本文選題：網絡結構 + 產學研合作　； 參考：《山東師范大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著技術進步、知識更新的加快,企業(yè)、學校和研究所面對激烈的競爭,三方為了整合各方資源、提高創(chuàng)新的效率,并且降低承擔的風險,三方結成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟或者加強合作關系,形成聯(lián)合開發(fā)、優(yōu)勢互補、利益共享、風險共擔的產學研合作網絡。這種組織介于市場和一體化組織中間,既避免了市場組織的過于松散,又避免受一體化組織的過于規(guī)范的約束。產學研合作網絡是指高校、科研院所以及企業(yè)之間基于某種社會聯(lián)系,在信任和共享互補資源基礎上,就各自需求進行合作形成的,具備社會網絡特性和基本結構的組織。文章從社會網絡的視角,以山東省產學研聯(lián)合申請專利數(shù)據(jù)為例,將企業(yè)、高校和研究院所抽象為網絡中的節(jié)點。兩個機構之間有聯(lián)合申請專利,則認為兩個機構有邊連接,由這些點和邊構建了山東省產學研合作網絡。對該合作網絡的統(tǒng)計特征,如密度、度分布、平均路徑長度等進行了研究。發(fā)現(xiàn)產學研合作網絡由很多連通子圖構成,合作緊密程度低,連通子圖內部知識擴散快,效率高,且具有無標度的網絡特征;并從網絡中的點故障和邊故障兩個角度對網絡的魯棒性進行了研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)網絡對節(jié)點或邊的隨機故障及按照邊介數(shù)刪除邊有較高的魯棒性,而對按照節(jié)點度優(yōu)先和點介數(shù)優(yōu)先刪除節(jié)點極其脆弱。基于網絡演化博弈的角度,從網絡結構、博弈矩陣及演化規(guī)則的三個要素出發(fā),構建了新的產方和學研方在專利合作網絡中的演化博弈模型。最優(yōu)策略的選擇是通過網絡的平均積極合作概率以及平均收益來測度的,并且從通過改變博弈支付矩陣中知識溢出、懲罰因素和分配系數(shù)等參數(shù)的大小,來仿真研究其對產學研合作網絡合作行為的影響。通過數(shù)值模擬發(fā)現(xiàn)合作行為受到這些參數(shù)變化的影響。發(fā)現(xiàn)懲罰成本大于研究開發(fā)成本時知識溢出效應對合作行為的影響與懲罰成本小于研究開發(fā)成本時的影響有很大差異。結果表明合理的懲罰會有利于積極合作,合適的懲罰能促進度大的節(jié)點與其鄰居節(jié)點合作。通過實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)合適的產方與學研方的合作收益分配比例為一半對一半。由此為了保證產學研合作網絡更好發(fā)揮其作用,我們需要設置一定的條件因素來確保網絡中的大度節(jié)點(即學校和科研院所)積極合作,從而使網絡的每個個體均能受益。
[Abstract]:As technology advances and knowledge updates accelerate, businesses, schools, and research institutes face fierce competition. In order to integrate resources, improve innovation efficiency, and reduce risks,The three parties form a strategic alliance or strengthen the cooperative relationship to form an industry-university-research cooperative network with joint development, complementary advantages, shared benefits and shared risks.This kind of organization is between the market and the integration organization, which not only avoids the market organization too loose, but also avoids being restrained by the integration organization too much.The industry-university-research cooperative network is an organization with the characteristics and basic structure of social network which is formed by cooperation on the basis of trust and sharing of complementary resources based on certain social connections among colleges and universities research institutes and enterprises.From the point of view of social network, this paper abstracts enterprises, universities and research institutes as nodes in the network, taking the joint patent application data of industry, university and research institute in Shandong Province as an example.There is a joint patent application between the two institutions, and the two institutions are considered to have edge links, from which the Shandong Province Industrial, academic and Research Cooperation Network has been established.The statistical characteristics of the cooperative network, such as density, degree distribution and average path length, are studied.It is found that the cooperation network is composed of many connected subgraphs with low degree of cooperation, fast knowledge diffusion, high efficiency and scale-free characteristics.The robustness of the network is studied from the point fault and edge fault. It is found that the network is robust to the random faults of nodes or edges and to deleting edge according to the number of edge mediums.But it is very fragile to delete nodes according to node degree priority and point number priority.Based on the theory of network evolution game, a new evolutionary game model is constructed based on the three elements of network structure, game matrix and evolution rules.The selection of the optimal strategy is measured by the average positive cooperation probability and the average income of the network, and the size of knowledge spillover, penalty factor and distribution coefficient in the game payment matrix is changed.To simulate and study its impact on the cooperative behavior of industry, college and research cooperation network.By numerical simulation, it is found that the cooperative behavior is affected by the variation of these parameters.It is found that the impact of knowledge spillover effect on cooperative behavior when the penalty cost is greater than the research and development cost is significantly different from that on the penalty cost being smaller than that on the research and development cost.The results show that reasonable punishment is beneficial to positive cooperation, and appropriate punishment can promote the cooperation between large nodes and their neighbors.It is found that the proportion of cooperative income between the right producer and the partner is half to half.Therefore, in order to ensure that the industry-university-research cooperative network can play its role better, we need to set up certain conditions to ensure the active cooperation of the large nodes in the network (that is, schools and research institutes), so that each individual of the network can benefit.
【學位授予單位】：山東師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F273.1

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