial institutions and the weakness of internal risk prevention and control mechanism of financial institutions, the radical compensation incentive mechanism of financial enterprise executives is also one of the important reasons for the crisis. After the crisis, governments have introduced policies to strengthen the supervision of executive compensation in financial enterprises. Compensation incentive, especially for senior managers, has become an important part of the internal governance of financial enterprises. Most enterprises take operating performance as an important reference factor to evaluate the effect of compensation incentives. Therefore, the study of the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance has become a very meaningful research topic in the study of corporate governance. In this paper, the relationship between executive compensation and performance is studied, and the current situation of executive compensation in financial enterprises in China is analyzed. Then the paper selects the data of executive compensation and performance of 45 listed financial enterprises in China from 2009 to 2015 and makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive compensation and comprehensive performance of Chinese financial listed enterprises by using multiple panel regression model. The study shows that there is a significant positive correlation between the executive compensation and the proportion of managerial shareholding in financial enterprises and the level of comprehensive management performance. The pay gap between executives and ordinary employees has a negative impact on the performance level of enterprises. Finally, according to the results of theoretical and empirical studies, this paper puts forward some possible policy recommendations on the current salary incentive mechanism of financial enterprises in China, in order to promote the improvement of the performance level of domestic financial enterprises and promote the sustained and steady development of the financial industry in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F272.92;F832.39
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