本文選題：真實(shí)盈余管理 + 應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理��； 參考：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在中國(guó)現(xiàn)行制度背景和資本市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下,管理層盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)和盈余管理方式以及投資者情緒已成為社會(huì)各界關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。本文聯(lián)系我國(guó)獨(dú)特的制度背景,采用規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法對(duì)管理層盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)和盈余管理方式以及投資者情緒之間的內(nèi)在關(guān)系進(jìn)行深入的梳理和研究。 本文首先是在對(duì)管理層盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)、盈余管理方式和投資者情緒相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)梳理和分析的基礎(chǔ)上,分別歸納了管理層動(dòng)機(jī)與盈余管理方式研究現(xiàn)狀以及盈余管理方式與投資者情緒研究現(xiàn)狀,并基于契約理論及委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論、期望理論等理論基礎(chǔ),分別分析了管理層動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)盈余管理方式和盈余管理方式對(duì)投資者情緒影響,并通過中介效用檢驗(yàn)驗(yàn)證了管理層盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)投資者情緒的中介效應(yīng),理論分析三者的相互作用機(jī)理,提出實(shí)證研究假設(shè)；然后,在理論分析基礎(chǔ)上以滬深兩市A股上市公司2006-2011年間的9581公司年度為樣本,將管理層動(dòng)機(jī)、盈余管理方式及投資者情緒這三個(gè)指標(biāo)進(jìn)行具體的量化,納入一個(gè)框架進(jìn)行整體研究,分析了管理層動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理及盈余管理方式的影響,以及真實(shí)盈余管理及盈余管理方式對(duì)投資者情緒的影響,實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示,出于扭虧、避虧、再融資以及高管變更的動(dòng)機(jī),上市公司管理層采用了更為隱蔽的真實(shí)盈余管理方式操控報(bào)告盈余,此外,高管薪酬高和高管持股的上市公司不愿意采用真實(shí)盈余管理；然而,由于我國(guó)的資本市場(chǎng)還不夠完善,通過真實(shí)盈余管理活動(dòng)做大利潤(rùn)還不是普遍現(xiàn)象；當(dāng)公司采用真實(shí)盈余管理活動(dòng)做大利潤(rùn)時(shí),投資者表現(xiàn)出樂觀情緒；當(dāng)公司采用更多的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理活動(dòng)時(shí),投資者更容易識(shí)別,因而情緒悲觀。
[Abstract]:In China's current institutional background and capital market environment, earnings management motivation, earnings management mode and investor sentiment have become the focus of attention. Considering the unique institutional background of our country, this paper combines normative research with empirical research to analyze and study the internal relationship among earnings management motivation, earnings management mode and investor sentiment. First of all, this paper reviews and analyzes the motivation of management earnings management, earnings management methods and investor sentiment. The paper summarizes the current situation of management motivation and earnings management, and the current situation of earnings management and investor sentiment, and based on contract theory and principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, signal transmission theory. On the basis of expectation theory, this paper analyzes the influence of management motivation on earnings management mode and earnings management mode on investor sentiment, and verifies the intermediary effect of management earnings management motivation on investor sentiment through intermediary utility test. Theoretical analysis of the interaction mechanism of the three, put forward empirical research hypothesis; then, based on the theoretical analysis of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as a sample of 9581 companies, the management motivation, The three indexes of earnings management mode and investor sentiment are quantified and integrated into a framework to analyze the influence of management motivation on real earnings management and earnings management. As well as the real earnings management and the impact of earnings management on investor sentiment, the empirical results show that, out of the motivation of turning losses, avoiding losses, refinancing and the change of executives, The management of listed companies used more covert real earnings management to manipulate the reported earnings. In addition, listed companies with high executive pay and high executive ownership were unwilling to adopt real earnings management; however, Since the capital market of our country is not perfect enough, it is not a common phenomenon to make large profits through real earnings management activities, and investors show optimism when companies use real earnings management activities to make large profits. When companies adopt more accrual management activities, investors are easier to identify and thus pessimistic.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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