本文選題：控制權(quán)配置 + 公司績效��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：2009年10月30日至今，我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場已經(jīng)成立了四年的時(shí)間，在完善我國資本市場結(jié)構(gòu)、為優(yōu)秀企業(yè)提供融資平臺(tái)的同時(shí)，也面臨著許多問題，尤其是創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的公司治理問題，再加之創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的自身特點(diǎn)也使其內(nèi)部治理問題更加突出。 控制權(quán)的有效配置是公司治理環(huán)節(jié)中非常重要的部分，也是提升公司績效的關(guān)鍵因素。隨著企業(yè)經(jīng)營的不斷擴(kuò)大，所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離導(dǎo)致了控制權(quán)的產(chǎn)生，國內(nèi)外學(xué)者通常把控制權(quán)機(jī)制分為控制權(quán)市場和控制權(quán)配置，本文主要研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司中控制權(quán)配置模式與公司績效的關(guān)系，從理論和實(shí)證兩方面，探討我國上市公司控制權(quán)配置的狀態(tài)以及對公司績效的影響，最終通過優(yōu)化公司內(nèi)部控制來提高公司經(jīng)營績效。 在企業(yè)中，完整的控制權(quán)應(yīng)包括兩個(gè)層面，一是作為外部治理機(jī)制的股份制公司控制權(quán)市場范疇中的控制權(quán)，也就是我們所說的控制權(quán)市場；二是企業(yè)的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的控制權(quán)，是指控制權(quán)在公司股東、董事會(huì)、經(jīng)理層之間的分配狀況以及各個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)主體之間的相互作用關(guān)系。本文則將三大經(jīng)濟(jì)主體統(tǒng)一起來構(gòu)建了一個(gè)綜合的控制權(quán)配置模型，這樣做能夠使我們從一個(gè)更加系統(tǒng)的角度看待公司控制權(quán)配置，同時(shí)各個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)主體間的相互影響和作用也進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。首先，本文依據(jù)股東、董事會(huì)以及經(jīng)理層的自身特點(diǎn)，按照一定的依據(jù)對這三大主體進(jìn)行了類型的劃分，將股東按照第一大股東持股比例分為四類，董事會(huì)按照其由大股東控制、經(jīng)理層控制或是獨(dú)立狀態(tài)分為三類，經(jīng)理層依據(jù)其歸屬性分為兩類，按此進(jìn)行排列組合得出24種控制權(quán)配置模式，并對其治理方式及績效在理論上進(jìn)行了分析。然后選取主營業(yè)務(wù)利潤率作為績效指標(biāo)，加入控制變量進(jìn)行回歸分析，選取我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司共355家作為樣本，，得出我國大部分的控制權(quán)配置狀態(tài)是第一大股東擁有10%-50%的股權(quán)，董事會(huì)處于獨(dú)立制衡的狀態(tài)，總經(jīng)理由董事會(huì)任命。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明，第一大股東的持股比例越低公司績效越高，并且統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)意義上極為顯著；在董事會(huì)層面上相對獨(dú)立的董事會(huì)對公司績效有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系；在經(jīng)理層層面上有董事會(huì)委派的經(jīng)理層對公司績效有不顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，結(jié)果有待考核。我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司中最為集中的控制權(quán)配置模式并不是績效最優(yōu)的，對于大股東的制約、獨(dú)立董事的選擇以及總經(jīng)理的激勵(lì)等問題都有待解決和完善。
[Abstract]:Since October 30, 2009, China's gem market has been established for four years, while perfecting the structure of our capital market and providing financing platform for excellent enterprises, it also faces many problems. In particular, the corporate governance of gem listed companies, plus the gem listed companies own characteristics also make its internal governance problems more prominent. The effective allocation of control rights is a very important part of corporate governance and a key factor to improve corporate performance. With the continuous expansion of enterprise management, the separation of ownership and management rights leads to the emergence of control rights. Domestic and foreign scholars usually divide the control rights mechanism into control market and control rights allocation. This paper mainly studies the relationship between control allocation mode and corporate performance in gem listed companies, and discusses the status of control allocation and its impact on corporate performance in China's listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. Finally, improve the performance of the company by optimizing the internal control. In the enterprise, the complete control right should include two levels, one is the control right in the control market category of the joint-stock company as the external governance mechanism, that is, the control right market that we call; The second is the control right of the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise, which refers to the distribution of the control right among the shareholders, the board of directors and the managers of the company, as well as the interaction between the various economic entities. In this paper, the three economic entities are unified to construct a comprehensive control allocation model, which enables us to look at corporate control allocation from a more systematic perspective. At the same time, the interaction between the economic entities and the role of the empirical analysis. First of all, according to the characteristics of shareholders, board of directors and managers, this paper divides the three main bodies into four categories according to the proportion of the largest shareholders. The board of directors can be divided into three categories according to their control by large shareholders, managers or independent states. According to their attributes, the board of directors can be divided into two categories. According to this arrangement and combination, 24 control allocation modes can be obtained. And its governance and performance in the theoretical analysis. Then select the main business profit rate as the performance index, add control variables for regression analysis, choose 355 listed companies in the gem as the sample. It is concluded that most of the allocation of control rights in China is that the largest shareholder has 10% to 50% equity, the board of directors is in the state of independent checks and balances, and the general manager is appointed by the board of directors. The empirical results show that the lower the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder, the higher the corporate performance, and statistically significant, the relatively independent board of directors on the board level has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. At the managerial level, there is no significant negative correlation between company performance and the manager appointed by the board of directors, and the results need to be evaluated. The most centralized control allocation mode of listed companies in gem is not the best performance. The constraints of large shareholders, the selection of independent directors and the incentive of the general manager need to be solved and improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F271;F275


本文編號：1785867