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  本文選題：管理者持股 + 獨立董事比例��； 參考：《西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：管理層持股是公司治理機制中重要的激勵機制；獨立董事的設(shè)立是董事會起到監(jiān)督和決策的目的。二者都是現(xiàn)代公司治理中重要的治理機制，并且也是研究公司治理機制的核心問題。從已有的文獻看，研究二者與公司價值關(guān)系的文章很多，但是多從單一方向進行研究�；诖�，本文從以下三點來展開研究，，首先，從單一影響檢驗管理者持股對公司價值的影響，二者之間究竟是否存在線性關(guān)系或者非線性關(guān)系，探討中國上市公司股權(quán)激勵實施的有效性，并且尋找到中國上市公司管理者持股的最優(yōu)點；其次，研究董事會治理中重要的獨立董事比例對公司價值的影響，獨立董事比例設(shè)立的程度分析，獨立董事是否能在當(dāng)期中國這一特殊的市場環(huán)境下發(fā)揮其有效性，達到有效的監(jiān)督管理作用，從而探討?yīng)毩⒍碌淖饔靡约笆欠衲苷业阶顑?yōu)的獨立董事的設(shè)置比例，以期實現(xiàn)公司價值最大化；最后，本文將三者的研究放在內(nèi)生性的情況下考慮，因為三者的影響并不是單一影響，而是存在很大的相互互動關(guān)系的經(jīng)濟影響在里面，所以運用聯(lián)立方程模型考慮三者的互動影響，能更好的在經(jīng)濟學(xué)上來解釋三者的關(guān)系，從而實現(xiàn)本文的研究目的。 本文首先對管理者持股與公司價值；獨立董事比例與公司價值的理論與實證研究進行了總結(jié)。在文獻回顧與理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，建立關(guān)于管理者持股、獨立董事比例與公司價值三者的互動關(guān)系，包括分析管理層持股對公司價值的影響；獨立董事比例對公司價值的影響；以及從內(nèi)生性的角度探討三者相互作用的互動影響。之后，選取2011年，上市公司A股數(shù)據(jù)，通過建立回歸模型和聯(lián)立方程組來實證分析上述假設(shè)，得到了以下三個結(jié)論：（1）管理層持股與公司價值之間存在相互顯著正向關(guān)系；（2）獨立董事比例與公司價值之間沒有顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系，但兩職合一與公司價值顯著地負(fù)相關(guān)；（3）獨立董事比例與管理者持股和公司價值都不存在顯著地相關(guān)關(guān)系，獨立董事比例與管理層持股負(fù)相關(guān)，與公司價值正相關(guān)。 最后，本文結(jié)合前面的實證分析結(jié)果，結(jié)合我國上市公司治理的特點，對完善公司治理提出一些建議。
[Abstract]:Management ownership is an important incentive mechanism in corporate governance, and the establishment of independent directors is the purpose of supervision and decision-making. Both are important governance mechanisms in modern corporate governance, and are also the core issues in the study of corporate governance mechanisms. From the existing literature, there are many articles on the relationship between the two and corporate value, but mostly from a single direction. Based on this, this paper starts the research from the following three aspects: firstly, from the single impact test, whether there is a linear or nonlinear relationship between the managers' shareholding and the value of the company, whether there is a linear relationship or a nonlinear relationship between the two, This paper discusses the effectiveness of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies, and finds out the most advantages of managers holding shares in Chinese listed companies. Secondly, it studies the influence of the proportion of independent directors in the governance of the board of directors on the value of the company. An analysis of the degree of the establishment of the proportion of independent directors, whether the independent directors can exert their effectiveness in the current special market environment of China, and achieve an effective supervisory and management role. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of independent directors and whether they can find the optimal proportion of independent directors, in order to maximize the value of the company. Because the influence of the three is not a single effect, but there is a very large interaction between the economic impact in it, so using the simultaneous equation model to consider the interaction of the three, we can better explain the relationship between the three in economics. In order to achieve the purpose of this paper. Firstly, this paper summarizes the theoretical and empirical research on the proportion of independent directors and corporate value. On the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis, this paper establishes the interactive relationship among managers' shareholding, proportion of independent directors and company value, including analyzing the influence of management ownership on company value, the influence of independent director proportion on company value, and the influence of independent director proportion on company value. And from an endogenous perspective to explore the interaction of the three interactions. Then, in 2011, A share data of listed companies are selected, and the above assumptions are empirically analyzed by establishing regression model and simultaneous equations. Three conclusions are drawn as follows: (1) there is a significant positive relationship between managerial shareholding and corporate value. (2) there is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the value of the company. However, there is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and managerial shareholding and corporate value, but the proportion of independent directors is negatively correlated with managerial shareholding and positive correlation with corporate value. Finally, based on the results of empirical analysis and the characteristics of corporate governance in China, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F271;F275

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