本文選題：農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款 + 集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)��； 參考：《武漢理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)，聯(lián)保貸款憑借其獨(dú)特的制度優(yōu)勢(shì)迅速發(fā)展成為我國(guó)第二大農(nóng)戶貸款模式，在緩解農(nóng)戶融資困境、解決“三農(nóng)”問(wèn)題上發(fā)揮了重要作用。然而，當(dāng)聯(lián)保農(nóng)戶選擇集體違約時(shí)，該貸款模式不僅未能夠發(fā)揮其社會(huì)擔(dān)保的制度優(yōu)勢(shì)，，反而會(huì)給放貸機(jī)構(gòu)造成更大損失。因此，有必要加強(qiáng)對(duì)聯(lián)保農(nóng)戶集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理與控制，以使農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款模式有效發(fā)揮其支農(nóng)惠農(nóng)的扶貧效應(yīng)。 本文以農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為研究對(duì)象，綜合運(yùn)用博弈論、概率論、實(shí)證案例以及新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)分析方法，對(duì)其生成與防控機(jī)制展開(kāi)深入研究，并基于分析結(jié)論提出改進(jìn)與創(chuàng)新該貸款模式的制度安排。論文主要內(nèi)容如下： 本文在介紹農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款模式概況的基礎(chǔ)上，首先借助相關(guān)案例對(duì)農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的表現(xiàn)形式與成因進(jìn)行了梳理與總結(jié)，接著通過(guò)構(gòu)建聯(lián)保小組內(nèi)部成員之間、以及聯(lián)保小組與放貸機(jī)構(gòu)之間的博弈模型，借助概率論等相關(guān)數(shù)理工具探析了不同情形下農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的生成機(jī)制；然后，本文擬通過(guò)引入抵押品對(duì)農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款模式進(jìn)行改進(jìn)，并對(duì)其現(xiàn)實(shí)可行性以及對(duì)集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的防控機(jī)制展開(kāi)了分析；最后，論文基于前文分析結(jié)論，從多個(gè)角度探討了農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的有效防控措施。 本文通過(guò)分析指出，農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)主要有組員跟風(fēng)拖欠、組員合謀以及經(jīng)營(yíng)環(huán)境惡化三種表現(xiàn)形式，由借款農(nóng)戶法律與誠(chéng)信意識(shí)薄弱、放貸機(jī)構(gòu)信貸管理執(zhí)行不力以及同地域農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)單一等原因造成。從博弈角度來(lái)看，聯(lián)保農(nóng)戶集體違約現(xiàn)象發(fā)生與否，主要取決于信貸市場(chǎng)完全程度、未來(lái)再貸款價(jià)值以及社會(huì)約束大小。另外，隨著近年來(lái)我國(guó)農(nóng)村居民抵押擔(dān)保能力的不斷提升，農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保抵押創(chuàng)新貸款模式具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)可行性，并且可借助物質(zhì)擔(dān)保手段有效解決聯(lián)保組員集體違約下的社會(huì)擔(dān)保失效問(wèn)題。最后，為有效防控農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，論文針對(duì)農(nóng)村金融機(jī)構(gòu)和相關(guān)政府部門(mén)不同的參與程度與角色扮演，分別對(duì)二者提出一系列可操作性建議以及政策安排。 從理論意義來(lái)講，本文將借助博弈與數(shù)理工具從多個(gè)角度對(duì)聯(lián)保農(nóng)戶集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的生成與防控機(jī)制展開(kāi)分析，這是對(duì)當(dāng)前關(guān)于農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款模式研究領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)重要補(bǔ)充；而從現(xiàn)實(shí)意義來(lái)看，論文將根據(jù)集體違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)生成與防控機(jī)制的分析結(jié)果提出相關(guān)政策建議，可對(duì)農(nóng)村金融機(jī)構(gòu)今后順利開(kāi)展農(nóng)戶聯(lián)保貸款業(yè)務(wù)提供一定借鑒。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with its unique institutional advantages, the UNPROFOR loan has developed rapidly into the second largest peasant household loan mode in China, which has played an important role in alleviating the farmers' financing difficulties and solving the "three rural" problems. However, when UNPROFOR farmers choose to default collectively, the loan model will not only fail to give play to the institutional advantages of social guarantees, but will cause more losses to lenders. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the management and control of the risk of collective default of the rural households in order to make the mode of rural households' UNPROFOR loan give full play to the effect of helping agriculture and benefiting farmers effectively. This paper takes the collective default risk of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan as the research object, synthetically uses the game theory, the probability theory, the empirical case and the new institutional economics and so on correlation analysis method, carries on the thorough research to its generation and the prevention and control mechanism. Based on the conclusion of the analysis, the paper puts forward the institutional arrangements for improving and innovating the loan model. The main contents of this paper are as follows: on the basis of introducing the general situation of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan mode, this paper firstly combs and summarizes the manifestation and cause of collective default risk of peasant household's UNPROFOR loan with the help of relevant cases. Then, by constructing the game model between the members of the group and between the group and the lending institution, and with the help of the probability theory and other relevant mathematical tools, this paper analyzes the generation mechanism of collective default risk of the farmers' UNPROFOR loan under different circumstances. This paper intends to improve the model of farmers' UNPROFOR loan by introducing collateral, and analyzes its practical feasibility and prevention and control mechanism of collective default risk. Finally, the paper is based on the conclusions of the above analysis. This paper discusses the effective prevention and control measures of collective default risk of farmers'UNPROFOR loan from several angles. Through analysis, this paper points out that the collective default risk of peasant households' UNPROFOR loan mainly includes three forms: group members' default, collusion of the members and deterioration of the operating environment, and the sense of law and good faith of the borrowing farmers is weak. The credit management of lending institutions is weak and the structure of agricultural industry in the same region is single. From the point of view of game theory, whether the collective default occurs or not mainly depends on the complete degree of the credit market, the value of the future reloan and the size of the social constraints. In addition, with the continuous improvement of the mortgage guarantee ability of rural residents in China in recent years, the innovative loan mode of rural household protection mortgage has certain practical feasibility. And it can effectively solve the problem of social guarantee invalidation under collective breach of contract by means of material guarantee. Finally, in order to effectively prevent and control the collective default risk of farmers' UNPROFOR loans, the paper puts forward a series of operational suggestions and policy arrangements for rural financial institutions and related government departments. From the theoretical point of view, this paper will use game and mathematical tools to analyze the generation and prevention and control mechanism of the collective default risk of UNPROFOR farmers from many angles, which is an important supplement to the field of research on the mode of peasant households' UNPROFOR loan at present; According to the analysis results of collective default risk generation and prevention and control mechanism, the paper will put forward relevant policy recommendations, which can be used as a reference for rural financial institutions to carry out rural household UNPROFOR loan business smoothly in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.43;F224.32

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