本文選題：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資 + 首次公開發(fā)行股票(IPO)��； 參考：《西北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)可以通過幫助被投資企業(yè)上市獲得資本的增值,同時(shí)也可以提升公司的價(jià)值。但是,企業(yè)為了能夠順利獲得上市資格,會(huì)采用資產(chǎn)重組、推遲或提前收入費(fèi)用的確認(rèn)時(shí)間等等方法包裝公司的財(cái)務(wù)。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)是企業(yè)的外部投資者,作為第三方,其會(huì)對被投資企業(yè)產(chǎn)生一定的影響。一方面可能在IPO過程中對被投資企業(yè)的經(jīng)營管理起到監(jiān)督的作用；但是另一方面,其也可能在企業(yè)IPO過程中出于自身的利益考慮,促進(jìn)其盈余管理。那么,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的存在對IPO過程中的盈余管理行為,到底是起到助長作用還是抑制作用?本文將針對這一問題進(jìn)行研究。 本文選取2009年10月-2013年3月在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的302家公司作為樣本,選取合理的盈余管理模型計(jì)算樣本企業(yè)的操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤,通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)和多元回歸分析方法,研究了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資對創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO盈余管理的影響。結(jié)果顯示,創(chuàng)業(yè)板的上市公司在IPO過程中普遍存在盈余管理,而且與沒有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資背景的企業(yè)相比,其盈余管理程度會(huì)更低。另外,通過研究IPO過程中風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的參股程度發(fā)現(xiàn),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的持股比例、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資占董事會(huì)的比例越大,盈余管理的程度越低,這些結(jié)果都說明風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在企業(yè)IPO過程中對盈余管理能夠起到監(jiān)督作用,有效約束盈余管理的行為。但是,當(dāng)聯(lián)合風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資參與到IPO過程中時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的認(rèn)證監(jiān)督作用反而被減弱了,聯(lián)合風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的家數(shù)越多,IPO的盈余管理程度越大,這說明聯(lián)合風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不能夠發(fā)揮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)督效應(yīng),相反是助長了企業(yè)的盈余管理程度,這主要是由于多家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)的參與,會(huì)存在“搭便車”的現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:Venture capitalists can gain capital appreciation by helping invested companies to list, and can also enhance the value of the company. However, in order to obtain the listing qualification successfully, the enterprises will use the methods of assets reorganization, delay or advance revenue and expense confirmation time to package the financial affairs of the company. Venture capital institution is the external investor of the enterprise, as a third party, it will have certain influence on the invested enterprise. On the one hand, it may supervise the operation and management of the invested enterprises in the process of IPO; on the other hand, it may also promote the earnings management of the invested enterprises in the process of IPO for the sake of their own interests. So, the existence of venture capital in the process of IPO earnings management behavior, after all, play a role in promoting or restraining effect? This paper will study this problem. In this paper, 302 companies listed on the gem from October 2009 to March 2013 are selected as samples, and reasonable earnings management models are selected to calculate the operating accrual profits of the sample enterprises. The effects of venture capital on IPO earnings management in gem were studied by correlation test and multiple regression analysis. The results show that earnings management exists generally in the IPO process of listed companies in gem, and the earnings management degree is lower than that of enterprises without venture capital background. In addition, by studying the degree of equity participation of venture capital institutions in the process of IPO, it is found that the greater the proportion of venture capital to the board of directors, the lower the degree of earnings management. These results show that venture capital can supervise earnings management and restrain earnings management effectively in the process of IPO. However, when the joint venture capital participates in the process of IPO, the certification and supervision function of the venture capital is weakened, and the more the number of joint venture capital is, the greater the earnings management degree of the joint venture capital is. This shows that the joint venture capital can not exert the supervision effect of venture capital institutions, on the contrary, it encourages the earnings management degree of enterprises, which is mainly due to the participation of many venture capital institutions, there will be a "free ride" phenomenon.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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