本文選題：代理沖突 + 融資約束�。� 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇，一個(gè)國(guó)家只有擁有強(qiáng)大的自主創(chuàng)新能力，才能在激烈的國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中把握先機(jī)、贏得主動(dòng)。近年來我國(guó)RD經(jīng)費(fèi)投入繼續(xù)保持穩(wěn)定增長(zhǎng)，國(guó)家RD經(jīng)費(fèi)投入強(qiáng)度創(chuàng)歷史新高，并在新興發(fā)展國(guó)家中居領(lǐng)先地位。然而，盡管企業(yè)投入在全社會(huì)研發(fā)投入中所占比重已經(jīng)不低，但我國(guó)企業(yè)的研發(fā)投入強(qiáng)度卻依然不足。企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的不足與面臨融資約束相關(guān)聯(lián)，代理沖突在二者關(guān)系間發(fā)揮了重要的調(diào)節(jié)作用，這既包括股東與管理層之間的代理沖突，也包括控股股東與其他股東之間的代理沖突。從代理沖突視角出發(fā)，研究企業(yè)面臨的融資約束與研發(fā)投入的關(guān)系，是本文主要研究的問題。 本文以2010-2012年中國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為樣本，采用了理論分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的研究方法，研究了代理沖突下研究融資約束與企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的關(guān)系。在文獻(xiàn)梳理和理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出了本文的研究假設(shè)，通過設(shè)置研究模型和變量對(duì)提出的研究假設(shè)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證，實(shí)證部分中包括描述性檢驗(yàn)、相關(guān)分析、多元回歸分析，并對(duì)結(jié)果進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)，最終得出研究結(jié)論。 本文的研究結(jié)果表明：(1)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的樣本支持融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約作用；(2)從股東與管理層之間的代理沖突來看，管理層持有公司股份、提高股權(quán)集中度可以緩解融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約，股東與管理層之間的代理沖突的改善有助于緩解融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約；(3)從控股股東與其他股東之間的代理沖突看，大股東持股比例越高則加劇了融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約，形成股權(quán)制衡可以改善這種制約關(guān)系，所以控股股東與其他股東代理沖突的改善有助于緩解融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約。本文認(rèn)為，在我國(guó)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入不足，且金融市場(chǎng)不完善存在較強(qiáng)融資約束的環(huán)境下，在化解企業(yè)融資約束的同時(shí)，改善兩類代理沖突，可以緩解融資約束對(duì)研發(fā)投入的制約。從政府層面看，應(yīng)拓寬企業(yè)研發(fā)融資的渠道，構(gòu)建企業(yè)研發(fā)投資的資助體系；從企業(yè)層面看，應(yīng)調(diào)整對(duì)管理層的績(jī)效考核方式，側(cè)重對(duì)研發(fā)活動(dòng)的績(jī)效考核。通過管理層持股的方式調(diào)節(jié)股東與管理層的代理沖突，使雙方的訴求趨于一致。完善股東和董事會(huì)的治理機(jī)制，減少內(nèi)部人控制對(duì)研發(fā)投入的影響。還要引入股權(quán)制衡，，避免因一股獨(dú)大而降低研發(fā)投入的情況發(fā)生。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of international competition, only if a country has strong independent innovation ability, can it grasp the opportunity and win the initiative in the fierce international competition. In recent years, China's R D expenditure continues to maintain a steady growth, and the intensity of the national R D funding has reached a record high, and has taken the lead in the emerging developing countries. However, although the proportion of enterprise investment in the whole social R & D investment is not low, the R & D investment intensity of Chinese enterprises is still insufficient. The deficiency of enterprise R & D investment is related to the financing constraint. Agency conflict plays an important role in regulating the relationship between them, which includes the agency conflict between shareholders and management. It also includes the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders. From the perspective of agency conflict, it is the main problem of this paper to study the relationship between financing constraints and R & D investment faced by enterprises. Based on the sample of listed companies in China's gem from 2010-2012, this paper studies the relationship between financing constraints and enterprise R & D investment under agency conflict by using the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. On the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis, the research hypotheses are put forward, and the research hypotheses are verified by setting up research models and variables. The empirical part includes descriptive test, correlation analysis, multivariate regression analysis. And the results of robust test, the final conclusion of the study. The research results of this paper show that: (1) the sample of gem listed companies in China supports the restriction of financing constraints on R & D investment. (2) from the perspective of the agency conflict between shareholders and management, the management holds shares in the company. The improvement of agency conflict between shareholders and management helps to ease the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. (3) from the perspective of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders, increasing equity concentration can ease the constraints on R & D investment caused by financing constraints, and the improvement of agency conflicts between shareholders and management is helpful to alleviate the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. The higher the shareholding ratio of large shareholders is, the more the restriction of financing constraints on R & D investment is intensified, and the formation of equity checks and balances can improve this kind of restriction relationship. Therefore, the improvement of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders helps to ease the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. This paper holds that under the circumstance of insufficient investment in R & D of Chinese enterprises and the imperfection of financial market there are strong financing constraints. In the meantime of resolving the financial constraints of enterprises and improving the two kinds of agency conflicts, the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment can be alleviated. From the government level, we should broaden the channels of enterprise R & D financing and construct the R & D investment funding system, and from the enterprise level, we should adjust the performance appraisal of management, and focus on the performance evaluation of R & D activities. The agency conflict between shareholders and management is regulated by the way of management ownership, so that the demands of both sides tend to be consistent. Improve the governance mechanism of shareholders and board of directors, reduce the impact of insider control on R & D investment. We should also introduce equity checks and balances to avoid reducing R & D investment due to a dominant share.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F273.1;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王家庭;趙亮;;我國(guó)上市公司的融資約束及其影響因素的實(shí)證分析[J];產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2010年03期

2 劉運(yùn)國(guó);劉雯;;我國(guó)上市公司的高管任期與R&D支出[J];管理世界;2007年01期

3 韓鵬;唐家海;;融資約束、現(xiàn)金持有與研發(fā)平滑[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究;2012年10期

4 梅波;;行業(yè)周期、兩類代理沖突與研發(fā)費(fèi)用投入——來自企業(yè)和行業(yè)層面的證據(jù)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)論叢;2013年04期

5 李延喜;杜瑞;高銳;李寧;;上市公司投資支出與融資約束敏感性研究[J];管理科學(xué);2007年01期

6 張紅軍;中國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效的理論及實(shí)證分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2000年04期

7 魏鋒,劉星;融資約束、不確定性對(duì)公司投資行為的影響[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)科學(xué);2004年02期

8 劉國(guó)亮,王加勝;上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、激勵(lì)制度及績(jī)效的實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2000年05期

9 蘇武康;中國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)集中度與公司績(jī)效實(shí)證研究[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革;2003年03期

10 李焰;張寧;;集團(tuán)控股比例與上市公司融資約束——基于代理理論的實(shí)證分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究;2007年03期

本文編號(hào)：1819000