發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-19 18:20

  本文選題：獨(dú)立董事　切入點(diǎn)：政府官員型　出處：《會(huì)計(jì)研究》2017年08期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文基于公司違規(guī)視角檢驗(yàn)了兩類官員型獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)督功能。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),聘任政府官員型獨(dú)立董事的公司違規(guī)傾向更高,違規(guī)被稽查的概率更低;聘任高校官員型獨(dú)立董事的公司違規(guī)傾向更低,違規(guī)被稽查的概率沒有表現(xiàn)更低。進(jìn)一步還發(fā)現(xiàn),對(duì)公司過度投資發(fā)揮監(jiān)督功能是官員型獨(dú)董影響違規(guī)的重要傳導(dǎo)路徑;政府官員型獨(dú)董背后的尋租能力是其監(jiān)督失效的主要原因,而高校官員型獨(dú)董則憑借其專業(yè)優(yōu)勢(shì)發(fā)揮了積極的監(jiān)督作用。本文的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明,"18號(hào)文"的政策沖擊導(dǎo)致的官員型獨(dú)董的離職,一方面切斷了公司通過聘任政府官員擔(dān)任獨(dú)立董事而建立政治關(guān)系的通道,有利于證券市場秩序的維護(hù),但同時(shí)也將部分能夠發(fā)揮積極監(jiān)督作用的高校官員型獨(dú)董排除在外。
[Abstract]:Based on the perspective of company violation, this paper examines the supervisory function of two types of official independent directors. The study shows that the company employing government official independent directors has a higher tendency to violate the regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is lower. The company employing independent directors of university officials has a lower tendency to violate regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is not lower. Furthermore, it is found that overinvestment and supervision is an important transmission path to influence the violation; The main reason for the failure of supervision is the rent-seeking ability behind the government officials' independent directors. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that the policy impact of "article 18" has led to the departure of the official independent director. On the one hand, it cuts off the channel of establishing political relations by employing government officials as independent directors, which is conducive to the maintenance of the order of the securities market, but also excludes some university officials who can play an active role in supervision.
【作者單位】： 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71672149、71620107005、71273212) 教育部高等學(xué)校全國優(yōu)秀博士學(xué)位論文作者專項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目(201493) 中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金(JBK1407116)的資助
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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