本文關(guān)鍵詞： 高管職位特征 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者治理 產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì) 研發(fā)投入　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國企業(yè)對技術(shù)的吸收創(chuàng)新能力相對較弱,企業(yè)的研發(fā)創(chuàng)新問題一直是理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界探討的熱點(diǎn)主題。企業(yè)的研發(fā)投入關(guān)系到企業(yè)的核心競爭力,是我國企業(yè)未來獲得持續(xù)競爭優(yōu)勢的基礎(chǔ)。而整個管理層團(tuán)隊(duì)作為公司研發(fā)投資的核心決策者,其整體的穩(wěn)定和相互協(xié)作構(gòu)成企業(yè)研發(fā)的前提條件,企業(yè)高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的特征對研發(fā)活動決策風(fēng)格有直接影響。落實(shí)到團(tuán)隊(duì)的背景特征上說,其整體任期特征及任期內(nèi)薪酬因素是這類影響因素的典型特征,將直接影響高管團(tuán)隊(duì)的激勵動機(jī),決定其多大程度上支持企業(yè)的研發(fā)活動。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在我國公司治理中扮演了越來越重要的角色。在委托代理關(guān)系的理論框架下,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為股東和作為內(nèi)部經(jīng)營者的管理層在面臨研發(fā)決策時,其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好和時間敏感性是異質(zhì)的。相較于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者,管理層受到任期合同約束較多,更加關(guān)注短期收益,從而引發(fā)管理層和機(jī)構(gòu)股東之間的代理沖突。如何有效激勵管理層,使其按照與機(jī)構(gòu)股東利益一致的方向進(jìn)行研發(fā)投入,成為值得深入研究的問題。進(jìn)一步地,本文探討了當(dāng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能夠發(fā)揮嚴(yán)格監(jiān)督治理作用時對高管層的激勵問題,高管層如果以確定性任期和薪酬作為參照點(diǎn),考慮其研發(fā)失敗的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)期,則更有可能減弱研發(fā)投入,研究此時如何有效激勵管理層加大研發(fā)投入,更具理論和實(shí)踐意義。本文首先對相關(guān)研究概念進(jìn)行定義,通過綜述前人研究,指出了現(xiàn)有研究的局限,經(jīng)過理論分析,構(gòu)建了高管層-機(jī)構(gòu)投資者-企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的理論框架,提出了相關(guān)假設(shè)。在實(shí)證部分,以滬深A(yù)股非金融類上市公司為樣本,利用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)和多元回歸分析、分企業(yè)性質(zhì)進(jìn)一步討論以及穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)等方法,檢驗(yàn)了高管職位特征(任期、薪酬)以及機(jī)構(gòu)投資者治理對企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):高管職位特征對企業(yè)研發(fā)投入有顯著的正向影響,高管任期越長、貨幣薪酬越高,企業(yè)研發(fā)動力越強(qiáng),研發(fā)投入越大;然而在機(jī)構(gòu)投資者有效監(jiān)督環(huán)境下,高管任期越長、短期貨幣薪酬越高時,出于研發(fā)失敗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)致未來職業(yè)聲譽(yù)受損和被替換的考慮,高管會傾向規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn),反而不利于企業(yè)研發(fā)。本文的政策意義在于:董事會和股東應(yīng)當(dāng)將長短任期和薪酬機(jī)制有效結(jié)合,完善對高管層的薪酬激勵保護(hù)機(jī)制,審慎做出因研發(fā)失敗導(dǎo)致業(yè)績下滑時的處罰,解除高管層的"后顧之憂",增強(qiáng)高管加大研發(fā)投入的動力。
[Abstract]:The ability of technology absorption and innovation in Chinese enterprises is relatively weak. The research and development innovation of enterprises has been a hot topic in the theoretical and practical circles. The R & D investment of enterprises is related to the core competitiveness of enterprises. As the core decision maker of R & D investment, the whole management team, whose overall stability and cooperation constitute the premise of enterprise R & D, is the foundation of our country's enterprises to obtain the sustainable competitive advantage in the future. The characteristics of the executive team have a direct impact on the decision-making style of R & D activities. In terms of the background characteristics of the team, the overall tenure characteristics and salary factors are the typical characteristics of such factors. Will directly affect the incentive motivation of the executive team. Institutional investors play a more and more important role in the corporate governance of our country. Under the theoretical framework of principal-agent relationship, institutional investors play a more and more important role in determining the extent to which they support the R & D activities of enterprises. The risk preference and time sensitivity of institutional investors as shareholders and internal managers are heterogeneous when they are faced with R & D decisions. Compared with institutional investors, management is more constrained by tenure contracts. Pay more attention to short-term income, thus causing agency conflict between management and institutional shareholders. How to effectively motivate management, according to the interests of institutional shareholders in accordance with the direction of R & D investment. Further, this paper discusses the incentive of senior management when institutional investors can play a role of strict supervision and governance. If the executives take deterministic tenure and salary as reference point and consider the risk expectation of their R & D failure, it is more likely to weaken R & D investment and study how to effectively motivate management to increase R & D investment at this time. First of all, this paper defines the related research concepts, points out the limitations of the existing research, through a review of previous studies, through theoretical analysis. In the empirical part, we take Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as the sample of non-financial listed companies. Using descriptive statistics and multivariate regression analysis, the paper tests the characteristics of executive positions (tenure) by further discussion of the nature of enterprises and robustness test. The empirical results show that the characteristics of executive positions have a significant positive impact on R & D investment, and the longer the tenure, the higher the monetary compensation. The stronger the enterprise research and development power, the greater the R & D investment; However, in the environment of institutional investors' effective supervision, the longer the tenure of senior executives and the higher the short-term monetary compensation, the higher the risk of failure in R & D will lead to future career reputation damage and replacement considerations, executives will tend to avoid risks. The policy significance of this paper is that the board of directors and shareholders should effectively combine the long and long tenure and compensation mechanism to improve the compensation incentive and protection mechanism for executives. Take care to punish those who fail to do research and development, remove the "worries" of executives, and increase the incentive for executives to invest more in research and development.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.91;F273.1;F275;F271

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