發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-01 00:34

  本文選題：財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)力 + 機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)制度是目前我國(guó)上市公司正在積極推進(jìn)完善的一項(xiàng)公司治理機(jī)制,財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)在上市公司組織結(jié)構(gòu)中具有重要的地位,財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)的職能已從傳統(tǒng)的會(huì)計(jì)核算延伸到了戰(zhàn)略決策、內(nèi)部控制和信息管理等領(lǐng)域,因而財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)在公司的會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇上能夠發(fā)揮更重要的監(jiān)督作用,會(huì)顯著影響上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。那么,上市公司在財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)影響下所選擇的會(huì)計(jì)政策是會(huì)提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量還是降低會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量?本文選取盈余管理作為一個(gè)觀察點(diǎn)來窺視財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)于上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響。為了解決該問題,本文以委托代理理論和公司治理理論為依據(jù),梳理了國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)力與盈余管理的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),運(yùn)用2007年—2014年滬深兩市全部A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)能夠產(chǎn)生抑制盈余管理的作用,并且在區(qū)分不同的盈余管理屬性以及上市公司面臨的不同的情境,財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)上市公司盈余管理行為的影響作用也會(huì)存在差別。研究結(jié)果顯示:第一,CFO的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)會(huì)顯著抑制應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理。第二,CFO的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理也具有顯著的抑制作用。其中,CFO的權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)于操縱性費(fèi)用的抑制作用更顯著,對(duì)于銷售操控(通過改變信用政策來擴(kuò)大銷售)和生產(chǎn)操控(進(jìn)行過度生產(chǎn)以降低單位銷售成本)的抑制作用不顯著。第三,區(qū)分盈余管理不同的屬性,如果公司具有機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī),會(huì)弱化財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)利優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的抑制作用。第四,如果上市公司當(dāng)年負(fù)責(zé)人發(fā)生變更,這使得財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)在財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域的話語權(quán)進(jìn)一步得到增強(qiáng),所以公司負(fù)責(zé)人發(fā)生變更會(huì)強(qiáng)化財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)權(quán)力優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)于盈余管理的抑制作用。依據(jù)相關(guān)理論分析和實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文提出了以下建議:(1)上市公司要積極完善CFO制度,以及科學(xué)合理的界定CFO在公司的權(quán)利;(2)上市公司要加強(qiáng)CFO職業(yè)能力培訓(xùn)與職業(yè)道德培訓(xùn),提升CFO的財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)能力和道德素質(zhì),有效保證上市公司披露的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,進(jìn)而維護(hù)內(nèi)外部中小股東的利益,有助于我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)健康的發(fā)展。(3)完善公司治理機(jī)制,確保外部約束機(jī)制和內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制得到有效實(shí)施,發(fā)揮公司治理的規(guī)范作用,提高公司治理效率。
[Abstract]:The financial director system is a perfect corporate governance mechanism for listed companies in our country at present. The chief financial officer plays an important role in the organizational structure of listed companies. The function of CFO has been extended from traditional accounting to strategic decision-making, internal control and information management, so CFO can play a more important supervisory role in the choice of accounting policy. It will significantly affect the quality of accounting information of listed companies. So, will the listed companies choose accounting policies under the influence of the power advantage of the chief financial officer to improve the quality of accounting information or reduce the quality of accounting information? This paper selects earnings management as an observation point to look into the influence of financial director's power advantage on the accounting information quality of listed companies. In order to solve this problem, based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of corporate governance, this paper combs the relevant literature on the power of chief financial officer and earnings management at home and abroad. Using the data of all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2014, the empirical study shows that the power advantage of CFO can restrain earnings management. And in the distinction of different earnings management attributes and different situations faced by listed companies, the influence of the power advantage of CFO on earnings management behavior of listed companies will also be different. The results show that: first, the power advantage of CFO significantly inhibits accrual earnings management. Second, the power advantage of CFO also has a significant inhibitory effect on real earnings management. The power advantage of CFO has a more significant inhibitory effect on manipulative costs than on sales manipulation (expanding sales by changing credit policy) and production manipulation (overproduction to reduce unit sales cost). Third, distinguish the different attributes of earnings management, if the company has opportunistic earnings management motivation, it will weaken the financial director's right advantage corresponding to the restraining effect of earnings management. Fourth, if the person in charge of the listed company changes in that year, this will further strengthen the voice of the chief financial officer in the field of finance and accounting. So the change of the head of the company will strengthen the power advantage of the chief financial officer to restrain the earnings management. Based on the relevant theoretical analysis and empirical results, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) the listed companies should actively improve the CFO system, and scientifically and reasonably define the rights of CFO in the company. (2) the listed companies should strengthen the CFO vocational ability training and professional ethics training. To improve the financial professional ability and moral quality of CFO, to effectively guarantee the quality of accounting information disclosed by listed companies, and then to safeguard the interests of internal and external minority shareholders, is helpful to the healthy development of China's capital market. To ensure the effective implementation of external restraint mechanism and internal supervision mechanism, to give play to the normative role of corporate governance, and to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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