發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-27 08:19

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：激勵(lì)水平　出處：《南華大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)、經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離，引發(fā)了信息不對(duì)稱、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、逆向選擇等委托代理問題。激勵(lì)制度有利于這一問題的解決，刺激了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的產(chǎn)生。股權(quán)激勵(lì)通過給予管理者一定的激勵(lì)股票，，使其成為股東，參與公司的剩余收益的分配，同時(shí)共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，有利于公司的利益、管理人員的利益與股東的利益的緊密聯(lián)系，促使管理者提高經(jīng)營效率，帶動(dòng)公司業(yè)績的提升，緩解委托代理問題。 在國外，股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的出現(xiàn)至今已有60多年的歷史，大多數(shù)學(xué)者認(rèn)為，股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施可顯著提升上市公司的業(yè)績。我國自2005年12月《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法（試行）》出臺(tái)以來，股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度得到較快的發(fā)展。但是，中外上市公司面臨不同市場環(huán)境、自身?xiàng)l件有差異等，在我國，股權(quán)激勵(lì)能否提高上市公司業(yè)績，值得深入研究。 本文從我國國情出發(fā)，實(shí)證研究了股權(quán)激勵(lì)與上市公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。全文分為以下五章：第一章為緒論。主要介紹了研究的背景及意義，回顧了國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究成果，闡明了本文的研究思路、研究內(nèi)容、研究方法及創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二章界定了高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)的概念，介紹了委托代理理論、人力資本理論、管理學(xué)激勵(lì)理論，以及股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司業(yè)績的作用原理，為實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。第三章回顧了股權(quán)激勵(lì)在中國的歷史演變和執(zhí)行情況，指出我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施過程中存在的主要問題。第四章為實(shí)證部分。選取2007-2011年實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的154家上市公司為研究樣本，通過樣本公司和配對(duì)公司橫向與縱向的業(yè)績對(duì)比，及利用多元回歸分析，實(shí)證了股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系，同時(shí)，研究了不同行業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果。第五章得出了本文的結(jié)論，指出本文的不足之處，并提出了充分發(fā)揮股權(quán)激勵(lì)積極作用的對(duì)策建議。 本文主要結(jié)論如下：（1）股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平與上市公司業(yè)績之間呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，即股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例越大，企業(yè)業(yè)績?cè)胶�。�?）不同行業(yè)中，股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例影響業(yè)績的程度不存在顯著差異。（3）現(xiàn)階段我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在實(shí)施范圍較小、激勵(lì)比例偏低、相關(guān)制度不健全等問題，股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)業(yè)績提升的幅度較小，其有效性有待提高。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises leads to the problems of information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection and other principal-agent problems. The incentive system is conducive to the solution of this problem. Equity incentive by giving managers a certain incentive to become shareholders, participate in the distribution of the company's residual income, at the same time, share the risks, which is beneficial to the interests of the company. The close relationship between the interests of the managers and the interests of the shareholders urges the managers to improve the management efficiency, to promote the performance of the company, and to alleviate the principal-agent problem. In foreign countries, the emergence of equity incentive system has more than 60 years of history, most scholars believe that, The implementation of equity incentive can significantly improve the performance of listed companies. Since the introduction of the measures on Equity incentive Management of listed companies (trial implementation) in December 2005, the equity incentive system has developed rapidly in China. Chinese and foreign listed companies are faced with different market environment and their own conditions are different. In our country, whether equity incentive can improve the performance of listed companies is worth further study. Based on the situation of China, this paper empirically studies the relationship between equity incentive and the performance of listed companies. The thesis is divided into the following five chapters: the first chapter is the introduction. It mainly introduces the background and significance of the research, and reviews the related research results at home and abroad. The second chapter defines the concept of executive equity incentive, introduces the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, management incentive theory. The effect of equity incentive on corporate performance lays a theoretical foundation for the implementation of equity incentive. Chapter three reviews the historical evolution and implementation of equity incentive in China. The main problems in the implementation of equity incentive in China are pointed out. Chapter four is the empirical part. 154 listed companies that implemented equity incentive from 2007 to 2011 are selected as the research samples, and the horizontal and vertical performance of the sample companies and matched companies are compared. And by using multiple regression analysis, this paper demonstrates the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and studies the effect of equity incentive in different industries. Chapter five draws the conclusion of this paper, and points out the shortcomings of this paper. And put forward the countermeasures and suggestions to give full play to the positive role of equity incentive. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the level of equity incentive and the performance of listed companies, that is, the greater the proportion of equity incentive, the better the performance of enterprises. There is no significant difference in the degree of influence of equity incentive ratio on performance. (3) at present, there are some problems such as small scope of implementation, low incentive ratio, imperfect related system and so on, and the extent of equity incentive to performance improvement is relatively small. Its effectiveness needs to be improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92

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