本文選題：PPP模式 + PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化　； 參考：《重慶工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)化的高速推行,要求保障基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的需求就越來(lái)越高,單靠政府財(cái)政支出已經(jīng)很難滿足�；A(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目建設(shè)的特點(diǎn)有投資時(shí)間較長(zhǎng)、投資成本較高且風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大,則需要探索一條新的融資渠道來(lái)滿足后期建設(shè),即PPP資產(chǎn)證券化。政府大力倡導(dǎo)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化這種新的融資模式,為我國(guó)民間資本進(jìn)入基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域打開(kāi)了一條新的通道,更好的深化投融資體系的改革。本文在分析PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化參與者委托代理關(guān)系以及信息不對(duì)稱的基礎(chǔ)上,研究參與者之間的博弈并提出相關(guān)的對(duì)策建議和機(jī)制建設(shè)。首先,闡述PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化的研究背景,研究意義,并提出研究思路和框架。綜合國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,決定以PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化為主要探討研究問(wèn)題,以對(duì)參與者進(jìn)行博弈分析為主要研究方法。其次,概述了資產(chǎn)證券化理論和博弈論理論,界定PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化過(guò)程中的參與人為分析對(duì)象,包括政府、PPP項(xiàng)目公司、SPV與投資者。同時(shí)說(shuō)明主要參與方在資產(chǎn)證券化過(guò)程中所處的信息優(yōu)劣地位,及參與方之間因信息不對(duì)稱會(huì)出現(xiàn)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇問(wèn)題。再次,構(gòu)建三組兩方博弈模型,包括政府與PPP項(xiàng)目公司的博弈、PPP項(xiàng)目公司與SPV的博弈以及SPV與投資者的博弈,得出PPP項(xiàng)目公司篩選行為、SPV出售行為、投資者投資行為以及政府監(jiān)督行為的最優(yōu)概率解。假設(shè)PPP項(xiàng)目公司與SPV存在合謀的情況下,構(gòu)建了三方博弈模型,分析投資者采取投訴策略的最優(yōu)行動(dòng),從投資者角度來(lái)提出防范合謀風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的對(duì)策。最后,提出參與人最優(yōu)行動(dòng)的建議并建立相關(guān)的機(jī)制,以此規(guī)避信息不對(duì)稱的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)上,對(duì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制、激勵(lì)機(jī)制、審查機(jī)制、跟蹤參與機(jī)制和溝通機(jī)制這幾方面進(jìn)行說(shuō)明。根據(jù)博弈分析提出參與人相對(duì)應(yīng)的建議,優(yōu)化參與人的行為,達(dá)到項(xiàng)目整體利益最大化。通過(guò)對(duì)參與人信息不對(duì)稱博弈及對(duì)策的研究,為PPP項(xiàng)目資產(chǎn)證券化健康發(fā)展提供了實(shí)際參考。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid implementation of urbanization in China, the demand for ensuring infrastructure construction has become higher and higher. The construction of infrastructure projects is characterized by long investment time, high investment cost and high risk. Therefore, it is necessary to explore a new financing channel to satisfy the later construction, that is, PPP asset securitization. The government strongly advocates the new financing mode of asset securitization of infrastructure PPP project, which opens a new channel for the private capital to enter the infrastructure field and deepens the reform of investment and financing system. Based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship and information asymmetry among the participants in the asset securitization of PPP project, this paper studies the game among the participants and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions as well as the construction of the mechanism. Firstly, the research background and significance of asset securitization of PPP project are expounded, and the research ideas and framework are put forward. Based on the current research situation at home and abroad, it is decided to take the PPP project asset securitization as the main research problem and the game analysis of the participants as the main research method. Secondly, it summarizes the theory of asset securitization and game theory, and defines the participants in the process of asset securitization of PPP project, including the government and investors. At the same time, it explains the information advantages and disadvantages of the main participants in the process of asset securitization, and the moral hazard and adverse selection of the participants due to asymmetric information. Thirdly, three groups of two-party game models are constructed, including the game between the government and the PPP project company and the game between the SPV and the SPV, and the game between the SPV and the investors, and the selection behavior of the PPP project company is obtained. The optimal probability solution of investor investment behavior and government supervision behavior. Under the condition of PPP project company and SPV collusion, this paper constructs a tripartite game model, analyzes the optimal action of investors' complaint strategy, and puts forward countermeasures to prevent collusion risk from investor's point of view. Finally, we propose the optimal action of participants and establish relevant mechanisms to avoid the risk of asymmetric information. In terms of mechanism design, it explains the supervision mechanism, incentive mechanism, review mechanism, tracking participation mechanism and communication mechanism. According to the game analysis, the corresponding suggestions of the participants are put forward to optimize the behavior of the participants to maximize the overall interests of the project. By studying the asymmetric game of participants' information and its countermeasures, this paper provides a practical reference for the healthy development of PPP project asset securitization.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F283;F832.51

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