本文選題：上市公司　切入點：治理結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國資本市場的不斷深入發(fā)展,投資者專業(yè)分析能力的不斷提升,上市公司對財務報告監(jiān)管力度的不斷增強,尤其自我國頒布了新的企業(yè)會計準則之后,使得傳統(tǒng)意義上低成本,易操作的應計盈余管理活動實施的空間日益減少,隱蔽性更強的真實盈余管理活動逐漸成為上市公司操縱盈余的主流。上市公司過度實施真實盈余管理會誤導會計信息使用者做出錯誤的決策,損害會計信息使用者的利益;導致企業(yè)偏離最佳決策方案,潛在地危害企業(yè)的持續(xù)經(jīng)營;不利于資本市場的資源進行合理配置,破壞資本市場的健康有序發(fā)展。上市公司的真實盈余管理程度與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)密切相關,設計并實施合理的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)有利于規(guī)范企業(yè)管理,發(fā)揮企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的有效性,對抑制上市公司實施真實盈余管理活動產(chǎn)生重要的作用。論文以上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與真實盈余管理的相關研究成果做為切入點,在采用文獻綜述法對目前國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進行了較為全面、詳細介紹的基礎上,闡述了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)及真實盈余管理的涵義與理論基礎。通過分析我國上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀,結(jié)合真實盈余管理產(chǎn)生的動機與實施手段,以我國滬深A股市場1891家上市公司2013—2015年財務數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,選擇7個變量并利用Roychowdhury模型進行回歸分析,研究上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對真實盈余管理的影響。得出的結(jié)論包括:股權集中度、董事長與總經(jīng)理兼任情況與真實盈余管理程度呈正相關關系;國有股持股比例、董事會規(guī)模、獨立董事所占董事會比例、監(jiān)事會規(guī)模、高管持股比例與真實盈余管理程度呈負相關關系。最后針對實證分析結(jié)果,結(jié)合我國實際情況,提出完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以規(guī)范真實盈余管理的建議,旨在幫助上市公司的所有者設計并實施合理的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),以保障會計信息質(zhì)量,促進資本市場的資源優(yōu)化配置,推動我國上市公司持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:With the development of the capital market and the improvement of the professional analysis ability of the investors, the supervision of the financial reports by listed companies has been strengthened, especially since the promulgation of the new accounting standards for enterprises in our country. The traditional low cost and easy to operate accrual management activities have less and less space to implement, The more hidden real earnings management activities gradually become the mainstream of earnings manipulation by listed companies. Excessive implementation of real earnings management by listed companies will mislead accounting information users to make wrong decisions and harm the interests of accounting information users. Causes the enterprise to deviate from the best decision plan, potentially endangers the enterprise's continuing operation, is not conducive to the rational allocation of the resources in the capital market, The degree of real earnings management of listed companies is closely related to the corporate governance structure. The design and implementation of a reasonable corporate governance structure is conducive to standardizing enterprise management and giving play to the effectiveness of internal control. It plays an important role in restraining the real earnings management activities of listed companies. This paper takes the related research results of listed companies' governance structure and real earnings management as the starting point. On the basis of a comprehensive and detailed introduction to the current research situation at home and abroad by the method of literature review, This paper expounds the meaning and theoretical basis of corporate governance structure and real earnings management. By analyzing the present situation of the governance structure of listed companies in China, it combines the motivation and implementation means of real earnings management. Taking the financial data of 1891 listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets for 2013-2015 as a sample, seven variables are selected and the regression analysis is carried out using Roychowdhury model. This paper studies the influence of the governance structure of listed companies on real earnings management. The conclusions include: ownership concentration, the relationship between the co-appointment of chairman and general manager and the degree of real earnings management, the proportion of state-owned shares, the size of board of directors. The proportion of independent directors to the board of directors, the size of the board of supervisors, the proportion of senior management shares are negatively related to the real earnings management. Finally, according to the results of empirical analysis, combined with the actual situation in China, In order to help the owners of listed companies to design and implement reasonable corporate governance structure, to ensure the quality of accounting information and to promote the optimal allocation of capital market resources, the paper puts forward some suggestions to perfect the governance structure of listed companies to standardize the real earnings management. Promote the sustainable and healthy development of listed companies in China.
【學位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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