本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 稅收征管�。� 參考：《浙江大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)是公司治理領(lǐng)域的重要內(nèi)容,采用股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,公司可以降低經(jīng)理人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),減少因?yàn)楣蓶|和經(jīng)理人之間的利益矛盾而造成的委托—代理成本。國內(nèi)外研究表明,雖然股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于公司治理來說具有積極意義,但卻也可能成為誘使經(jīng)理人進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)因。經(jīng)理人可能采取一定的方式人為調(diào)節(jié)報(bào)表盈余,使自己能夠在股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案當(dāng)中取得更多的利益。在股權(quán)激勵(lì)授予之前,經(jīng)理人可能實(shí)施向下的盈余管理,從而提高激勵(lì)標(biāo)的價(jià)值。這樣的行為可能對(duì)公司所有者的利益造成侵害,因而,研究和識(shí)別股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后經(jīng)理人的盈余管理行為有利于維護(hù)公司所有者的利益,提高股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的有效性,有利于公司的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展。由于盈余管理的手段多種多樣,既涉及應(yīng)稅行為,又涉及非應(yīng)稅行為。因此,在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃實(shí)施的過程中,所得稅成本成為了盈余管理方式選擇的一個(gè)重要參考因素。本文從股權(quán)激勵(lì)這一特定公司治理行為出發(fā),研究不同宏觀環(huán)境下經(jīng)理人盈余管理行為的異質(zhì)性,填補(bǔ)相關(guān)研究的空白,識(shí)別經(jīng)理人機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,也為進(jìn)一步完善公司治理機(jī)制提供依據(jù)。同時(shí),稅收征管強(qiáng)度變量的引入有助于識(shí)別經(jīng)理人進(jìn)行盈余管理方式選擇時(shí)的避稅動(dòng)因,可以為稅收征管部門提供一定的參考。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在股權(quán)激勵(lì)授予前,公司會(huì)實(shí)施向下的真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理。在高強(qiáng)度的稅收征管水平下,公司向下的真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理會(huì)受到抑制。進(jìn)一步地,股權(quán)激勵(lì)授予階段的公司,稅收征管顯著抑制其向下的真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理,經(jīng)理人更加傾向采用應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理達(dá)到業(yè)績目標(biāo)。基于研究結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為公司應(yīng)提高內(nèi)部治理水平,識(shí)別并控制經(jīng)理人對(duì)利潤的過度操控;投資者在分析公司投資價(jià)值時(shí)應(yīng)重點(diǎn)關(guān)注公司行為對(duì)盈余管理可能造成的影響,并加以識(shí)別,從而排除"盈余異象"的干擾,判斷公司的真實(shí)價(jià)值;稅收征管部門應(yīng)當(dāng)依法實(shí)施行政監(jiān)管,對(duì)異常報(bào)稅的公司進(jìn)行識(shí)別和審核,防止逃稅行為的滋生。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is an important content in the field of corporate governance. By adopting the equity incentive plan, the company can reduce the moral hazard of managers and the principal-agent cost caused by the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers.Studies at home and abroad show that although equity incentive has positive significance for corporate governance, it may also become an incentive to induce managers to carry out earnings management.Managers may adopt a certain way to artificially adjust their earnings so that they can gain more benefits from equity incentive schemes.Managers may implement downward earnings management before equity incentives are awarded, thus increasing the value of incentive marks.Such behavior may infringe upon the interests of the owner of the company. Therefore, studying and identifying the earnings management behavior of the managers before and after equity incentive is conducive to safeguarding the interests of the owner of the company and improving the effectiveness of the implementation of the equity incentive.It is good for the long-term development of the company.Earnings management involves both taxable and non-taxable behavior because of its variety of means.Therefore, the cost of income tax has become an important reference factor in the choice of earnings management during the implementation of equity incentive plan.Starting from the specific corporate governance behavior of equity incentive, this paper studies the heterogeneity of managers' earnings management behavior in different macro environments, fills up the gaps in relevant research, and identifies the opportunistic behavior of managers.Also for the further improvement of corporate governance mechanism to provide the basis.At the same time, the introduction of the intensity variable of tax collection is helpful to identify the tax avoidance motivation when managers choose the way of earnings management, and can provide a certain reference for the tax collection and management department.In this paper, we find that before equity incentive is granted, the company will carry out downward earnings management of real activities.At the level of high-intensity tax collection, the downward earnings management of the company's real activity will be restrained.Further, in the stock incentive awarding stage, the tax collection and management significantly inhibit the downward true earnings management, and managers tend to use accrual earnings management to achieve performance goals.Based on the conclusion of the study, this paper holds that the company should improve the level of internal governance, identify and control the excessive manipulation of profits by managers, and that investors should focus on the possible impact of corporate behavior on earnings management when analyzing the investment value of the company.In order to eliminate the interference of "earnings anomaly" and judge the true value of the company, the tax collection and management department should carry out administrative supervision according to law, identify and examine the abnormal tax return companies, and prevent the breeding of tax evasion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

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