發(fā)布時(shí)間：2017-12-31 07:28

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：控股股東代理問(wèn)題與公司投融資決策　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 控股股東 現(xiàn)金持有量 債務(wù)比率 股權(quán)再融資 投資支出

【摘要】：在完美市場(chǎng)假設(shè)下,公司投資支出和增長(zhǎng)不取決于融資資金來(lái)源,而僅與投資機(jī)會(huì)多寡有關(guān)(Modigliani and Miller,1958)。在放松了MM一系列嚴(yán)格的假設(shè)后,Jensen and Meckling (1976)認(rèn)為管理者與股東之間的利益偏差將影響公司融資行為,進(jìn)而影響投資支出。Myers and Majluf (1984)也分析得出投資者與公司之間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)導(dǎo)致公司外部融資成本過(guò)高,引發(fā)投資不足問(wèn)題。這些研究以分散的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)為背景探討信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)對(duì)公司投融資行為的影響,所考慮的代理問(wèn)題也是由管理者與股東之間的利益偏差引起的。 事實(shí)上大量研究都發(fā)現(xiàn)在世界上的大部分國(guó)家中,上市公司的股權(quán)都較為集中,存在一個(gè)或多個(gè)大股東對(duì)上市公司進(jìn)行控制。獲得控制權(quán)的大股東有能力和動(dòng)機(jī)侵占公司資產(chǎn)、損害其他投資者利益,在這種情況下公司治理的核心問(wèn)題是如何解決控股股東與其他投資者之間的代理問(wèn)題,從而有效保護(hù)其他投資者利益。我國(guó)的情況更是如此,上市公司股權(quán)高度集中、外部治理環(huán)境不夠完善,導(dǎo)致控股股東侵害其他投資者的事件頻頻發(fā)生。除了直接通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)交易、資金占用等方式侵占公司資產(chǎn)外,控股股東還有可能操縱公司日常經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng),并在此過(guò)程中獲取控制權(quán)私利。 控股股東操縱上市公司日常經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的行為主要體現(xiàn)在,通過(guò)過(guò)度融資、過(guò)度投資來(lái)增加控制資源規(guī)模,從而獲得更大的控制權(quán)交易或轉(zhuǎn)移時(shí)的溢價(jià)。本文從三個(gè)方面考察了控股股東對(duì)公司投融資行為的影響：第一,探討了控股股東對(duì)上市公司現(xiàn)金持有行為的影響,并進(jìn)一步分析了控股股東控制下現(xiàn)金持有量影響投資支出的機(jī)理過(guò)程；第二,探討了控股股東對(duì)上市公司債務(wù)融資行為的影響,并進(jìn)一步分析了債務(wù)融資對(duì)投資支出的影響；第三,探討了控股股東對(duì)上市公司股權(quán)再融資行為的影響,并進(jìn)一步分析了股權(quán)再融資行為對(duì)投資支出的影響。 在回顧和總結(jié)已有投融資相關(guān)理論和控股股東侵占行為的相關(guān)理論和文獻(xiàn)后,本文通過(guò)構(gòu)建控股股東控制下的上市公司融資模型,從理論上分析了控股股東對(duì)上市公司現(xiàn)金持有量、債務(wù)水平以及股權(quán)再融資決策的影響。進(jìn)一步本文分析了控股股東融資行為影響投資支出的機(jī)理過(guò)程,并采用我國(guó)上市公司2003-2011年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,本文的研究主要得到了如下幾個(gè)方面的結(jié)論： 第一,被西方學(xué)者理論和實(shí)踐證明有效的公司治理機(jī)制,如董事會(huì)治理、管理者股權(quán)激勵(lì)以及多個(gè)大股東股權(quán)制衡等不能有效遏制控股股東侵占行為,因而不能起到公司治理、保護(hù)投資者利益的作用。主要原因在于上市公司處在控股股東的超強(qiáng)控制之下,董事會(huì)、管理者出于控股股東利益實(shí)施財(cái)務(wù)決策,其他大股東持股較低、股權(quán)制衡力量有限。 第二,通過(guò)模型分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文發(fā)現(xiàn)控股股東與中小股東之間的利益沖突顯著影響公司現(xiàn)金持有量�？毓晒蓶|兩權(quán)分離系數(shù)高、控股股東為國(guó)有屬性時(shí),公司持有更多的現(xiàn)金資產(chǎn)。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在控制了投融資行為的內(nèi)生性后,控股股東代理問(wèn)題較為嚴(yán)重的公司所持有的現(xiàn)金持有量對(duì)投資支出的影響更大。以上研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明控股股東出于侵占動(dòng)機(jī)將更多的現(xiàn)金留存于公司內(nèi)部,并可能將現(xiàn)金資產(chǎn)用于過(guò)度投資以獲得控制權(quán)私利。 第三,控股股東與債權(quán)人之間的利益偏差顯著影響公司債務(wù)水平,控股股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離程度越大,公司債務(wù)水平越高。在控股股東代理問(wèn)題較為嚴(yán)重時(shí),公司的債務(wù)策略更為激進(jìn),表現(xiàn)為公司會(huì)在現(xiàn)金流增加的情形下以更大比例償還債務(wù),而在現(xiàn)金流減少的情形下以更大比例增加債務(wù)。負(fù)債融資并沒(méi)有發(fā)揮相機(jī)治理作用而減少投資水平,相反在控股股東代理問(wèn)題較為嚴(yán)重時(shí),公司舉債導(dǎo)致了投資支出的增加。按照這一分析邏輯,當(dāng)公司已經(jīng)存在過(guò)度投資時(shí),增加債務(wù)加劇了過(guò)度投資程度。 第四,控股股東與潛在股東之間的利益沖突顯著影響公司股權(quán)再融資計(jì)劃,控股股東僅會(huì)在自身利益增加的情況下發(fā)行股票,導(dǎo)致公司股權(quán)再融資實(shí)施的概率與控股股東兩權(quán)分離程度成正比。進(jìn)一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相比于未進(jìn)行股權(quán)再融資的公司,進(jìn)行了股權(quán)再融資的公司投資水平將顯著提升,控股股東兩權(quán)分離程度越大,再融資資金對(duì)投資支出的正向影響越強(qiáng),并且不同程度代理問(wèn)題下公司增加投資支出所導(dǎo)致的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果也存在差異。這些結(jié)果說(shuō)明了控股股東通過(guò)股權(quán)再融資行為侵占新股東利益,并且通過(guò)將融資資金用于投資以增加控制權(quán)私利。 總的來(lái)講,本文通過(guò)對(duì)控股股東控制下上市公司的融資行為以及融資影響投資支出的機(jī)理過(guò)程進(jìn)行研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)在股權(quán)集中的情形下,投資者法律保護(hù)水平較差時(shí),控股股東自利動(dòng)機(jī)導(dǎo)致公司融資行為、投資行為扭曲�？毓晒蓶|通過(guò)過(guò)度融資、過(guò)度投資來(lái)侵占公司資產(chǎn),獲取控制權(quán)私利�？刂茩�(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離加劇了控股股東利益侵占行為,損害了其他投資者利益。為了能夠有效監(jiān)督控股股東行為,保護(hù)投資者利益,我國(guó)必須完善資本市場(chǎng)建設(shè),為各項(xiàng)公司治理機(jī)制效應(yīng)的發(fā)揮提供條件。同時(shí)還需要提高投資者法律保護(hù)水平,引導(dǎo)資源流向效率高的行業(yè)和企業(yè),優(yōu)化資源配置效率。
[Abstract]:In the perfect market assumption, investment spending and growth does not depend on financing sources, but only with the investment opportunity (about Modigliani and Miller, 1958). In the relaxed MM a series of strict assumptions, Jensen and Meckling (1976) considers the interests of deviation between shareholders and managers will affect the company's financing behavior.Myers and, and then affects the investment Majluf (1984) analysis of information asymmetry between the investors and the company's cost of external financing company is too high, cause the problem of inadequate investment. The ownership structure of these studies is to spread the background of the impact of information asymmetry on the company's investment behavior, the agency problem is caused by the deviation between the interests of shareholders and managers.
In fact, a large number of studies have found that most countries in the world, the shares of listed companies are more concentrated, there is one or more large shareholders to control the listed company. The large shareholders have the ability and motivation to misappropriate company assets, other damage the interests of investors, the core issue in this case of corporate governance is how to solve the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other investors, so as to effectively protect the interests of other investors. Especially in the case of China, the equity concentration of listed companies, the external governance environment is not perfect, leading to the controlling shareholders encroach on other investors frequently. In addition to direct through related transactions, funds etc. misappropriate company assets, controlling shareholders may also control the daily business activities of the company, to obtain private benefits of control and in the process.
The controlling shareholder of listed companies to manipulate daily business activities are mainly embodied in, through excessive financing, excessive investment to increase the resources control scale, to gain greater control over the transaction or transfer premium. This paper examines three aspects of the controlling shareholder of the company's investment and financing behavior influence: first, to investigate the effect of holding the shareholders of the cash holdings of listed companies, and further analyzes the controlling shareholder control mechanism of investment expenditure under the influence of cash holdings; second, to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders of listed companies debt financing behavior, and further analysis of the impact of debt financing on investment expenditures; third, to investigate the effect of controlling shareholders of Listed Companies Equity Refinancing Behavior, and further analyzes the Equity Refinancing Behavior of investment spending.
In the review of related theory and summarizes the existing financing theory and the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and literatures, this paper constructs the model of financing of listed companies under the control of the controlling shareholders, from the theoretical analysis of the controlling shareholders of listed companies cash holdings, the impact of debt level and equity refinancing decision. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the process of holding shareholder financing behavior influence mechanism of investment spending, and make an empirical study on the listed companies in China experience data of 2003-2011, this paper obtained the following conclusions:
First, by western scholars theory and practice proves that the effective mechanism of corporate governance, such as board governance, equity incentive management and multiple large shareholder equity balance can not effectively curb the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders, and therefore can not play the corporate governance, protect the interests of investors. The main reason is that under the strong control of Listed Companies in holding the board of shareholders, the implementation of financial decision-making management for the interests of the controlling shareholder and other shareholders equity is low, the balance of power is limited.
Second, through the model analysis and empirical test, this paper found that the conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders affect the company's cash holdings. The controlling shareholder of two rights separation coefficient is high, the controlling shareholder is state-owned property, the company holding more cash assets. Further research the control of the endogenous financing behavior. The impact of cash holdings held by the controlling shareholder agency problem is more serious, investment spending even more. This result indicates that the controlling shareholders for occupation motivation will be more cash retained in the company, and may be used for cash assets over investment to obtain private benefits of control.
Third, the interests of deviation between controlling shareholders and creditors affect the company's debt level, the separation degree of controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights is greater, the higher the level of corporate debt. In the controlling shareholder agency problem is more serious, the company's debt strategy is more aggressive, the performance of the company will increase the cash flow in with a greater proportion of debt repayment, while cash flow reduced circumstances with greater increase in the proportion of debt. Debt financing does not play a governance role and reduce the level of investment, on the contrary in the more serious agency problem of controlling shareholder, the company's debt to increase investment spending. According to this analysis logic, when the company already exists over investment, increase debt exacerbated by excessive investment.
Fourth, between the controlling shareholders and potential shareholders conflicts of interest affect the company's equity refinancing plan, the controlling shareholder will only increase in their own interests under the condition of issuing shares, resulting in equity refinancing probability and the controlling shareholder of the implementation of the separation of two rights is proportional to the degree. Further research found that compared to non equity the financing of the company, the level of investment in the equity refinancing of the company will significantly enhance the controlling shareholder, the separation degree of the two rights, refinancing funds positive impact on investment spending is stronger, and the different degree of agency problems under the company increase investment spending caused by the economic consequences are also different. These results show that by controlling shareholders equity refinancing behavior of the new occupation of the interests of shareholders, and the financing funds for investment to increase private benefits of control.
In general, this paper through the research on the process of financing behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies under the control and influence mechanism of financing investment spending, found in concentrated ownership situation, investor protection level is poor, the controlling shareholders self-interest leads to corporate financing behavior, investment behavior distortion. By controlling shareholders over financing, excessive investment embezzlement of company assets, to obtain private benefits of control. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights exacerbated controlling shareholders'entrenchment behavior, damage the interests of other investors. In order to effectively monitor the behavior of controlling shareholders, protect the interests of investors, China must improve the construction of capital market, provide the conditions for the effect of the company governance mechanism. At the same time the need to improve the level of legal protection of investors, guide the flow of resources and high efficiency industries and enterprises, optimize the allocation of resources efficiency.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275;F276.6

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