本文選題：管理者權(quán)力　切入點(diǎn)：會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　出處：《集美大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性存在了將近500多年,其從產(chǎn)生以來就備受矚目,在公司治理機(jī)制和會計(jì)準(zhǔn)則中扮演著十分重要的角色。會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生的原因主要在于契約,契約的本質(zhì)是緩解管理者和股東之間的代理沖突。同時(shí),契約關(guān)系賦予了管理者對企業(yè)進(jìn)行經(jīng)營管理的權(quán)力,但是管理者可能為了自身因素,利用權(quán)力進(jìn)行尋租,操縱會計(jì)信息,對會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性產(chǎn)生不良的影響,所以管理者所持有的權(quán)力是企業(yè)會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的重要影響因素。另一方面,會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性可以保護(hù)股東權(quán)益,減少不確定性,使企業(yè)能夠得到良性的發(fā)展,對企業(yè)價(jià)值有正面的促進(jìn)作用。已有研究表明,會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果基本都是正面的,比如會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性會提升企業(yè)的業(yè)績。然而,企業(yè)的會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性很大程度上會受到代理問題的影響。不可否認(rèn)的是,會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性良好的企業(yè)能提供質(zhì)量較優(yōu)的會計(jì)信息,利于企業(yè)經(jīng)營決策的民主化與科學(xué)化,限制非效率行為,降低企業(yè)進(jìn)行各項(xiàng)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的交易成本,從而提高企業(yè)的價(jià)值。但從另一個(gè)角度來看,在企業(yè)或公司內(nèi)部,管理者所擁有的權(quán)力越大,所能掌握的資源就越多,其機(jī)會主義傾向就愈可能,他們出于私利而進(jìn)行“權(quán)力尋租”,就會計(jì)信息的披露予以干涉,影響會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,可能表現(xiàn)出表面上的會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性以滿足監(jiān)管要求。在這種情況下,權(quán)力越來越大的管理者對于會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是正面影響,是否會起到抑制作用?本文以會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性為切入點(diǎn),探討管理者權(quán)力、會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與企業(yè)價(jià)值三者的關(guān)系,研究遵循“權(quán)力-穩(wěn)健性-企業(yè)”的思路進(jìn)行。寫作的邏輯順序是:首先進(jìn)行規(guī)范分析,明確基本概念與度量方法,回顧與企業(yè)價(jià)值、會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、管理者權(quán)力相關(guān)的研究結(jié)果;其次,站在國內(nèi)制度大環(huán)境的角度,討論三者相互作用的機(jī)理,為實(shí)證研究奠定基礎(chǔ),然后通過實(shí)證分析驗(yàn)證假設(shè),歸納得出以下結(jié)論:(1)企業(yè)的會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性越強(qiáng),企業(yè)價(jià)值越高。實(shí)證結(jié)果得出會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性指標(biāo)與企業(yè)價(jià)值指標(biāo)呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系;(2)管理者權(quán)力抑制會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對企業(yè)價(jià)值的改善作用。研究結(jié)果表明,管理者權(quán)力的擴(kuò)大對會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性促進(jìn)企業(yè)價(jià)值的作用有一定的約束作用,即企業(yè)管理者權(quán)力越大,會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的正面影響受到的約束越多,企業(yè)價(jià)值會隨之降低。最后給出相關(guān)的政策建議,提出本文研究存在的局限性及研究展望。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism, which has existed for nearly 500 years, has attracted much attention since its emergence and plays a very important role in the corporate governance mechanism and accounting standards.The reason of accounting conservatism lies in the contract, the essence of which is to alleviate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders.At the same time, the contract relationship gives managers the power to manage the enterprises, but the managers may make use of their power to seek rent for their own reasons, manipulate accounting information, and have a negative impact on accounting conservatism.Therefore, the authority held by managers is an important factor of accounting conservatism.On the other hand, accounting conservatism can protect shareholders' rights and interests, reduce uncertainty, make enterprises get benign development, and promote the value of enterprises.However, the accounting conservatism of enterprises will be greatly affected by agency problems.It is undeniable that enterprises with good accounting conservatism can provide accounting information of better quality, which is conducive to the democratization and scientization of business decisions, limits inefficient behavior, and reduces the transaction costs of enterprises in various economic activities.In order to improve the value of the enterprise.But from another perspective, the more power managers have within an enterprise or company, the more resources they have, and the more opportunistic tendencies they have, the more likely they are to engage in "power rent-seeking" for their own gain.To interfere with the disclosure of accounting information and affect the quality of accounting information may show the apparent accounting conservatism in order to meet the regulatory requirements.In this case, more and more powerful managers on the accounting conservatism is a positive impact, will it play a restraining role?Taking accounting conservatism as the starting point, this paper discusses the relationship among manager power, accounting conservatism and enterprise value, and follows the train of thought of "power-conservatism-enterprise".The logical order of writing is as follows: first, normative analysis, clear basic concepts and measurement methods, review of research results related to enterprise value, accounting conservatism, managers' power; second, standing in the perspective of domestic institutional environment,This paper discusses the mechanism of the interaction of the three factors and establishes the foundation for the empirical research. Then through empirical analysis to verify the hypothesis, we conclude that the stronger the accounting conservatism of the firm is, the higher the enterprise value is.The empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between accounting conservatism and enterprise value.The results show that the expansion of managerial power has a certain constraint on the role of accounting conservatism in promoting the value of enterprises, that is, the greater the power of managers, the more the positive impact of accounting conservatism is constrained.The value of the enterprise will decrease with it.Finally, some policy suggestions are given, and the limitations and prospects of this study are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：集美大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275

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