本文選題：信用村　切入點(diǎn)：運(yùn)行機(jī)制　出處：《貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：信用村模式是解決農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)借款人資金短缺、降低農(nóng)村信貸市場(chǎng)中由信息不對(duì)稱引起的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一種新型信貸管理模式,與傳統(tǒng)個(gè)人信用貸款相比具有其獨(dú)特的運(yùn)行機(jī)制。實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明,農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)上的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為加劇了農(nóng)村地區(qū)的信貸配給現(xiàn)象,而信用村模式的應(yīng)用對(duì)于減輕借款人道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為、促進(jìn)農(nóng)村地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展具有很大的積極作用。因此,對(duì)該模式在防范農(nóng)村金融市場(chǎng)上的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為進(jìn)行深入研究,對(duì)探討信用村模式運(yùn)行機(jī)理、促進(jìn)信用村的健康發(fā)展具有重要意義。本文采用文獻(xiàn)檢索法、理論研究與實(shí)證調(diào)研相結(jié)合等研究方法,在詳細(xì)整理已有文獻(xiàn)資料的基礎(chǔ)之上,從信用村的運(yùn)行模式、契約關(guān)系、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范機(jī)制等角度入手,運(yùn)用博弈論和信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論知識(shí),從借款人的貸款資金使用行為角度入手研究信用村模式的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范問(wèn)題,并通過(guò)實(shí)踐調(diào)研輔以定量驗(yàn)證。信用村模式中銀行、借款人、村組織這三方主體之間存在的復(fù)雜的信息傳遞關(guān)系和利益沖突是本文進(jìn)行研究的主線。本文通過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合得出以下研究結(jié)論:(1)在傳統(tǒng)信用貸款模式下,存在較嚴(yán)重的借款人道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為。在傳統(tǒng)信用貸款模式下,由于各個(gè)村民之間都是相互獨(dú)立的個(gè)體,該模式下的信息傳遞渠道較為單一,懲罰機(jī)制較為單一且懲罰威懾力較低。這兩方面的因素使得在傳統(tǒng)信用貸款模式下,借款人在獲得銀行貸款后出于自身收益最大化的目的會(huì)以較大的可能性采取道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為。(2)在信用村模式下,能夠有效防范借款人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為。由于信用村模式中更為復(fù)雜和完善的信息傳遞機(jī)制與懲罰機(jī)制,其他村民會(huì)在銀行放貸后對(duì)借款人的資金使用情況進(jìn)行監(jiān)督,并會(huì)采取向銀行上報(bào)其監(jiān)督結(jié)果、進(jìn)行社會(huì)懲罰等措施。同時(shí),借款人在獲得銀行的貸款資金后,會(huì)以更大概率將資金用于安全性更高的低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)用途。因此,信用村模式使得有效防范借款人因資金使用行為引起的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為可能。(3)在信用村模式的推廣中,仍存在很多制約因素。在實(shí)踐中,信用村模式存在著以下主要問(wèn)題:集中用款現(xiàn)象突出,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高度集中;信用村模式運(yùn)行效率受規(guī)模限制明顯;“信用村”的非理性發(fā)展。以上三方面因素使得信用村模式很難發(fā)揮出對(duì)于農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、農(nóng)村誠(chéng)信建設(shè)的促進(jìn)作用。同時(shí),文章根據(jù)研究結(jié)論與信用村模式在實(shí)際發(fā)展中的現(xiàn)狀,提出促進(jìn)農(nóng)村地區(qū)誠(chéng)信建設(shè)、保障信用村規(guī)模的運(yùn)行效率、銀行與政府共同推動(dòng)信用村的理性發(fā)展的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:The credit village model is a new type of credit management mode, which solves the fund shortage of the borrowers in the rural financial market and reduces the moral hazard caused by the information asymmetry in the rural credit market. Compared with the traditional personal credit loan, it has its unique operating mechanism. The practical experience shows that the moral hazard behavior in the rural financial market intensifies the phenomenon of credit rationing in rural areas. The application of the credit village model plays a positive role in reducing the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and promoting the economic development in rural areas. It is of great significance to probe into the operating mechanism of the credit village mode and promote the healthy development of the credit village. This paper adopts the method of literature retrieval, the combination of theoretical research and empirical investigation and so on, on the basis of detailed sorting out the existing literature and materials. Starting with the operation mode of credit village, contract relationship, moral hazard prevention mechanism and so on, using the relevant theory knowledge of game theory and information economics, This paper studies the moral hazard prevention of the credit village model from the perspective of the borrower's use behavior of loan funds, and through practical investigation and research with quantitative verification. The complex information transmission relationship and conflict of interest among the three main bodies of village organization are the main line of this paper. This paper combines the theoretical analysis with the empirical analysis and draws the following conclusions: 1) under the traditional credit loan model, There are serious moral hazard behaviors of borrowers. Under the traditional credit loan model, because the villagers are independent individuals, the information transmission channel is relatively single. The punishment mechanism is single and the penalty deterrent is low. These two factors make the traditional credit loan mode, In order to maximize their income, the borrower will take moral hazard behavior in the credit village mode. Can effectively guard against the moral hazard behavior of the borrower. Because of the more complex and perfect information transmission mechanism and punishment mechanism in the credit village model, other villagers will supervise the use of the borrower's funds after the bank loans. They also take measures such as reporting the results of their supervision to the bank, imposing social penalties, and so on. At the same time, after obtaining the bank's loan funds, the borrower will use the funds with a greater probability of using the funds for safer, low-risk purposes. The credit village model makes it possible to effectively prevent the moral hazard caused by the use of funds by the borrower. (3) there are still many restrictive factors in the promotion of the credit village model. The credit village model has the following main problems: the phenomenon of centralized use of funds is prominent, the risk is highly concentrated; The operation efficiency of the credit village model is obviously limited by the scale; the irrational development of the "credit village". The above three factors make it difficult for the credit village mode to promote the rural economic development and the rural credit construction. According to the conclusion of the research and the present situation of the credit village mode in the actual development, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the credit construction in rural areas, to ensure the operation efficiency of the credit village scale, and to promote the rational development of the credit village jointly by the bank and the government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：貴州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F275

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