本文選題：債務(wù)約束 + 自由現(xiàn)金流量　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來,隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷深化,我國進(jìn)入了迅速增長的階段,經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革取得了歷史性成就。經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌帶來的高投資、高收益、高成長固然值得欣喜,然而近十年來,我國的固定資產(chǎn)投資率持續(xù)攀升,受到消費(fèi)需求以及有限資源的影響,很多行業(yè)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了投資過剩的現(xiàn)象,比如鋼鐵、電解鋁、水泥行業(yè)等,投資過熱問題開始引起社會(huì)各界的關(guān)注,2013年9月,北京工商大學(xué)發(fā)布了“2013上市公司會(huì)計(jì)投資者保護(hù)指數(shù)”,由于上市公司過度投資問題嚴(yán)重,該指數(shù)已連續(xù)四年呈現(xiàn)下滑趨勢(shì)。在這樣的大背景下,如何有效地抑制企業(yè)的過度投資行為,確保經(jīng)濟(jì)的良性發(fā)展已迫在眉睫。 在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中債務(wù)已經(jīng)成為了一種不可或缺的資本,1976年,Jensen和Meckling開始著手探討債務(wù)的治理功能,從此開啟了對(duì)債務(wù)治理效果研究的新時(shí)代。本文采用規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的方法,在規(guī)范研究方面,本文嘗試以Jensen(1986)的自由現(xiàn)金流量假說為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合代理成本理論以及債務(wù)的相機(jī)治理,通過分析債務(wù)治理效果的生成機(jī)制,研究銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資行為的影響路徑。在理論上,本文認(rèn)為由于銀行的外部監(jiān)督以及銀行貸款到期還本付息的強(qiáng)制性要求,約束了管理者對(duì)自由現(xiàn)金流量的自由支配權(quán),在一定程度上緩解了管理者與所有者之間的利益矛盾,進(jìn)而抑制了管理者的過度投資行為。在實(shí)證研究方面,本文通過建立研究模型,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了理論分析的結(jié)論,通過對(duì)銀行貸款影響過度投資作用機(jī)制的分析,不僅考察了銀行作為外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制是否發(fā)揮了對(duì)企業(yè)應(yīng)有的治理作用,同時(shí)也為我國的公司治理研究提供了新的視角。在前述研究的基礎(chǔ)之上,本文進(jìn)一步基于貸款期限結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)以及制度環(huán)境的差異來研究銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資的抑制作用,提出完善我國制度環(huán)境的建議和措施,為促進(jìn)當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)步健康發(fā)展提供有價(jià)值的參考。 本文的邏輯思路為：隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷深化,我國企業(yè)內(nèi)部?jī)蓹?quán)分離的特征越發(fā)明顯,所有者與管理者之間的代理問題較為嚴(yán)重,當(dāng)企業(yè)內(nèi)部存有充裕的自由現(xiàn)金流量時(shí),管理者會(huì)在自身利益的驅(qū)動(dòng)下選擇凈現(xiàn)值為負(fù)的投資項(xiàng)目,帶來了企業(yè)的過度投資問題。債務(wù)融資作為有效的公司治理機(jī)制之一,能夠發(fā)揮應(yīng)有的積極治理效應(yīng)。由于債權(quán)人的外部監(jiān)督以及迫于債務(wù)到期還本付息的壓力,管理者的自由裁量權(quán)受到了制約,約束了其隨意支配自由現(xiàn)金流量的行為,緩解了所有者與管理者之間的代理問題,進(jìn)而可以對(duì)企業(yè)的投資水平起到改善的作用。并且本文認(rèn)為貸款期限結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)和制度環(huán)境的不同也能夠帶來債務(wù)融資治理效應(yīng)的差異,從而對(duì)企業(yè)的投資行為產(chǎn)生不同的影響。銀行貸款作為我國企業(yè)最主要的債務(wù)來源,同樣應(yīng)該能夠發(fā)揮上述作用。根據(jù)文章的邏輯思路,本文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容可以分為以下幾個(gè)部分： 第一部分為緒論,主要闡述了本文的研究背景、研究目的、研究意義、研究思路及方法、研究框架、主要貢獻(xiàn)與不足。 第二部分為文獻(xiàn)綜述,主要對(duì)過度投資的存在性、自由現(xiàn)金流量對(duì)過度投資的影響、過度投資的債務(wù)制約機(jī)制進(jìn)行了綜述,并評(píng)述了相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)。 第三部分為理論分析,這一部分主要闡述了過度投資的含義與度量方法,分析了相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ),其中包括代理成本理論、自由現(xiàn)金流量假說、債務(wù)的相機(jī)治理,并且在該部分的最后闡述了本文的推導(dǎo)框架和理論途徑。 第四部分為實(shí)證研究,這一部分首先是假設(shè)的提出,在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)之上提出本文需要研究的七個(gè)假設(shè)；其次是研究設(shè)計(jì)與實(shí)證結(jié)果的分析部分,本文選擇了2008-2012年深滬A股上市公司為樣本,借鑒Richardson (2006)提出的預(yù)期投資模型來衡量過度投資規(guī)模,逐個(gè)檢驗(yàn)了本文提出的七個(gè)假設(shè),旨在研究銀行貸款是否能夠約束管理者對(duì)自由現(xiàn)金流量的濫用,緩解所有者與管理者之間的代理問題,進(jìn)而抑制其過度投資行為,在此基礎(chǔ)之上,該部分還進(jìn)一步研究了貸款期限結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)和制度環(huán)境差異對(duì)銀行貸款這一相機(jī)治理作用的影響；最后是穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)部分,本文將通過以下兩種方式進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)：(1)過度投資的重新度量；(2)分年度單獨(dú)檢驗(yàn)。 第五部分為研究結(jié)論、建議與局限性,主要根據(jù)研究得出的結(jié)論,提出旨在提高我國銀行貸款發(fā)揮債務(wù)治理效應(yīng)的相關(guān)建議和措施。 通過以上五個(gè)部分的分析,本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)我國所有者與管理者之間的代理問題嚴(yán)重,管理者有著隨意支配自由現(xiàn)金流量來滿足自身利益的動(dòng)機(jī),從而企業(yè)內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流量越多,.過度投資問題就越嚴(yán)重；(2)銀行貸款能夠有效減少管理者能夠隨意支配的自由現(xiàn)金流量,緩解所有者與管理者之間的代理問題,進(jìn)而抑制其過度投資行為,并且這種作用更多的體現(xiàn)在短期貸款上；(3)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的差異能夠影響銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資的抑制作用,即在非國有企業(yè)中,銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資的相機(jī)治理作用更強(qiáng)；(4)不同的制度環(huán)境也能影響銀行貸款的治理效用,金融發(fā)展水平越高、法治環(huán)境越好、政府干預(yù)越少的地區(qū),銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資行為的抑制作用越強(qiáng)。根據(jù)上述分析,本文提出以下幾個(gè)建議：(1)完善企業(yè)信息披露制度,加強(qiáng)對(duì)自由現(xiàn)金流量的監(jiān)管；(2)適當(dāng)引入債務(wù)融資,完善企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)；(3)完善相關(guān)法律法規(guī),建立有效的償債保障機(jī)制；(4)改革官員考評(píng)機(jī)制,減少政府干預(yù)；(5)進(jìn)一步深化國有商業(yè)銀行的改革。 本文的貢獻(xiàn)主要有： 第一,與以往的多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)不同,本文單獨(dú)選取了銀行貸款這個(gè)視角來研究債務(wù)對(duì)管理者過度投資的治理作用,這是因?yàn)閷?duì)我國的大多數(shù)公司而言,銀行貸款仍然是最主要的債務(wù)融資來源,研究銀行貸款的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義更強(qiáng)。 第二,本文將從銀行貸款期限結(jié)構(gòu)來進(jìn)行分析,通過這樣的細(xì)化來研究不同期限結(jié)構(gòu)的銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資抑制作用的差異。 第三,本文根據(jù)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的差異將企業(yè)分為國有與非國有進(jìn)行探討,旨在研究經(jīng)過多年的改革,國有企業(yè)預(yù)算軟約束的程度是否仍舊高于非國有企業(yè)。 第四,本文進(jìn)一步探討了制度環(huán)境帶來的影響,旨在發(fā)現(xiàn)制度環(huán)境層面的差異是否能夠影響銀行貸款對(duì)管理者過度投資的抑制作用,有助于從動(dòng)態(tài)層面考察我國制度環(huán)境發(fā)展的成果,并且可以從宏觀層面探討如何完善制度環(huán)境來更好的發(fā)揮銀行貸款的相機(jī)治理作用,以期能夠?yàn)楸Ｕ辖?jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)步發(fā)展提供有價(jià)值的參考。 本文的不足之處在于： 第一,本文僅選取了上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行研究,非上市公司文中并未涉及。但是現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中,我國的非上市公司面臨的外部監(jiān)督管理較少,部分公司的過度投資問題更為嚴(yán)重。并且一方面,由于非上市公司的融資渠道較為狹窄,債務(wù)融資中銀行貸款的比重更高,另一方面,部分非上市公司的股東、管理者、債權(quán)人之間的關(guān)系可能區(qū)別于上市公司,從而對(duì)該類公司的過度投資行為進(jìn)行研究也具有一定的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 第二,實(shí)際生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營活動(dòng)中,管理者能夠自由支配的現(xiàn)金流量并非僅由經(jīng)營活動(dòng)而產(chǎn)生,非經(jīng)營活動(dòng)以及以前的留存部分也可能帶來管理者的過度投資問題,本文在計(jì)算自由現(xiàn)金流量時(shí),僅根據(jù)Richardson (2006)的說法使用了經(jīng)營活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量?jī)纛~,對(duì)于其他部分并未涉及,這可以成為未來的一個(gè)研究方向。 第三,本文根據(jù)Richardson (2006)提出的預(yù)期投資模型對(duì)過度投資規(guī)模進(jìn)行衡量,此模型雖然在該領(lǐng)域已經(jīng)有著一定的權(quán)威性,但是其衡量還是較為主觀。首先,在現(xiàn)實(shí)社會(huì)中能夠影響企業(yè)投資行為的因素很多,模型的度量很難全面；其次,模型中成長性的衡量一直說法不一,有人采用托賓Q,也有人采用主營業(yè)務(wù)收入增長率等,不管采用何種方法度量,都存在一定的局限性。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, with the continuous deepening of the market economy, China has entered a stage of rapid growth, and the reform of the economic system has made historic achievements. The high investment, high income and high growth of the economic transition are worthy of joy. However, in the past ten years, the investment rate of fixed assets in China has continued to rise, and is subject to consumption demand and limited capital. In many industries, there have been overinvestment phenomena in many industries, such as iron and steel, electrolytic aluminum, cement industry, and so on. Investment overheating has begun to attract attention from all walks of life. In September 2013, Beijing Technology and Business University issued the "2013 listed company accounting investor protection index", due to the serious problem of overinvestment of listed companies, the index has already In the past four years, there has been a downward trend. Under such a background, how to effectively curb the excessive investment behavior of enterprises and ensure the healthy development of the economy is imminent.
In the modern enterprise, debt has become an indispensable capital. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling began to explore the governance function of debt. Since then, a new era of research on the effect of debt governance has been opened. This article adopts the method of combining normative research and empirical research. In the normative research, this paper tries to use Jensen (1986). Based on the free cash flow hypothesis, combined with the agency cost theory and the debt camera governance, the impact path of bank loans on overinvestment behavior of managers is studied by analyzing the generation mechanism of debt governance effect. In theory, this paper argues that the external supervision of the bank and the mandatory requirement of the repayment of bank loans due to the maturity of the bank loans are in theory. It restrains the manager's free control of free cash flow, to a certain extent, alleviates the contradiction between the managers and the owners, and then inhibits the overinvestment behavior of the managers. In the empirical study, this paper empirically tests the conclusion of theoretical analysis through the establishment of a research model, which has influenced bank loans. The analysis of the mechanism of degree investment not only examines whether the bank has played a role in the governance of the enterprise as an external supervision mechanism, but also provides a new perspective for the study of corporate governance in China. On the basis of the previous research, this paper further studies the difference between the term structure of the loan, the property property and the institutional environment. To investigate the restraining effect of bank loans on the overinvestment of the managers, the suggestions and measures to improve the institutional environment of our country are put forward to provide valuable reference for promoting the steady and healthy development of the contemporary economy.
The logical idea of this article is: with the continuous deepening of the market economy, the characteristics of the separation of the two rights in our enterprises are more obvious. The agency problem between the owners and the managers is more serious. When there are plenty of free cash flows in the enterprises, the managers will choose the investment projects with negative net present value under the drive of their own interests. The debt financing, as one of the effective corporate governance mechanisms, can give full play to the positive effect of governance. Due to the external supervision of the creditor and the pressure on the repayment of the debt due to the debt maturity, the discretion of the managers is restricted, and the free cash flow is controlled at random. It relieves the agency problem between the owner and the manager, and then can improve the investment level of the enterprise. And this paper thinks that the loan term structure, the property property and the institutional environment can also bring the difference of the debt financing effect, and have different influence on the investment behavior of the enterprise. According to the logic of the article, the main research content of this article can be divided into the following parts:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly describes the research background, purpose, significance, research ideas and methods, research framework, main contributions and deficiencies.
The second part is the literature review, mainly on the existence of overinvestment, the effect of free cash flow on overinvestment, the debt restriction mechanism of overinvestment, and the related literature.
The third part is the theoretical analysis. This part mainly expounds the meaning and measurement method of overinvestment, and analyzes the relevant theoretical basis, including the agency cost theory, the free cash flow hypothesis, the debt management of the camera, and at the end of this part expounds the derivation framework and theoretical approaches of this paper.
The fourth part is an empirical study. This part is the first of the hypothesis, on the basis of theoretical analysis, the seven hypotheses need to be studied. Secondly, the analysis part of the research design and the empirical results. This paper selects the A shares listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai as the sample for reference, and draws on the expected investment model proposed by Richardson (2006). To measure the scale of overinvestment, the seven hypotheses are tested one by one to study whether bank loans can restrain the abuse of free cash flow, alleviate the agency problem between owners and managers, and then restrain their overinvestment behavior. On this basis, this part further studies the loan term. The influence of the structure, property property and institutional environment difference on the management of the bank loan, and finally the robustness test part, the robustness test will be carried out in the following two ways: (1) the re measurement of overinvestment; (2) separate inspection in the year.
The fifth part is the research conclusion, the suggestion and the limitation, mainly based on the conclusion of the study, and puts forward the relevant suggestions and measures to improve the effect of the bank loans in our country to play the debt governance effect.
Through the analysis of the above five parts, this paper finds that: (1) the problem of agency between the owner and the manager is serious, and the managers have the motivation to satisfy their own interests at random. The more free cash flow within the enterprise, the more serious the problem of overinvestment; (2) the bank loan can be effectively reduced. The free cash flow that managers can control at random can relieve the agent problem between owners and managers, and then restrain their overinvestment behavior, and this effect is more reflected in short-term loans. (3) the difference of property property can affect the restraining effect of bank loans on overinvestment of managers, that is, in non-state-owned enterprises, Bank loans have a stronger effect on the management of overinvestment by managers; (4) different institutional environments can also affect the governance effectiveness of bank loans, the higher the level of financial development, the better the rule of law environment, the less government intervention, the stronger the restraining effect of bank loans to managers over investment. According to the above analysis, this paper proposes The following suggestions are as follows: (1) improving the enterprise information disclosure system and strengthening the supervision of free cash flow; (2) proper introduction of debt financing, perfect enterprise capital structure; (3) perfect relevant laws and regulations, establish effective debt service guarantee mechanism; (4) reform officials' examination and evaluation mechanism, reduce government intervention; (5) further deepen state-owned commercial banks Reform.
The main contributions of this article are as follows:
First, unlike most of the previous literature, this paper selects the perspective of bank loan to study the governance effect of debt on overinvestment of managers. This is because bank loans are still the most important source of debt financing for most of our companies, and the practical significance of studying bank loans is stronger.
Second, this article will analyze the term structure of the bank loan, and through such a refinement, we will study the difference between the bank loans of different term structures and the restraining effect of overinvestment on managers.
Third, according to the differences in property rights, this paper divides enterprises into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. The purpose of this study is to study whether the degree of soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises is still higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises after years of reform.
Fourth, this paper further explores the impact of the institutional environment, and aims to find out whether the differences in the institutional environment can affect the restraining effect of the bank loans on the overinvestment of the managers. It is helpful to investigate the achievements of the development of our institutional environment from the dynamic level, and to discuss how to improve the institutional environment from the macro level. We should give full play to the role of camera governance of bank loans in order to provide valuable reference for ensuring the steady development of the economy.
The shortcomings of this paper are as follows:
First, this article only selects the data of the listed companies to carry on the research, the non-listed company article does not involve. But in real life, the external supervision and management of the non-listed company in our country is less, the over investment problem of some companies is more serious. On the one hand, the financing channels of non-listed company are relatively narrow, and the debt financing is in the middle. The proportion of bank loans is higher, on the other hand, the relationship between the shareholders, managers and creditors of some non-listed company may be different from the listed companies, so it is also of practical significance to study the overinvestment behavior of this kind of company.
Second, in the actual production and operation activities, the cash flow that the manager can freely control is not only produced by the operating activities. The non operating activities and the previous remaining parts may also bring about the overinvestment of the managers. In this paper, when calculating the free cash flow, the management activities are used only according to the Richardson (2006) statement. The net cash flow is not related to other parts, which can become a research direction in the future.
Third, this paper measures the scale of overinvestment based on the expected investment model proposed by Richardson (2006). Although this model has some authority in this field, it is still more subjective. First, there are many factors that can affect the investment bank in the real society, and the measurement of the model is difficult to be comprehensive; secondly, The measurement of growth in the model has always been different. Some people adopt Tobin Q, and some people adopt the growth rate of main business income. No matter what measure, there are certain limitations.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 徐曉東;張?zhí)煳?;公司治理、自由現(xiàn)金流與非效率投資[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2009年10期

2 李楓;楊興全;;債務(wù)融資、債務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司過度投資行為——來自我國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];大連理工大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2008年04期

3 田利輝;;國有產(chǎn)權(quán)、預(yù)算軟約束和中國上市公司杠桿治理[J];管理世界;2005年07期

4 楊華軍;胡奕明;;制度環(huán)境與自由現(xiàn)金流的過度投資[J];管理世界;2007年09期

5 汪輝;上市公司債務(wù)融資、公司治理與市場(chǎng)價(jià)值[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年08期

6 林毅夫,李志峗;政策性負(fù)擔(dān)、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與預(yù)算軟約束[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2004年02期

7 童盼,陸正飛;負(fù)債融資、負(fù)債來源與企業(yè)投資行為——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2005年05期

8 黃乾富;沈紅波;;債務(wù)來源、債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)與現(xiàn)金流的過度投資——基于中國制造業(yè)上市公司的實(shí)證證據(jù)[J];金融研究;2009年09期

9 劉峰;制度安排與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量——紅光實(shí)業(yè)的案例分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2001年07期

10 支曉強(qiáng);童盼;;管理層業(yè)績(jī)報(bào)酬敏感度、內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流與企業(yè)投資行為——對(duì)自由現(xiàn)金流和信息不對(duì)稱理論的一個(gè)檢驗(yàn)[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2007年10期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 何召濱;國有企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)治理問題研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2012年

，

本文編號(hào)：1868692