本文選題：創(chuàng)新型企業(yè) + 風(fēng)險投資��； 參考：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)是當今社會響應(yīng)建設(shè)創(chuàng)新型國家戰(zhàn)略、進行技術(shù)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的主力角色,卻時常面臨的資金缺乏的窘境,因此解決創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)融資難問題是幫助其不斷發(fā)展壯大的關(guān)鍵。風(fēng)險投資作為一種重要的融資手段,已經(jīng)受到了學(xué)術(shù)界和企業(yè)界的格外關(guān)注,然而向創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)引入風(fēng)險投資資金并不是單純地將兩者綁定在一起就能夠解決問題的,相反,創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)和風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)都必須具備一些必要的自身特點和業(yè)務(wù)能力才能彼此相互吸引,從而達成合作共識,且雙方的優(yōu)勢互補和信息交融必然也會推動合作效應(yīng)實現(xiàn)最大化。鑒于此,探究創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)和風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)合作策略選擇的影響因素,建立和探索這些影響因素與合作策略選擇之間的交互關(guān)系,以及分析它們對長期均衡穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)的作用和機理是本文的主要研究內(nèi)容。因此為解決創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)合作創(chuàng)新問題,加強創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)和風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)之間的有效合作與互動,本文借助演化博弈方法,構(gòu)建了創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)在尋求融資的過程中與風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)之間的二階段演化博弈模型,對雙方的合作策略選擇進行了動態(tài)穩(wěn)定性分析,通過對模型參數(shù)的調(diào)整和分析,尋求有助于建立良性的演化狀態(tài)的合理初始條件,并使用數(shù)值仿真工具,驗證研究結(jié)果。研究結(jié)果表明,提高創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)自身的創(chuàng)新能力、不斷增強企業(yè)的資產(chǎn)水平和管理水平是吸引風(fēng)險投資的關(guān)鍵,同時風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)也應(yīng)擴大自己的社會網(wǎng)絡(luò)資源、優(yōu)化所提供的增值服務(wù),并選擇最合適的資金投入量,協(xié)商出雙方均能接受的持股比例,從而最大可能地推動二者達成合作、共同創(chuàng)新。另一方面,降低業(yè)務(wù)成本,增強彼此的文化認同和契合,通過正式或非正式的控制確定恰當?shù)莫剟詈蛻吞幩?最大程度地降低投機行為,力求創(chuàng)新型企業(yè)和風(fēng)險投資之間相互信任、相互監(jiān)管,則是促進彼此積極共贏、合作關(guān)系良性發(fā)展的重要舉措。本文以技術(shù)創(chuàng)新企業(yè)和風(fēng)險投資機構(gòu)作為研究對象,運用演化博弈方法,并將其合作過程劃分為合作關(guān)系建立階段和合作關(guān)系維系階段,突破了已有研究因偏重委托代理關(guān)系、契約治理等而造成的對二者合作關(guān)系理解的局限性,對進一步尋求雙方有效合作的均衡狀態(tài)提供了理論框架,同時對完善各種治理機制具有一定的參考價值和指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:Innovative enterprises are the main role of the society in response to the construction of innovative national strategy and technological research and development innovation, but often face the dilemma of lack of funds. Therefore, to solve the financing problem of innovative enterprises is the key to help them grow. As an important means of financing, venture capital has been paid special attention by academia and business circles. However, the introduction of venture capital to innovative enterprises is not a simple binding of the two to solve the problem, on the contrary, In order to attract each other, both innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions must have some necessary characteristics and business capabilities to reach a common understanding of cooperation. And the complementary advantages of both sides and the blending of information will certainly promote the maximization of the cooperative effect. In view of this, this paper explores the factors influencing the choice of cooperative strategies between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions, and establishes and explores the interaction between these factors and the choice of cooperative strategies. The main content of this paper is to analyze their action and mechanism on long-term equilibrium and stability state. Therefore, in order to solve the problem of innovative enterprises' cooperative innovation and strengthen the effective cooperation and interaction between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions, this paper makes use of evolutionary game method. This paper constructs a two-stage evolutionary game model between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions in the process of seeking financing, and analyzes the dynamic stability of the cooperation strategy between the two sides. The reasonable initial conditions are found to be helpful to the establishment of a benign evolutionary state, and the numerical simulation tools are used to verify the results of the study. The results show that the key to attract venture capital is to improve the innovation ability of innovative enterprises and to enhance the level of assets and management of enterprises. At the same time, venture capital institutions should expand their social network resources. Optimize the value-added services and select the most appropriate amount of capital investment to negotiate the mutually acceptable shareholding ratio so as to push the two to achieve cooperation and joint innovation. On the other hand, reduce business costs, enhance mutual cultural identity and alignment, determine appropriate levels of incentives and penalties through formal or informal controls, and minimize speculation, To strive for mutual trust and mutual supervision between innovative enterprises and venture capital is an important measure to promote mutual positive win-win and healthy development of cooperative relationship. In this paper, technological innovation enterprises and venture capital institutions are taken as the research objects, and the evolutionary game method is used to divide the cooperation process into the stages of establishing cooperative relationship and maintaining cooperative relationship, which breaks through the existing research because of the emphasis on principal-agent relationship. The limitation of understanding the cooperative relationship between the two parties caused by contract governance provides a theoretical framework for further seeking the equilibrium state of effective cooperation between the two parties and also has certain reference value and guiding significance for the improvement of various governance mechanisms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F279.2;F832.48

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本文編號：1921983