本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 機(jī)會(huì)主義行為��； 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：很多國(guó)內(nèi)外的理論與實(shí)證研究都表明，股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于改善委托-代理問(wèn)題、提升公司業(yè)績(jī)有著顯著的正效應(yīng)。但也有很多學(xué)者指出股權(quán)激勵(lì)容易誘發(fā)管理層的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為，去追求個(gè)人利益的最大化而非公司價(jià)值最大化，，其中就包括盈余管理和時(shí)機(jī)選擇。在監(jiān)管機(jī)制相對(duì)完善的西方成熟市場(chǎng)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過(guò)程中尚會(huì)出現(xiàn)各種各樣的管理層機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。在現(xiàn)階段將該種機(jī)制引入我國(guó)，其有效性引起了眾多學(xué)者的質(zhì)疑。 本文選取了2008年1月1日至2012年12月31日首次進(jìn)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)草案公告的245家A股上市公司作為研究對(duì)象，旨在通過(guò)事件研究法來(lái)檢驗(yàn)管理層是否會(huì)利用自身的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)、尤其是對(duì)于盈余數(shù)據(jù)的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)來(lái)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)草案的公告日進(jìn)行時(shí)機(jī)選擇。 實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：即使不考慮股權(quán)激勵(lì)本身帶來(lái)的短期效應(yīng)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)草案公告日也更可能出現(xiàn)在股價(jià)低點(diǎn)，說(shuō)明管理層更傾向于在好消息之前、壞消息之后推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃；進(jìn)一步的研究則表明管理層的確利用了自身對(duì)于公司盈余數(shù)據(jù)的信息優(yōu)勢(shì)來(lái)對(duì)草案公告日進(jìn)行時(shí)機(jī)選擇，結(jié)果在1%的水平上顯著。 本文認(rèn)為，原本是為了激勵(lì)管理層努力提高公司績(jī)效的股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度，會(huì)在不完善的監(jiān)管制度下演變?yōu)楣芾韺訉ぷ獾墓ぞ�，因此現(xiàn)如今上市公司大規(guī)模地使用這一工具，其動(dòng)機(jī)與有效性存疑。
[Abstract]:Many theoretical and empirical studies at home and abroad show that equity incentive has a significant positive effect on improving the principal-agent problem and corporate performance. However, many scholars have pointed out that equity incentive is apt to induce opportunistic behavior of management and pursue the maximization of personal benefits rather than the maximization of corporate value, including earnings management and timing. In the mature western market where the regulatory mechanism is relatively perfect, there will still be a variety of managerial opportunism in the implementation of equity incentives. At present, the mechanism is introduced into China, and its validity has been questioned by many scholars. From January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012, 245 A-share listed companies are selected as the research objects. The purpose of this study is to test whether the management will take advantage of their own information advantages through event research. Especially for the information advantage of earnings data to choose the timing of the announcement date of stock incentive draft. The empirical results show that even if the short-term effect of equity incentive itself is not taken into account, the announcement date of stock incentive draft is more likely to appear at the low price of stock price, indicating that management is more inclined to launch equity incentive plan before good news and after bad news; Further studies show that the management does use its own information advantage for earnings data to choose the timing of the draft announcement date, and the results are significant at the level of 1%. This paper argues that the equity incentive system, which was originally designed to motivate management to improve corporate performance, will evolve into a management rent-seeking tool under an imperfect regulatory system, so now listed companies use this tool on a large scale. Its motive and validity are doubtful.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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本文編號(hào)：1980846