本文選題：對沖基金 + 經(jīng)理人收益��； 參考：《寧波大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著世界經(jīng)濟的蓬勃發(fā)展，各種金融衍生工具應(yīng)運而生，對沖基金也受到了越來越多投資者的青睞。據(jù)統(tǒng)計，截止于2011年底，，全球?qū)_基金管理資產(chǎn)總規(guī)模約2.12萬億美元，是2002年對沖基金規(guī)模的4倍，對沖基金市場欣欣向榮。廣大投資者關(guān)注對沖基金的同時也有許多人開始關(guān)注對沖基金經(jīng)理人的收益問題，開始考慮如何使得經(jīng)理人報酬最大化以及采取何種激勵方式能讓沖基金經(jīng)理人能竭盡全力經(jīng)營對沖基金，防止對沖基金經(jīng)理人的投機行為。當(dāng)前我國金融環(huán)境已日趨成熟，具備發(fā)展對沖基金的有利條件，因此研究對沖基金經(jīng)理人的收益問題以及激勵機制十分必要。 本文首先對對沖基金的發(fā)展?fàn)顩r、面臨問題以及國內(nèi)外學(xué)者針對對沖基金經(jīng)理人收益和激勵問題的研究情況進行綜述。接著對對沖基金的定義、分類、發(fā)展以及當(dāng)前經(jīng)理人的激勵機制進行介紹，并且分別在不同的激勵機制下建立數(shù)學(xué)模型，得到對沖基金經(jīng)理人報酬的最大值，得出為避免對沖基金經(jīng)理人的投機行為需采用兩種機制相結(jié)合的激勵機制。最后總結(jié)美國日本兩國對沖基金發(fā)展的國際經(jīng)驗，歸納出我國對沖基金發(fā)展制約因素以及當(dāng)前對沖基金經(jīng)理人的激勵機制和存在問題，對我國對沖基金發(fā)展提出可行性分析，并提出經(jīng)理人激勵方式的建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the world economy, various financial derivatives emerge as the times require, and hedge funds are favored by more and more investors. Global hedge funds had about $2.12 trillion in assets under management at the end of 2011, four times the size of hedge funds in 2002, and the hedge fund market was booming, according to statistics. While the majority of investors are concerned about hedge funds, many people are beginning to pay attention to the return of hedge fund managers. Start thinking about how to maximise managers' compensation and how incentives will enable hedge fund managers to do their best to prevent hedge fund managers from speculating. At present, the financial environment of our country has matured day by day and has the favorable condition to develop the hedge fund, so it is necessary to study the income of the hedge fund manager and the incentive mechanism. Firstly, this paper summarizes the development of hedge funds, the problems they face and the research of hedge fund managers' returns and incentives at home and abroad. Then the definition, classification, development and current incentive mechanism of hedge funds are introduced, and mathematical models are established under different incentive mechanisms to obtain the maximum compensation of hedge fund managers. In order to avoid the speculative behavior of hedge fund managers, the incentive mechanism combined with two mechanisms should be adopted. Finally, this paper summarizes the international experiences of the development of hedge funds in the United States and Japan, and concludes the restrictive factors of the development of hedge funds in China, as well as the incentive mechanism and existing problems of the current hedge fund managers, and puts forward a feasibility analysis on the development of hedge funds in China. And puts forward the manager incentive way suggestion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1956752