本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股 + 公司治理��； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文首先回顧了公司治理的內(nèi)涵、利益相關(guān)者理論和委托代理理論等機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的理論基礎(chǔ)并總結(jié)歸納了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn),其中特別回顧了在機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對我國上市公司利益輸送行為影響的研究。在理論基礎(chǔ)和文獻(xiàn)回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,本文通過全面分析機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與企業(yè)各利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)系及可能的影響途徑與方法,將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的機(jī)制歸為內(nèi)部和外部兩方面。結(jié)合對上市公司并購流程和相應(yīng)信息披露時(shí)點(diǎn)的分析,本文指出了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對上市公司并購交易可能的介入時(shí)機(jī)、方式和途徑。基于上述分析,提出了有關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對上市公司并購交易的六個(gè)假設(shè)并構(gòu)建了相應(yīng)的邏輯回歸模型和多元線性回歸模型。模型以機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例作為解釋變量,以上市公司并購交易的產(chǎn)生、規(guī)模和績效作為被解釋變量,通過實(shí)證的方法對文章的假設(shè)進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。本文以2009年至2011年我國滬深兩市A股市場發(fā)生的790個(gè)并購事件為樣本,識別了以利益輸送為目的的掏空型并購和支持型并購。通過實(shí)證分析和對結(jié)果的討論之后,得出以下結(jié)論：(1)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股沒有能夠有效遏制上市公司掏空型并購的產(chǎn)生,其主要可能的原因是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在上市公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制中的缺位。(2)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股能夠有效減小上市公司掏空型并購的規(guī)模,說明其在外部治理機(jī)制中的作用影響了上市公司的并購決策。(3)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股能夠有效識掏空型并購并對其市場績效產(chǎn)生負(fù)向影響。(4)證券投資資金和合格境外投資者持股與上市公司掏空型并購的財(cái)務(wù)績效顯著正相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:This paper reviews the connotation of corporate governance, stakeholder theory, principal-agent theory and other institutional investors involved in corporate governance, and summarizes the existing literature on institutional investor participation in corporate governance. In particular, it reviews the impact of institutional investor holding on the interest transmission behavior of listed companies in China. On the basis of theoretical basis and literature review, this paper analyzes the relationship between institutional investors and various stakeholders of the enterprise, as well as the possible ways and methods of influence. The mechanism of institutional investors participating in corporate governance is classified as internal and external. Based on the analysis of the process of M & A of listed companies and the corresponding information disclosure, this paper points out the possible timing, ways and means for institutional investors to intervene in M & A transactions of listed companies. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward six hypotheses about institutional investor holding on M & A transactions of listed companies, and constructs corresponding logical regression model and multivariate linear regression model. The model takes institutional investor's shareholding ratio as the explanatory variable, and takes the emergence, scale and performance of M & A transaction of listed companies as the explanatory variables, and tests the hypothesis of the article by empirical method. Based on 790 M & A events in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2009 to 2011, this paper identifies tunneling M & A and supporting M & A. After empirical analysis and discussion of the results, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Institutional investors' shareholding can not effectively curb the emergence of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. The main possible reason is the absence of institutional investors in the internal governance mechanism of listed companies. (2) Institutional investors holding shares can effectively reduce the scale of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. It shows that its role in the external governance mechanism affects the M & A decision of listed companies. (3) Institutional investor holding can effectively identify tunneling M & A and have a negative impact on its market performance. (4) Securities investment funds and qualified overseas investment. There is a significant positive correlation between shareholder shareholding and financial performance of tunneling mergers and acquisitions of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F271

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 唐洋;郭靜潔;田玉蘭;;盈余管理與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股的實(shí)證研究[J];天津商業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2011年01期

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本文編號：2100996