本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板　切入點(diǎn)：企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性　出處：《西北大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管人員薪酬問題一直是學(xué)者和企業(yè)家們的關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn),他們是企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策層,所做的決策關(guān)乎公司發(fā)展方向。對(duì)于我國(guó)股份公司“兩權(quán)分離”而產(chǎn)生的問題,需要通過公司治理體系的不斷完善以及合理的薪酬體系的建立來解決。由于美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)引發(fā)的全球金融危機(jī),高管薪酬問題再度成為公眾關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板作為主板的重要補(bǔ)充部分,給我國(guó)高科技、高成長(zhǎng)性企業(yè)提供了良好的融資平臺(tái)。這個(gè)新興板塊的高成長(zhǎng)性作為其突出特點(diǎn),高管薪酬激勵(lì)的效果以及高管薪酬對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性的貢獻(xiàn)程度,是我們值得探討的一個(gè)問題。 本文以企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)為出發(fā)點(diǎn),根據(jù)高管的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)將自變量高管薪酬分為貨幣薪酬、權(quán)益薪酬和股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度,根據(jù)這種分類方法對(duì)高管薪酬進(jìn)行理論分析,采用相關(guān)性分析法和線性回歸分析法來觀察與企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性之間的關(guān)系。本文得出以下主要結(jié)論：高管的權(quán)益薪酬與企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)能力的相關(guān)性較高,與貨幣薪酬的激勵(lì)相比,權(quán)益薪酬更能夠提高高管工作的積極性；創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度對(duì)成長(zhǎng)性的貢獻(xiàn)是不顯著的,由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板的特殊性,持股比例過高會(huì)產(chǎn)生“確定效應(yīng)”,甚至可能抵消高管薪酬的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果。 因此本文認(rèn)為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管薪酬的有效性,并不是在于高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的強(qiáng)度,而是重視高管貨幣薪酬的基礎(chǔ)上提高高管的權(quán)益薪酬,避免股權(quán)激勵(lì)程度過高產(chǎn)生的負(fù)面影響。在理論分析與實(shí)證分析的基礎(chǔ)上,在本文最后提出了一些有針對(duì)性的建議。
[Abstract]:The issue of executive compensation has always been the focus of attention of scholars and entrepreneurs. They are the decision makers of enterprises, and the decisions they make are related to the development direction of the company. Need to be solved through the continuous improvement of the corporate governance system and the establishment of a reasonable compensation system. Because of the global financial crisis caused by the outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States, The issue of executive compensation has once again become the focus of public attention. As an important supplementary part of the main board, the gem gives our country high technology. High-growth enterprises provide a good financing platform. The high growth of this emerging plate as its outstanding characteristics, the effect of executive compensation incentive and the contribution of executive compensation to growth of gem, It is a problem worth discussing. In this paper, according to the structure of executive compensation, the independent variable executive compensation is divided into monetary compensation, equity compensation and equity incentive intensity. According to this classification method, the paper makes a theoretical analysis of executive compensation. The correlation analysis and linear regression analysis are used to observe the relationship between the growth and the growth of the firm. The main conclusions are as follows: the equity compensation of the executive is highly correlated with the growth ability of the enterprise, compared with the incentive of monetary compensation. Equity compensation can improve the enthusiasm of senior executives. The contribution of incentive intensity to growth is not significant, because of the particularity of gem. Excessive shareholdings can have a "deterministic effect" and may even offset the equity incentive effect of executive compensation. Therefore, this paper argues that the effectiveness of executive compensation in gem listed companies is not due to the intensity of executive equity incentive, but to improve the equity compensation of executives on the basis of monetary compensation. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, some specific suggestions are put forward at the end of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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