本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司　切入點(diǎn)：生命周期　出處：《西安理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場于2009年10月30日正式掛牌成立,截至2016年12月31日共有573家公司在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市。隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)板的不斷向前發(fā)展,其存在的問題也逐漸浮出水面,其中控制權(quán)爭奪問題最為明顯�？刂茩�(quán)的有效配置是公司治理研究的核心,也是提高公司績效的關(guān)鍵。如何規(guī)范創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的控制權(quán)配置進(jìn)而提高企業(yè)績效是理論界和企業(yè)治理實(shí)踐都熱切關(guān)注的問題。由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板突出的家族特性、高成長性以及高科技性,使得其在控制權(quán)配置的問題上明顯區(qū)別于主板上市公司,無法直接應(yīng)用主板上市公司現(xiàn)有的控制權(quán)配置策略。因此,為了促進(jìn)創(chuàng)業(yè)板更好更快的發(fā)展,有必要單獨(dú)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置與企業(yè)績效的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。目前,學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效影響的研究尚處于起步階段。本文基于企業(yè)生命周期理論分階段研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效的影響,對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展具有實(shí)踐指導(dǎo)意義。首先,本文在梳理相關(guān)理論和文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上分析了企業(yè)生命周期對(duì)控制權(quán)配置與企業(yè)績效關(guān)系的影響機(jī)理。其次,采用現(xiàn)金流特征組合法對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司進(jìn)行企業(yè)生命周期的劃分。最后,運(yùn)用多元回歸分析方法,對(duì)不同發(fā)展階段下創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效的影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果表明:創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效的影響存在生命周期的狀態(tài)依存性。成長期股權(quán)集中度,董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與企業(yè)績效正相關(guān),而成熟期股權(quán)集中度,董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與企業(yè)績效負(fù)相關(guān)。成長期股權(quán)制衡度、董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例與企業(yè)績效負(fù)相關(guān),而成熟期股權(quán)制衡度、董事會(huì)規(guī)模、獨(dú)立董事比例與企業(yè)績效正相關(guān)。本論文重點(diǎn)關(guān)注不同生命周期階段創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效的影響,在豐富兩者關(guān)系理論研究的同時(shí),也旨在為創(chuàng)業(yè)板的更好發(fā)展獻(xiàn)計(jì)獻(xiàn)策。本文認(rèn)為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的控制權(quán)應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)其生命周期的演變而進(jìn)行動(dòng)態(tài)配置,最大限度地發(fā)揮控制權(quán)配置對(duì)企業(yè)績效的積極作用。
[Abstract]:China's gem market was officially established on October 30, 2009. As of December 31, 2016, there are 573 companies listed on the gem.With the continuous development of gem, the problems of gem emerge gradually, among which the problem of control control is the most obvious.The effective allocation of control rights is the core of corporate governance research and the key to improve corporate performance.How to regulate the allocation of control rights of listed companies in gem and then improve the performance of enterprises is a hot concern in both the theory circle and the practice of corporate governance.Because of the outstanding family characteristics, high growth and high technology, the gem is obviously different from the main board listed companies in the allocation of control rights, and can not directly apply the existing control allocation strategy of the main board listed companies.Therefore, in order to promote the better and faster development of the gem, it is necessary to study the relationship between the allocation of control rights and the performance of the listed companies.At present, the academic research on the influence of the allocation of control rights on the performance of listed companies in gem is still in its infancy.Based on the theory of enterprise life cycle, this paper studies the influence of the allocation of control rights on the performance of the listed companies in the gem, which has practical guiding significance for the long-term development of the gem.Firstly, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of enterprise life cycle on the relationship between control allocation and enterprise performance on the basis of combing relevant theories and literature.Secondly, the cash flow characteristic combination method is used to divide the life cycle of listed companies in gem.Finally, using the method of multiple regression analysis, this paper makes an empirical test on the influence of the allocation of control rights on the performance of listed companies in the gem at different stages of development.The results show that the influence of the allocation of control rights on the performance of listed companies in the gem is dependent on the state of life cycle.The degree of ownership concentration in growth period, the combination of chairman and general manager is positively related to enterprise performance, while the degree of ownership concentration in mature period and the combination of chairman and general manager are negatively correlated with enterprise performance.The degree of equity balance, the size of board of directors and the proportion of independent directors are negatively correlated with corporate performance, while the degree of equity balance, the size of board of directors and the proportion of independent directors in mature period are positively correlated with corporate performance.This paper focuses on the impact of the allocation of control rights on the performance of listed companies in different life cycle stages of gem. While enriching the theoretical study of the relationship between the two, it also aims to provide suggestions for the better development of gem.This paper holds that the control rights of listed companies in the gem should be dynamically allocated according to the evolution of their life cycle, and the allocation of control rights should play an active role in the performance of enterprises to the maximum extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F271;F275

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