本文選題：終極控制人 + 信息披露質(zhì)量��； 參考：《華東師范大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在證券市場中,投資者買賣股票主要依據(jù)是上市公司披露的信息,信息披露是連接投資者與上市公司溝通的重要橋梁之一,可以說,證券市場從本質(zhì)上來說是一個信息市場,要實現(xiàn)證券市場資源的有效配置,可靠充分準確及時的信息披露是其重要保障。 影響信息披露質(zhì)量的因素有多種多樣,包括公司特征、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理及審計意見等,本文選取股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)為研究視角。不同于股權(quán)較分散的美國、日本及英國上市公司,中國上市公司股權(quán)較集中。當股權(quán)分散時,代理問題主要集中于委托人和代理人之間,而當股權(quán)集中時,代理問題主要集中于處于控制鏈頂端的終極控制人和中小股東之間。因此本文關(guān)注終極控制人與中小股東的代理沖突,主要研究終極控制人對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響。 論文主要從以下方面展開： 首先,對終極控制人與信息披露質(zhì)量的相關(guān)國內(nèi)外前人所做的研究進行回顧與分析,通過文獻回顧,了解研究的歷史、發(fā)展與現(xiàn)狀,以期能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)有研究中存在的問題并為本文的研究找到方向。 其次,對終極控制人與信息披露質(zhì)量的概念進行界定。對終極控制人的概念界定,沿用拉波特等人的方法,從上市公司控制鏈條出發(fā),通過層層向上追溯,直至控制鏈條的最頂層,即上市公司最終控制人。以信息披露的及時性、準確性、真實性和完整性作為信息披露質(zhì)量的定性標準,并在回顧國內(nèi)外學者對信息披露質(zhì)量采用的多種定量衡量標準下,提出本文選取深交所信息披露考評結(jié)果作為信息披露質(zhì)量的定量衡量標準。并對與終極控制人和信息披露質(zhì)量相關(guān)的理論基礎(chǔ)進行回顧分析。 再次,在前文的基礎(chǔ)上,選擇在深圳證券交易所主板上市的上市公司,實證檢驗終極控制人特征對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響。對終極控制人超額控制的實證研究結(jié)果表明：超額控制的絕對程度、相對程度與信息披露質(zhì)量負相關(guān)但并不顯著；當存在超額控制時,其與信息披露質(zhì)量顯著負相關(guān)。對終極控制人控制層級的實證研究結(jié)果表明：當上市公司處于金字塔越底層,信息披露質(zhì)量越差。對終極控制人屬性的實證研究結(jié)果表明：相比終極控制人為國有的上市公司,民營上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量較差。對終極控制人管理權(quán)力的實證研究結(jié)果表明：終極控制人管理權(quán)力與信息披露質(zhì)量顯著負相關(guān)。 最后,對本文研究結(jié)果進行闡述,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提供若干條建議。同時結(jié)合本文研究局限性的考慮,給出進一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:In the stock market, investors buy and sell stocks mainly based on the information disclosed by listed companies. Information disclosure is one of the important bridges between investors and listed companies. It can be said that the securities market is essentially an information market. To realize the effective allocation of securities market resources, reliable, full, accurate and timely information disclosure is an important guarantee. There are a variety of factors affecting the quality of information disclosure, including corporate characteristics, equity structure, corporate governance and audit opinions. Unlike American, Japanese and British listed companies, Chinese listed companies are more concentrated. When the equity is dispersed, the agency problem is mainly between the principal and the agent, while when the equity is concentrated, the agency problem is mainly between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders at the top of the chain of control. Therefore, this paper focuses on the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and the minority shareholders, and mainly studies the impact of the ultimate controller on the quality of information disclosure. The thesis mainly starts from the following aspects: First of all, we review and analyze the research done by related domestic and foreign predecessors of the ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure, through literature review, we can understand the history, development and current situation of the research. In order to find out the existing problems in the existing research and find a direction for the study of this paper. Secondly, the concept of ultimate controller and information disclosure quality is defined. The concept of ultimate controller is defined by using the method of Laporte and so on, starting from the control chain of listed company, tracing back to the top of the control chain, that is, the ultimate controller of listed company. Taking the timeliness, accuracy, authenticity and completeness of information disclosure as the qualitative standard for the quality of information disclosure, and reviewing the various quantitative standards used by scholars at home and abroad to measure the quality of information disclosure, In this paper, the information disclosure evaluation results of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are selected as the quantitative measure of information disclosure quality. The theoretical basis related to the ultimate controller and the quality of information disclosure is reviewed and analyzed. Thirdly, on the basis of the above, the listed companies listed on the main board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are selected to empirically test the effect of the ultimate controller characteristics on the quality of information disclosure. The results of the empirical study on the ultimate controller's excess control show that the absolute degree and relative degree of excess control are negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure but not significant, and when there is excess control, it is negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure. The empirical results of the ultimate controller control level show that when listed companies are at the bottom of the pyramid, the quality of information disclosure is worse. The empirical research on the attribute of ultimate controller shows that the quality of information disclosure of private listed companies is worse than that of listed companies with ultimate control. The empirical results of the management power of the ultimate controller show that the management power of the ultimate controller is negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure. Finally, the research results of this paper are described, and some suggestions are provided on this basis. At the same time, considering the limitations of this study, the direction of further research is given.
【學位授予單位】：華東師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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本文編號：1975898