本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 公司績效　； 參考：《上海交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵與公司績效一直是公司金融領(lǐng)域研究中十分重要的問題。股權(quán)激勵的實施旨在減少代理成本，促使管理層與股東的利益達(dá)成一致。較多的股權(quán)激勵會增加股東成本，造成“掘壕自守效應(yīng)”，較少的股權(quán)激勵難以匹敵管理層利用職務(wù)便利帶來的好處，股權(quán)激勵沒有相應(yīng)的效果。因此，只有股權(quán)激勵能夠快速調(diào)整到最優(yōu)水平時，才能對公司績效起到正向的影響，保障大股東的利益不受損害。 然而，為了達(dá)到最佳公司績效或是為了達(dá)到最佳的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)水平，企業(yè)適時的改變股權(quán)激勵計劃以及公司績效是有調(diào)整成本的。由于調(diào)整成本的存在，均衡所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與可觀察到的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不一致。本文將從調(diào)整成本的視角入手，定義調(diào)整成本為把股權(quán)激勵以及公司績效調(diào)整到合理水平所需的“費(fèi)用”。正是這些“費(fèi)用”，導(dǎo)致了公司實際股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)（公司績效）與最佳股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)（公司績效）的偏差。 文章首先對比研究了考慮調(diào)整成本之前以及考慮調(diào)整成本之后股權(quán)激勵與公司績效之間的關(guān)系。在不考慮調(diào)整成本的情況下，股權(quán)激勵與公司績效相互間有顯著的負(fù)向關(guān)系，但是考慮調(diào)整成本之后，公司績效對于股權(quán)激勵的負(fù)向影響消失；同時，，一些之前對解釋股權(quán)激勵以及公司績效顯著的控制變量變的不再顯著。這證明如果忽略了調(diào)整成本，會造成股權(quán)激勵、公司績效以及公司特點(diǎn)之間的謬誤關(guān)系。 文章最后尋找了調(diào)整成本的決定因素。在決定因素方面，股權(quán)激勵的調(diào)整速度與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例、高管數(shù)量以及市場價格正相關(guān)，公司績效的調(diào)整速度與沉沒成本正相關(guān)而與公司定價能力負(fù)相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive and corporate performance are very important issues in the field of corporate finance. The implementation of equity incentives aims to reduce agency costs and promote agreement between management and shareholders. More equity incentive will increase the cost of shareholders, resulting in "trench self-defense effect", less equity incentive is difficult to match the advantages of management to take advantage of job convenience, equity incentive has no corresponding effect. Therefore, only when the equity incentive can be adjusted to the optimal level quickly, can it have a positive impact on the corporate performance and protect the interests of the major shareholders from being harmed. However, in order to achieve the best corporate performance or to achieve the best level of equity structure, the enterprise timely changes the equity incentive plan and corporate performance is the adjustment cost. Due to the existence of adjustment cost, the equilibrium ownership structure is inconsistent with the observable ownership structure. From the perspective of adjustment cost, this paper defines the adjustment cost as the "cost" required to adjust the equity incentive and corporate performance to a reasonable level. It is these "expenses" that lead to the deviation between the actual ownership structure (corporate performance) and the optimal ownership structure (corporate performance). In this paper, the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance before and after adjusting cost is compared. Without considering the adjustment cost, there is a significant negative relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, but after considering the adjustment cost, the negative impact of corporate performance on equity incentive disappears. Some of the previous control variables that explain equity incentives and corporate performance have become less significant. This proves that if the adjustment cost is ignored, there is a false relationship between equity incentive, corporate performance and corporate characteristics. Finally, the article looks for the determinants of adjustment cost. In terms of determinants, the adjusting speed of equity incentive is positively related to the proportion of institutional investors, the number of senior executives and the market price. The adjustment speed of corporate performance is positively correlated with sunk cost and negatively correlated with the pricing ability of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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