【摘要】： 近年來(lái),隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的不斷發(fā)展和國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的進(jìn)一步深化對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師委以重任.加上我國(guó)加入了WTO以后更為其提供了廣闊的業(yè)務(wù)空間。眾所周知注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中有著舉足輕重的作用,尤其在對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)信息真實(shí)度要求較高的證券市場(chǎng)中它更是起著市場(chǎng)靈魂的作用�？梢韵胂笠粋�(gè)連會(huì)計(jì)信息都失真了的證券市場(chǎng)何以能長(zhǎng)期取得投資者的信任?又憑什么能具有良好的發(fā)展前景?然而,近年來(lái)“銀廣廈”、“瓊民源”、“紅光實(shí)業(yè)”、“東方鍋爐”等上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)造假事件引發(fā)出“中天勤”、“海南大正”、“蜀都”、“四川君合”等會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所受罰甚至吊銷執(zhí)照。在這些案件中,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師不僅沒(méi)有盡到為投資者把關(guān)的作用,有的甚至扮演了很不光彩的角色。規(guī)范注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)已經(jīng)刻不容緩,然而面對(duì)存在的問(wèn)題,人們多是從道德、職業(yè)操守和“良心”的角度去要求注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師,沒(méi)有從更深層次的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度去思考問(wèn)題。事實(shí)上,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師也是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中謀求利益的經(jīng)濟(jì)人,他們?cè)趫?zhí)業(yè)過(guò)程中,受到來(lái)自利益和道德的兩難選擇,甚至陷入了博弈論所描述的“囚徒困境”之中,這是導(dǎo)致注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)行為異化的最主要的原因。因此,本文試圖從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度出發(fā),通過(guò)分析審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性,注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師與上市公司以及注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師與監(jiān)管部門(mén)的博弈關(guān)系來(lái)說(shuō)明導(dǎo)致注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)行為異化的原因并提出解決的辦法。 第一部分主要是介紹了審計(jì)市場(chǎng)各方的利益關(guān)系以及利用博弈論的觀點(diǎn)分析其關(guān)系的可能性。 第二部分是對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師獨(dú)立審計(jì)的博弈論分析。 第三部分分析了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師與被審計(jì)單位合謀的博弈論分析 第四部分針對(duì)以上的博弈論結(jié)論提出相應(yīng)的解決辦法及合理化建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the continuous development of China's capital market and the further deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, CPA is entrusted with an important task. In addition, after China's accession to the WTO, it has provided a broad business space. It is well known that certified public accountants play an important role in the development of market economy, especially in the securities market, which requires a high degree of authenticity of financial information, which plays a role as the soul of the market. You can imagine how a securities market with distorted accounting information can win the trust of investors in the long run. And how can there be a good prospect of development? However, in recent years, "Yinguang House", "Qiong Minyuan", "Hongguang Industry", "Oriental Boiler" and other accounting forgery incidents of listed companies have triggered "Zhongtian", "Hainan Dazheng" and "Shu du". Accounting firms such as Sichuan Junhe were fined and even revoked their licences. In these cases, CPA not only failed to act as a gatekeeper for investors, but also played a very disgraceful role. It is urgent to standardize the CPA profession. However, in the face of the existing problems, people mostly ask the CPA from the angle of ethics, professional ethics and "conscience", but not from a deeper point of view of economics. In fact, certified public accountants are also economic men seeking interests in the market economy. In the course of their practice, they are faced with the dilemma of interests and morality, and they even fall into the "prisoner's dilemma" described in game theory. This is the main reason leading to the dissimilation of CPA audit behavior. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze the independence of audit from the point of view of economics. The game relationship between CPA and listed companies as well as between CPA and regulatory department is to explain the reasons leading to the alienation of CPA audit behavior and put forward the solutions. The first part mainly introduces the interest relationship of audit market parties and the possibility of analyzing the relationship by using the viewpoint of game theory. The second part is the game theory analysis of CPA independent audit. The third part analyzes the game theory analysis of the collusion between certified public accountants and audited units. The fourth part puts forward corresponding solutions and rationalization suggestions to the above conclusions of game theory.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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