【摘要】： 獨立審計實質(zhì)上是一個經(jīng)濟信息系統(tǒng),其本質(zhì)目標(biāo)就是就被審經(jīng)濟事項向?qū)徲嬂嫦嚓P(guān)者提供對其決策有用的公正的信息。審計信息是審計行為的結(jié)果,審計信息失真是合規(guī)審計行為扭曲后發(fā)生異化的產(chǎn)物。審計行為異化是指審計行為主體(包括審計機構(gòu)和審計人員)受外部環(huán)境的影響,在扭曲的動機驅(qū)動下,對合規(guī)審計行為的背離,是在實現(xiàn)自身短期利益最大化的同時損害其他利益相關(guān)者的利益。 本文沿著獨立審計行為異化的內(nèi)涵——審計行為異化的影響因素——審計行為異化的成本-收益分析——審計行為異化的博弈分析——審計行為異化的綜合治理——綜合治理的實證檢驗這一邏輯主線,綜合運用舞弊三角理論、信息不對稱理論、博弈論和行為治理理論等理論與方法,對獨立審計行為異化的有關(guān)問題進行了系統(tǒng)研究。首先,界定了獨立審計行為的內(nèi)涵,在此基礎(chǔ)上界定了獨立審計行為異化的內(nèi)涵,分析了獨立審計行為異化的表現(xiàn)形式和特征,利用舞弊三角理論對獨立審計行為異化的影響因素進行分析,構(gòu)建由利益、壓力、機會、借口構(gòu)成的獨立審計行為異化的“實三角”模型;其次,分析審計行為異化的成本收益,分析管理當(dāng)局和監(jiān)管環(huán)境對異化成本收益的影響,以博弈論作為分析工具,以審計主體的異化行為為主線,分析各因素對審計行為異化的影響;再次,基于行為治理理論、激勵理論和約束理論探討了對獨立審計行為異化的綜合治理;最后,運用相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),通過設(shè)立假設(shè)、建立模型的實證研究方法對獨立審計行為異化的綜合治理進行了經(jīng)驗檢驗。 研究審計行為異化的影響因素,對其進行成本——收益及博弈分析,研究其綜合治理對策,旨在豐富審計行為理論,指導(dǎo)審計實踐,遏制和防范審計實務(wù)中的審計行為異化,確保審計信息質(zhì)量,提高審計資源配置效率。
[Abstract]:In essence, independent audit is an economic information system, whose essential goal is to provide the audit stakeholders with fair and useful information for their decision-making on the subject matter. Audit information is the result of audit behavior, and audit information distortion is the product of dissimilation after compliance audit behavior distortion. Audit behavior alienation refers to the deviation of audit behavior from compliance audit behavior, which is influenced by external environment and driven by distorted motivation. It is to maximize their own short-term interests at the same time to harm the interests of other stakeholders. Along with the connotation of independent audit behavior alienation, the influence factors of audit behavior alienation, the cost-benefit analysis of audit behavior alienation, the game analysis of audit behavior alienation, the comprehensive management of audit behavior alienation The logical thread of the empirical test of comprehensive governance, Based on the theories and methods of fraud triangle theory, information asymmetry theory, game theory and behavior governance theory, this paper makes a systematic study on the dissimilation of independent audit behavior. First of all, it defines the connotation of independent audit behavior, defines the connotation of independent audit behavior alienation, and analyzes the manifestation and characteristics of independent audit behavior alienation. Based on the theory of fraud triangle, this paper analyzes the influence factors of dissimilation of independent audit behavior, and constructs a "real triangle" model of dissimilation of independent audit behavior, which is composed of interests, pressures, opportunities and excuses. Secondly, it analyzes the cost and income of audit behavior alienation, analyzes the influence of management authority and supervision environment on alienation cost and income, takes game theory as the analysis tool, and takes the dissimilation behavior of audit subject as the main line. Analyze the influence of various factors on audit behavior alienation; Thirdly, based on the behavioral governance theory, incentive theory and constraint theory, this paper discusses the comprehensive governance of the alienation of independent audit behavior. Finally, the empirical research method based on the hypothesis and model is used to test the comprehensive management of the alienation of independent audit behavior. This paper studies the influencing factors of audit behavior alienation, analyzes its cost-benefit and game theory, studies its comprehensive management countermeasures, aims at enriching the audit behavior theory, guiding audit practice, curbing and preventing audit behavior alienation in audit practice. Ensure the quality of audit information and improve the efficiency of audit resource allocation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F239.4

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 靳思昌;;審計中利益沖突研究綜述[J];天津商業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2012年06期

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本文編號：2393099