本文選題：高管集權(quán)　切入點(diǎn)：內(nèi)控質(zhì)量　出處：《山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：21世紀(jì)初美國發(fā)生一系列財(cái)務(wù)舞弊案件,這促使美國政府強(qiáng)化了內(nèi)部控制信息披露機(jī)制。內(nèi)部控制能實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)內(nèi)部的自我調(diào)節(jié)和自我制約,企業(yè)通過建立完善并能得到有效執(zhí)行的內(nèi)部控制體系,能為利益相關(guān)者提供真實(shí)可靠的財(cái)務(wù)信息。而穩(wěn)健性作為財(cái)務(wù)信息確認(rèn)的必要標(biāo)準(zhǔn),可以有效解決由于數(shù)據(jù)不準(zhǔn)確而產(chǎn)生的代理沖突問題。高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制下,企業(yè)對外報(bào)出真實(shí)可靠的財(cái)務(wù)信息,從而可以提高會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性。借鑒美國的經(jīng)驗(yàn),我國的企業(yè)也應(yīng)如此,況且我國自古以來崇尚權(quán)力,企業(yè)高管的個(gè)人特質(zhì)及擁有的權(quán)力會影響企業(yè)的經(jīng)營決策和內(nèi)部控制執(zhí)行效果。因此,當(dāng)內(nèi)部控制增強(qiáng)企業(yè)會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的時(shí)候,高管集權(quán)會影響這種增強(qiáng)作用。本文搜集滬市和深市2012-2014年主板公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),利用迪博內(nèi)控指數(shù)來判斷內(nèi)控質(zhì)量的高低,通過Basu提出的盈余股票報(bào)酬模型衡量會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性,選擇公司規(guī)模、財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、成長能力作為控制變量,首先探究穩(wěn)健性特征是否為會計(jì)盈余的保障和基礎(chǔ),接著檢驗(yàn)內(nèi)控質(zhì)量對會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的增強(qiáng)作用,最后用董事長與CEO是否兩職合一來定義高管集權(quán),以分析高管集權(quán)對內(nèi)部控制與會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性關(guān)系的影響。經(jīng)過實(shí)證研究,本文發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)在研究樣本中,80.50%的上市公司內(nèi)控指數(shù)較高,然而少數(shù)公司內(nèi)控質(zhì)量處于較低水平。(2)穩(wěn)健性特征是會計(jì)盈余的保障和基礎(chǔ)。(3)高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制增強(qiáng)了會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性表現(xiàn)。(4)高管集權(quán)會削弱內(nèi)部控制對會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的增強(qiáng)作用,而在高管非集權(quán)狀態(tài)下,內(nèi)控質(zhì)量對會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的增強(qiáng)作用能得到有效發(fā)揮。本文系統(tǒng)研究了企業(yè)高管集權(quán)、內(nèi)控質(zhì)量和會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系,在理論價(jià)值上,相比于其他學(xué)者的研究,本文添加高管權(quán)力配置結(jié)構(gòu)變量,為配置公司權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)及制定政策提供參考;在實(shí)踐價(jià)值上,從會計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的角度證實(shí)了規(guī)范內(nèi)部控制信息披露的必要性,有助于真正發(fā)揮公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的監(jiān)督作用,以保證財(cái)務(wù)信息的可靠性。
[Abstract]:At the beginning of the 21st century, a series of financial fraud cases occurred in the United States, which prompted the United States government to strengthen the information disclosure mechanism of internal control, which can realize self-regulation and self-restraint within enterprises. By establishing a perfect internal control system that can be implemented effectively, the enterprise can provide real and reliable financial information for the stakeholders, and soundness is the necessary standard for the recognition of financial information. It can effectively solve the problem of agency conflict caused by inaccurate data. Under high quality internal control, enterprises can report true and reliable financial information to the outside world, thus improving accounting conservatism. Chinese enterprises should do the same. Moreover, our country has advocated power since ancient times. The personal characteristics and power of executives will affect the effect of business decisions and internal control. When the internal control enhances the accounting conservatism of the enterprise, the centralization of executive power will affect the enhancement. This paper collects the financial data of the main board companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for 2012-2014, and uses the Depot internal control index to judge the quality of the internal control. Through the earnings stock reward model proposed by Basu to measure accounting conservatism, select company size, financial risk, growth ability as control variables, first explore whether conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. Then it tests the enhancement effect of internal control quality on accounting conservatism, and finally defines the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism by using the combination of chairman and CEO to analyze the influence of executive centralization on the relationship between internal control and accounting conservatism. In this paper, we find that 80.50% of the listed companies in the study sample have a higher internal control index. However, a few companies' internal control quality is at a lower level) conservatism is the guarantee and basis of accounting earnings. (3) High quality internal control enhances the performance of accounting conservatism. 4) the centralization of executive power will weaken the enhancement effect of internal control on accounting conservatism. Under the condition of executive non-centralization, the enhancement of internal control quality to accounting conservatism can be effectively brought into play. This paper systematically studies the relationship between executive centralization, internal control quality and accounting conservatism. Compared with the research of other scholars, this paper adds the structural variables of executive power allocation to provide a reference for the allocation of corporate power structure and the formulation of policies. It proves the necessity of standardizing the disclosure of internal control information from the angle of the quality of accounting information, which is helpful to give full play to the supervisory role of the internal governance mechanism of the company and to ensure the reliability of the financial information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275

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