本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè) + 高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)�。� 參考：基于國(guó)有上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)

【摘要】：在企業(yè)中,技術(shù)研發(fā)的創(chuàng)新能力決定了企業(yè)在市場(chǎng)中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力。但是,企業(yè)是否進(jìn)行研發(fā)則完全由企業(yè)的高管決定。在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中,領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)與所有權(quán)分離導(dǎo)致了委托代理問題的產(chǎn)生,而企業(yè)引入股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)卻能使二者的利益趨同,有效地緩解代理問題,進(jìn)而影響高管做出相關(guān)的研發(fā)決策。本文以2007年—2011年披露了企業(yè)研發(fā)支出的國(guó)有上市公司為樣本,構(gòu)建多元回歸模型,研究了國(guó)有上市公司的高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)支出之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明:在國(guó)有企業(yè)中,高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)支出顯著正相關(guān),高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)越大,研發(fā)支出越多,同時(shí),高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與RD支出之間存在顯著的正U型的非線性關(guān)系,而非直接的線性關(guān)系;第二,當(dāng)國(guó)有企業(yè)處于較高業(yè)績(jī)或具有良好成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)時(shí),企業(yè)會(huì)忽視RD的投入;國(guó)企冗余資源類型不同,對(duì)高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)RD支出之間關(guān)系的影響不同;潛在的冗余資源越多,高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的影響越小,未吸收的冗余資源越多,高管股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的影響越大。
[Abstract]:In the enterprise, the innovation ability of technology research and development determines the competitive ability of the enterprise in the market. However, whether the enterprise carries on the research and development is entirely by the enterprise senior management decision. In modern enterprises, the separation of leadership and ownership leads to the principal-agent problem, but the introduction of stock option incentive can make the interests of the two converge, effectively alleviate the agency problem, and then affect executives to make relevant R & D decisions. This paper studies the relationship between the executive stock option incentive and R & D expenditure of the state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2011 by constructing a multivariate regression model based on the sample of state-owned listed companies that disclosed their R & D expenditure. The results show that: in state-owned enterprises, executive stock option incentive and R & D expenditure are significantly positive correlation, the higher the executive stock option incentive, the more R & D expenditure, at the same time, There is a significant positive U-type nonlinear relationship between executive stock option incentive and R D expenditure, but not a direct linear relationship. Second, when state-owned enterprises are in high performance or have good growth opportunities, enterprises will ignore R D input. Different types of redundant resources in state-owned enterprises have different effects on the relationship between executive stock option incentive and R D expenditure. The more potential redundant resources, the smaller the impact of executive stock option incentive on R & D expenditure, and the more redundant resources are not absorbed. The greater the impact of executive stock option incentives on R & D spending.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)商學(xué)院;吉林大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“非線性狀態(tài)空間混頻數(shù)據(jù)模型在中國(guó)第三產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)演變研究中的應(yīng)用”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):71573104) 吉林大學(xué)青年學(xué)術(shù)領(lǐng)袖培育計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目“非線性狀態(tài)空間混頻數(shù)據(jù)模型在中國(guó)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中的應(yīng)用”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2015FRLX15)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：1848969