本文選題：可轉(zhuǎn)換公司債券 + 融資選擇　； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速發(fā)展，我國的無效投資現(xiàn)象越來越嚴(yán)重，投資效率令人堪憂。過度投資和投資不足是我國上市公司投資過程中亟待解決的問題。 本文在已有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步研究了可轉(zhuǎn)債作為現(xiàn)在最重要的融資方式之一對于企業(yè)非效率投資的治理作用。理論上,可轉(zhuǎn)債融資具有降低外部融資成本和改善特定類型公司治理績效的作用。首先從理論上探討和總結(jié)了可轉(zhuǎn)債降低外部融資成本和改善特定類型公司非效率投資的作用機(jī)制和途徑。在此基礎(chǔ)上,對我國可轉(zhuǎn)債融資選擇行為和效果進(jìn)行了全面的研究和刻畫。 通過研究，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)我國可轉(zhuǎn)債融資公司特征表現(xiàn)為具有較高的負(fù)債率、較高的成長性、較低的獲取經(jīng)營現(xiàn)金能力、較高的自由現(xiàn)金流量、較大的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模。理論上,可轉(zhuǎn)債融資公司所具有的“小規(guī)模、高財(cái)務(wù)杠桿、高成長、高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和較多自由現(xiàn)金流”特征在我國可轉(zhuǎn)債融資企業(yè)中部分得到體現(xiàn)，這說明上市公司在選擇可轉(zhuǎn)債融資時(shí)，考慮了財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，代理問題和信息不對稱可能引起的資產(chǎn)替代風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、逆向選擇成本以及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)估計(jì)困難等因素。 可轉(zhuǎn)換公司債券能夠抑制過度投資行為，且其對投資不足具有很好的改善作用，這說明可轉(zhuǎn)債確實(shí)具有雙向治理無效投資的作用；另外，本文還對可轉(zhuǎn)債條款設(shè)計(jì)對治理非效率投資效果進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究，，研究證明，可轉(zhuǎn)債贖回條款在短期內(nèi)對過度投資有一定的抑制作用，但是其對投資不足的影響并不顯著，回售條款對于過度投資和投資不足都有一定的治理作用。這意味著在保持必要監(jiān)管的基礎(chǔ)上適度放開對于公司使用可轉(zhuǎn)債進(jìn)行融資的政策限制，積極發(fā)展債券市場，將有助于提高我國上市公司的整體投資效率。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the phenomenon of invalid investment is becoming more and more serious, and the efficiency of investment is worrying. Excessive investment and insufficient investment are the problems to be solved in the process of investment of listed companies in China. Based on the existing literature, this paper further studies the governance role of convertible bonds as one of the most important financing methods for enterprises' inefficient investment. Theoretically, convertible bond financing can reduce the cost of external financing and improve the performance of certain types of corporate governance. Firstly, the paper discusses and summarizes the mechanism and ways of reducing the external financing cost and improving the inefficiency investment of certain types of companies. On this basis, the paper makes a comprehensive study and characterization of the behavior and effect of convertible bond financing in China. Through research, this paper finds that the characteristics of convertible bond financing companies in China are higher debt ratio, higher growth, lower ability to obtain operating cash, higher free cash flow and larger asset scale. Theoretically, the characteristics of "small scale, high financial leverage, high growth, high risk and more free cash flow" of convertible bond financing companies are partly reflected in Chinese convertible bond financing enterprises. This shows that the listed companies consider the risk of financial crisis, the agent problem and the risk of asset substitution caused by asymmetric information, the cost of adverse selection and the difficulty of risk estimation when choosing convertible bond financing. Convertible corporate bonds can inhibit excessive investment behavior and have a good effect on improving underinvestment, which shows that convertible bonds do have the effect of two-way governance of ineffective investment; in addition, This paper also makes an empirical study on the effect of convertible bond clause design on the governance of inefficient investment. The research proves that the convertible bond redemption clause has a certain restraining effect on overinvestment in the short term, but its impact on investment insufficiency is not significant. The return clause for excessive investment and insufficient investment has a certain governance role. This means that on the basis of maintaining the necessary supervision, we should liberalize appropriately the policy restrictions on the use of convertible bonds to finance companies, and actively develop the bond market, which will help to improve the overall investment efficiency of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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