本文選題：市場化進程 + 股權(quán)激勵　； 參考：《石河子大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離以及職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的出現(xiàn)，公司經(jīng)營者與所有者的利益沖突逐漸突出，委托代理理論解釋了該現(xiàn)象深層次的原因，之后股權(quán)激勵為解決該現(xiàn)象提供一種可能。從最初的普通股到現(xiàn)在多種樣式的股權(quán)激勵方式，多個國家及地區(qū)的公司嘗試過股權(quán)激勵方案，以此來有效地激勵高管層。股權(quán)激勵制度在我國的發(fā)展相對比較滯后，但從股權(quán)分置改革及2006年頒布的《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》之后，我國的股權(quán)激勵從制度和實踐方面都有了很大的完善和發(fā)展，股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)的制度規(guī)范在逐步的完善中，股權(quán)激勵在我國的運用日益廣泛。 對高管施行股權(quán)激勵的目的是為了使高管與股東利益趨于一致，，減少代理沖突，但是對于股權(quán)激勵對盈余管理起促進還是抑制作用的問題學(xué)術(shù)界仍有較大爭議。如果高管為了達到股權(quán)激勵行權(quán)標準而進行盈余管理，那么這種結(jié)果違背了股權(quán)激勵制度的初衷，股權(quán)激勵反而成為了高管從股東攫取利益的工具。本文試圖探討股權(quán)激勵對盈余管理的影響，并結(jié)合我國實際情況，檢驗不同市場化進程下股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理的關(guān)系。 本文在相關(guān)理論和文獻的基礎(chǔ)上,先從邏輯上進行分析并提出假設(shè),再從實證方面進行證明。通過對激勵樣本與配對樣本的差異性檢驗本文發(fā)現(xiàn)：在基準年度，實施股權(quán)激勵的上市公司存在顯著向下的盈余管理；在首次考核業(yè)績年度，行權(quán)價低于年底收盤價且實施股權(quán)激勵的上市公司存在顯著的向上盈余管理。之后本文以首次考核業(yè)績年度激勵樣本高于配對樣本的盈余管理為股權(quán)激勵引起的向上盈余管理，選取首次考核業(yè)績年度行權(quán)價低于年底收盤價的激勵樣本為回歸樣本，研究市場化進程、股權(quán)激勵與向上盈余管理的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)：股權(quán)激勵與向上盈余管理正相關(guān)；市場化進程與向上盈余管理正相關(guān)；市場化進程加重了股權(quán)激勵引起的向上盈余管理。 以上結(jié)果表明，高管可以利用股權(quán)激勵以及盈余管理實現(xiàn)自身利益，這為今后合理地制定股權(quán)激勵計劃提供了依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the separation of ownership and management rights and the emergence of professional managers, the conflicts of interests between company managers and owners become more and more prominent. The principal-agent theory explains the deep reasons for this phenomenon. Then equity incentive provides a possibility to solve this phenomenon. From the initial common stock to the present various forms of equity incentive companies in many countries and regions have tried equity incentive schemes to effectively motivate senior executives. The development of stock right incentive system is relatively lagging behind in our country. However, after the reform of split share structure and the "measures of stock incentive management of listed companies" promulgated in 2006, the stock right incentive system of our country has been greatly improved and developed in terms of system and practice. The institutional norms related to equity incentive are gradually perfected, and equity incentive is widely used in our country. The purpose of executive equity incentive is to make the interests of executives and shareholders converge and reduce agency conflicts, but there is still more controversy about whether equity incentive can promote or inhibit earnings management. If the executive carries on the earnings management in order to meet the standard of equity incentive exercise, then the result is contrary to the original intention of the equity incentive system. Instead, the equity incentive becomes the tool for executives to grab the benefits from the shareholders. This paper attempts to explore the impact of equity incentive on earnings management and to test the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management in different market-oriented processes. On the basis of relevant theories and literatures, this paper first analyzes and puts forward the hypothesis logically, then proves it from the empirical aspect. By testing the differences between incentive samples and matched samples, this paper finds that: in the base year, listed companies with equity incentive have significantly downward earnings management, and in the first performance appraisal year, The listed companies whose exercise price is lower than the closing price at the end of the year and which implement equity incentive have significant upward earnings management. Then this paper takes the earnings management of the first performance annual incentive sample higher than the matched sample as the upward earnings management caused by equity incentive, and selects the incentive sample with the annual exercise price of the first appraisal performance below the year-end closing price as the regression sample. After studying the marketization process, the relationship between equity incentive and upward earnings management, it is found that the equity incentive is positively related to the upward earnings management, the marketization process is positively related to the upward earnings management, and the equity incentive is positively related to the upward earnings management. The process of marketization has aggravated the upward earnings management caused by equity incentives. The above results show that executives can use equity incentive and earnings management to achieve their own interests, which provides a basis for the rational formulation of equity incentive plan in the future.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275;F272.92

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