我國上市公司獨(dú)立董事制度與獨(dú)立審計(jì)相關(guān)性問題研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-12-30 21:10
【摘要】: 獨(dú)立董事制度是上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)重要組成部分,,獨(dú)立審計(jì)是健全上市公司外部治理機(jī)制的有效手段,兩者之間具有共性。完善的獨(dú)立董事制度是保障注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師獨(dú)立、客觀、公正執(zhí)業(yè)、切實(shí)發(fā)揮審計(jì)鑒證作用、提高獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的重要條件。同時(shí),注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)應(yīng)注重維護(hù)自身的獨(dú)立性,提供高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)信息,并就與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表審計(jì)相關(guān)、且根據(jù)職業(yè)判斷認(rèn)為與治理層責(zé)任相關(guān)的重大事項(xiàng),以適當(dāng)?shù)姆绞郊皶r(shí)與獨(dú)立董事溝通,便于獨(dú)立董事完整、深入了解上市公司,以有效行使決策權(quán)。注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的監(jiān)督作用與獨(dú)立董事的制衡作用的合成對(duì)于上市公司的穩(wěn)健運(yùn)行將起到良性互動(dòng)作用。獨(dú)立董事提升了獨(dú)立審計(jì)的“獨(dú)立性”,獨(dú)立審計(jì)奠定了獨(dú)立董事“獨(dú)立視事”的制度基礎(chǔ)。 本文主要通過對(duì)我國上市公司獨(dú)立董事行權(quán)的典型案例分析,以及采用統(tǒng)計(jì)方法,以2004、2005年在滬深兩地上市的84家浙江省上市公司為例,對(duì)獨(dú)立董事制度和獨(dú)立審計(jì)的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行分析。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)獨(dú)立董事制度和獨(dú)立審計(jì),對(duì)于提高我國上市公司的治理效率具有一定作用。(2)獨(dú)立董事制度和獨(dú)立審計(jì)具有相關(guān)性。獨(dú)立董事在董事會(huì)中所占比例較高者,公司業(yè)績(jī)相對(duì)較高,表現(xiàn)在每股收益(扣除后)、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、總資產(chǎn)收益率三個(gè)指標(biāo)。同時(shí)公司相對(duì)更能獲得標(biāo)準(zhǔn)無保留的審計(jì)報(bào)告。
[Abstract]:Independent director system is an important part of the internal governance structure of listed companies. Independent audit is an effective means to perfect the external governance mechanism of listed companies. Perfect independent director system is an important condition to guarantee the independent, objective and fair practice of CPA, to give full play to the role of audit verification and to improve the quality of independent audit. At the same time, the CPA industry should pay attention to maintaining its own independence, providing high-quality audit information, and regarding the major issues related to the audit of financial statements, and according to the professional judgment, which are related to the responsibilities of the governance layer. Communicate with the independent director in a proper way, so that the independent director can understand the listed company thoroughly and exercise the decision-making power effectively. The combination of the supervision of CPA and the check and balance of independent director will play a positive role in the steady operation of listed companies. Independent director promotes the independence of independent audit, and independent audit lays the foundation of independent director's independent supervision. This paper analyzes the typical cases of independent directors of listed companies in China, and takes 84 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2004 and 2005 as examples. The correlation between independent director system and independent audit is analyzed. The results show that: (1) the independent director system and independent audit have a certain role in improving the efficiency of governance of listed companies in China; (2) the independent director system and independent audit have relevance. The higher proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, the company's performance is relatively high, performance in earnings per share (after deducting), return on net assets, total return on assets three indicators. At the same time, the company is relatively more able to obtain standard unqualified audit reports.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2007
【分類號(hào)】:F276.6;F239.4
本文編號(hào):2396150
[Abstract]:Independent director system is an important part of the internal governance structure of listed companies. Independent audit is an effective means to perfect the external governance mechanism of listed companies. Perfect independent director system is an important condition to guarantee the independent, objective and fair practice of CPA, to give full play to the role of audit verification and to improve the quality of independent audit. At the same time, the CPA industry should pay attention to maintaining its own independence, providing high-quality audit information, and regarding the major issues related to the audit of financial statements, and according to the professional judgment, which are related to the responsibilities of the governance layer. Communicate with the independent director in a proper way, so that the independent director can understand the listed company thoroughly and exercise the decision-making power effectively. The combination of the supervision of CPA and the check and balance of independent director will play a positive role in the steady operation of listed companies. Independent director promotes the independence of independent audit, and independent audit lays the foundation of independent director's independent supervision. This paper analyzes the typical cases of independent directors of listed companies in China, and takes 84 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2004 and 2005 as examples. The correlation between independent director system and independent audit is analyzed. The results show that: (1) the independent director system and independent audit have a certain role in improving the efficiency of governance of listed companies in China; (2) the independent director system and independent audit have relevance. The higher proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, the company's performance is relatively high, performance in earnings per share (after deducting), return on net assets, total return on assets three indicators. At the same time, the company is relatively more able to obtain standard unqualified audit reports.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2007
【分類號(hào)】:F276.6;F239.4
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