本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)　； 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)管理制度中,由于企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離,從而形成委托代理關(guān)系。根據(jù)委托代理理論和信息不對(duì)稱理論,管理者和所有者之間會(huì)產(chǎn)生利益沖突。所有者擁有對(duì)企業(yè)的控制權(quán)和利潤的剩余索取權(quán),而管理者擁有投資決策權(quán)。管理者在投資決策過程中,為了增加個(gè)人收益、加強(qiáng)對(duì)企業(yè)資本的控制,可能會(huì)選擇凈現(xiàn)值為負(fù)的投資項(xiàng)目,從而導(dǎo)致過度投資問題;也可能為了降低私人成本、回避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而放棄凈現(xiàn)值為正的投資項(xiàng)目而導(dǎo)致投資不足。這兩種非正常投資問題都屬于非效率投資行為。學(xué)者普遍認(rèn)為可以通過將管理者與所有者之間的利益一致化,來解決所有者和管理者之間的委托代理矛盾,抑制非效率投資行為。具體來說,我們首先需要了解高管人員的工作態(tài)度、工作能力等,進(jìn)而制定有效的激勵(lì)措施來影響高管人員的投資行為,從而提高他們的投資效率。近期國外學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)抑制非效率投資行為的研究,主要集中在高管激勵(lì)對(duì)非效率投資的影響上,比如利用貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)或者股權(quán)激勵(lì)等單一激勵(lì)模式對(duì)非效率投資的影響,缺乏綜合性研究。與國外相比,我國高管薪酬在1998年才開始披露,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度也是在2006年才正式開始實(shí)施,因而我國對(duì)非效率投資的研究起步晚,理論體系尚不成熟。此外,有關(guān)高管激勵(lì)模式對(duì)非效率投資的影響程度的比較研究甚少。為此,本文以我國上市公司作為研究對(duì)象,通過實(shí)證分析法考察我國企業(yè)實(shí)施的高管激勵(lì)制度對(duì)非效率投資的影響,并比較貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)和股權(quán)激勵(lì)這兩種激勵(lì)模式對(duì)非效率投資的影響程度,進(jìn)而得出本文的研究結(jié)論。本文沿著“文獻(xiàn)綜述——理論分析——實(shí)證分析——提出建議”的路線進(jìn)行相關(guān)研究。首先對(duì)國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理;接著運(yùn)用規(guī)范分析方法具體闡釋委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)理論、不完全契約理論、激勵(lì)理論等相關(guān)理論;然后在我國的高管激勵(lì)制度背景下,根據(jù)以往的研究和理論基礎(chǔ)提出研究假設(shè)并建立模型;再通過樣本篩選(以2012年至2015年的滬深A(yù)股上市公司的4048個(gè)有效觀測值為研究樣本)運(yùn)用SPSS統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件進(jìn)行多元線性回歸,獲得實(shí)證結(jié)果。最后,根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析得出研究結(jié)論。研究結(jié)果顯示高管貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)和股權(quán)激勵(lì)都可以抑制非效率投資行為的產(chǎn)生,但通過比較二者對(duì)非效率投資的影響程度發(fā)現(xiàn),我國的上市公司中采用貨幣薪酬激勵(lì)要比采用股權(quán)激勵(lì)的作用更大。最后針對(duì)我國上市公司目前存在的問題,從激勵(lì)機(jī)制的完善以及監(jiān)督政策的構(gòu)建等方面提出相應(yīng)的政策性建議。
[Abstract]:In modern enterprise management system, due to the separation of ownership and management right, principal-agent relationship is formed. According to principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, conflicts of interest will occur between managers and owners. The owner has the residual claim on the control and profit of the enterprise, while the manager has the right of investment decision. In the process of making investment decisions, managers may choose investment projects with negative net present value in order to increase personal income and control the capital of enterprises, which may lead to overinvestment problems, or to reduce private costs. Risk avoidance and abandonment of positive NPV investments lead to underinvestment. These two kinds of abnormal investment problem belong to the non-efficient investment behavior. Scholars generally think that we can solve the principal-agent contradiction between the owner and the manager by unifying the interests between the manager and the owner, and restrain the inefficient investment behavior. Specifically, we first need to understand the work attitude, work ability and so on, and then formulate effective incentives to affect the investment behavior of senior managers, thereby improving their investment efficiency. Recent studies on restraining inefficient investment behavior in foreign academic circles mainly focus on the influence of executive incentive on inefficient investment, such as the impact of single incentive mode such as monetary compensation incentive or equity incentive on inefficient investment. Lack of comprehensive research. Compared with foreign countries, the executive compensation in our country only began to disclose in 1998, and the equity incentive system began to be implemented in 2006. Therefore, the research on inefficient investment in our country started late, and the theoretical system is not yet mature. In addition, there are few comparative studies on the impact of executive incentive model on inefficient investment. Therefore, this paper takes the listed companies of our country as the research object, through the empirical analysis to investigate the influence of the executive incentive system on the inefficient investment. The paper also compares the influence of monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive on inefficient investment, and draws the conclusion of this paper. This paper follows the route of literature review-theoretical analysis-empirical analysis-making recommendations. At first, it combs the relevant literature at home and abroad, then explains the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, risk-bearing theory, incomplete contract theory, incentive theory and other related theories by normative analysis method. Then under the background of the executive incentive system in our country, according to the previous research and theoretical basis, put forward the research hypothesis and establish the model; Through sample screening (from 2012 to 2015, 4048 effective observations of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research samples), the SPSS statistical software is used to carry out multivariate linear regression, and the empirical results are obtained. Finally, according to the empirical results of the analysis of the conclusions of the study. The results show that both monetary incentive and equity incentive can inhibit the emergence of inefficient investment behavior. Monetary compensation incentive is more important than equity incentive in Chinese listed companies. Finally, in view of the existing problems of listed companies in our country, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions from the aspects of the improvement of incentive mechanism and the construction of supervision policy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

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