本文選題：政府管制　切入點：薪酬變動　出處：《廣東財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：人力資本作為企業(yè)資源要素中最為積極和重要的因素,是企業(yè)發(fā)展和價值增值的動力和源泉。公司治理理論主要圍繞高管薪酬激勵研究展開,作為人力資本重要組成元素的普通職工如何影響企業(yè)價值,研究一直相對較少。本文從企業(yè)價值與薪酬體系關(guān)系出發(fā),以2009-2015年中國上市公司為樣本,將高管薪酬與普通職工薪酬進行對比分析,同時,在政府政策影響背景下,分國有和非國有上市公司,研究高管與普通職工薪酬的差距變化以及薪酬——業(yè)績敏感性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)在企業(yè)加薪時,高管薪酬增加幅度高于普通職工;在企業(yè)減薪時,高管薪酬降低幅度低于普通職工。(2)在企業(yè)業(yè)績上升時,高管享有比普通職工更高的報酬增幅;當企業(yè)業(yè)績下降時,高管薪酬變化幅度相比于普通職工無明顯差異、或仍有一定增幅;即在公司薪酬總額的分享上,由于高管享有企業(yè)代理權(quán)和控制權(quán),高管與普通職工薪酬存在隨業(yè)績變動的不對稱性,從而使得薪酬機制最大限度偏向于高管薪酬的保全。(3)政府政策的影響對象為國有企業(yè)高級管理人員,因此,國有企業(yè)高管薪酬變動與薪酬業(yè)績敏感性低于非國有企業(yè),同時,高管管理層權(quán)力越低,受政府政策影響程度越大。本文實證結(jié)果有助于政府改良和推進實施企業(yè)薪酬管制;有助于企業(yè)所有者合理制定激勵機制;對于預(yù)防人才流失將起到一個不容忽視的重要作用。
[Abstract]:As the most active and important factor of enterprise resource, human capital is the motive force and source of enterprise development and value increment. As an important element of human capital, there has been relatively little research on how ordinary workers and staff members influence the enterprise value. This paper, based on the relationship between the enterprise value and the compensation system, takes the Chinese listed companies from 2009-2015 as a sample. This paper makes a comparative analysis of executive compensation and ordinary staff compensation, and at the same time, under the influence of government policies, the listed companies are divided into state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. Study on the pay gap between executives and ordinary employees and pay sensitivity. The study found that: 1) when a company raises a salary, the increase in executive pay is higher than that of an ordinary worker; when a company reduces its salary, The reduction of executive compensation is lower than that of ordinary employees.) when the performance of the enterprise rises, the executive enjoys a higher increase in compensation than the ordinary employees; when the performance of the enterprise drops, the range of the change of the executive pay is not significantly different from that of the ordinary employees. Or there is still a certain increase; that is, in the share of the total compensation of the company, because the executives have the power of agency and control of the enterprise, there is asymmetry between the executive and the ordinary employees' compensation with the change of the performance. As a result, the compensation mechanism is biased towards the preservation of executive compensation to the maximum extent. (3) the government policy affects the senior managers of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the sensitivity of executive compensation and salary performance of state-owned enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises, at the same time, The lower the power of executive management, the greater the degree of influence by government policy. The empirical results of this paper are helpful for the government to improve and promote the implementation of corporate compensation control, to help business owners to develop a reasonable incentive mechanism; For the prevention of brain drain will play an important role that can not be ignored.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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本文編號：1667071