本文選題：海外經(jīng)歷 + 內(nèi)部控制��； 參考：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股市的穩(wěn)定與良好運(yùn)行是保證國家經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、保護(hù)投資者利益的必要條件,然而長期以來,股價(jià)暴跌、股市動(dòng)蕩不穩(wěn)的情況時(shí)有發(fā)生,我國股市自2008年至今也一直處于持續(xù)起伏階段,個(gè)股的股價(jià)崩盤事件不斷發(fā)生。因此,研究股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響因素,建立預(yù)防股價(jià)暴跌機(jī)制是目前亟需解決的重要難題。目前,有關(guān)股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響因素的研究大多集中在股票收益率、股票流動(dòng)性、會計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、分析師偏差、審計(jì)師專長、公司信息透明度等角度。根據(jù)股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的形成機(jī)理,管理層機(jī)會主義傾向于隱藏公司的“壞消息”,當(dāng)“壞消息”積累過多便會同時(shí)曝出,導(dǎo)致股價(jià)迅速下跌以致崩盤。從已有研究可知,公司內(nèi)部控制可以有效降低管理層機(jī)會主義的動(dòng)機(jī)和機(jī)會,因此論文從公司內(nèi)部控制的角度研究內(nèi)部控制有效性對股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,并加入CEO海外經(jīng)歷與產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)調(diào)節(jié)變量,分別研究二者對內(nèi)部控制與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間關(guān)系的影響。論文在回顧與高管背景特征、內(nèi)部控制、股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合委托代理理論、高階管理理論與信息不對稱理論,對公司內(nèi)部控制與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的關(guān)系、CEO海外經(jīng)歷和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)分別對內(nèi)部控制與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間關(guān)系的影響進(jìn)行了理論分析,并提出相應(yīng)假設(shè)。之后根據(jù)提出的假設(shè)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,得出以下結(jié)論:(1)公司內(nèi)部控制越高,股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就會越低,即公司良好的內(nèi)部控制可以有效抑制股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn);(2)CEO有海外經(jīng)歷的公司,內(nèi)部控制對股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的抑制作用減弱,這一結(jié)論在全樣本組、國有上市公司樣本組和非國有上市公司樣本組中都成立;(3)與國有上市公司相比,非國有上市公司中內(nèi)部控制對股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的抑制作用更強(qiáng),這一結(jié)論在全樣本組、CEO有海外經(jīng)歷的樣本組和CEO無海外經(jīng)歷的樣本組中都成立。最后,使用內(nèi)部控制的替代變量和增加新的控制變量進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn),得出結(jié)果與實(shí)證分析結(jié)果一致。論文從高管背景特征與公司內(nèi)部控制兩個(gè)角度研究了二者對股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,豐富了高階管理理論與信息不對稱理論的內(nèi)容,同時(shí)在一定程度上拓寬了股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響因素的范圍,為平穩(wěn)股市、控制股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的措施提供了新的方向。
[Abstract]:The stability and good operation of the stock market is a necessary condition for ensuring the country's economic development and protecting the interests of investors. However, for a long time, stock prices have plummeted and the stock market has been volatile and unstable. China's stock market has been in a continuous ups and downs since 2008, the stock price crash has occurred. Therefore, it is an important problem to study the risk factors of stock price collapse and to establish a mechanism to prevent stock price collapse. At present, most of the studies on the risk factors of stock price collapse focus on stock returns, stock liquidity, accounting conservatism, institutional investors, analyst bias, auditor expertise, corporate information transparency, and so on. According to the formation mechanism of the risk of stock price collapse, management opportunism tends to hide the "bad news" of the company. When "bad news" accumulates too much, it will come out at the same time, causing the stock price to fall quickly and collapse. According to the existing research, internal control can effectively reduce the motivation and opportunity of management opportunism. Therefore, this paper studies the effect of the effectiveness of internal control on the risk of stock price collapse from the perspective of internal control. The relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse is studied by adding CEO's overseas experience and property rights regulation variables. On the basis of reviewing the literature related to executive background characteristics, internal control, stock price collapse risk, combined with principal-agent theory, higher-order management theory and information asymmetry theory, This paper analyzes the relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse. The influence of CEO's overseas experience and property right on the relationship between internal control and the risk of stock price collapse is analyzed theoretically, and the corresponding assumptions are put forward. Then according to the hypothesis put forward, empirical analysis shows the following conclusion: 1) the higher the internal control of the company, the lower the risk of a stock price crash. That is, good internal control of the company can effectively suppress the risk of a stock price collapse. The effect of internal control on the risk of stock price collapse is weakened. This conclusion is established in the whole sample group, the sample group of state-owned listed companies and the sample group of non-state-owned listed companies. The internal controls of non-state-owned listed companies have a stronger inhibitory effect on the risk of stock price collapse, which is true in all sample groups with CEO's overseas experience and CEO sample group with no overseas experience. Finally, the robustness test is carried out by using the alternative variables of internal control and adding new control variables, and the results are consistent with the results of empirical analysis. This paper studies the impact of executive background and internal control on the risk of stock price collapse, which enriches the content of higher-order management theory and information asymmetry theory. At the same time, it broadens the scope of the risk factors of stock price crash to some extent, and provides a new direction for stabilizing the stock market and controlling the risk of stock price collapse.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.91;F275

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本文編號：1955253