本文選題：林權(quán)抵押 + 信貸約束��； 參考：《林業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問題》2017年03期

【摘要】：通過設(shè)計(jì)博弈模型,討論了單期博弈下的信貸約束、在假設(shè)條件下的動(dòng)態(tài)及重復(fù)博弈分析以及林權(quán)抵押改善信貸約束。首先確定信貸存在利率約束,為了降低信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn),對(duì)林農(nóng)等信貸需求者采取信貸約束措施;在動(dòng)態(tài)和重復(fù)博弈中,銀行和林農(nóng)之間的均衡策略為合作,也即銀行放貸,林農(nóng)還貸;通過抵押擔(dān)保模型發(fā)現(xiàn),森林資源可以降低銀行的預(yù)期貼現(xiàn)。因此,提出繼續(xù)確定林權(quán)抵押政策的確切內(nèi)涵、增強(qiáng)團(tuán)體貸款能力、政府分擔(dān)銀行部分信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等相關(guān)建議對(duì)策。
[Abstract]:By designing the game model, the paper discusses the credit constraint under the single-period game, the dynamic and repeated game analysis under the hypothetical condition and the improvement of the credit constraint under the forest right mortgage. In order to reduce the credit risk, credit constraint measures should be taken to the credit demanders such as forest farmers. In the dynamic and repeated game, the equilibrium strategy between banks and forest farmers is cooperation, that is, bank lending. Through the mortgage guarantee model, it is found that forest resources can reduce the bank's expected discount. Therefore, this paper puts forward some suggestions to continue to determine the exact connotation of forest tenure mortgage policy, to strengthen the ability of group loans, and to share some credit risks among banks.
【作者單位】： 南京林業(yè)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;南京師范大學(xué)泰州學(xué)院;
【基金】：江蘇省高校哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)研究課題(2015SJB106)
【分類號(hào)】：F326.23;F832.43

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