發(fā)布時間：2018-12-07 12:45

【摘要】： 隨著我國社會主義市場經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,民主政治制度的不斷完善,公眾對政府的要求越來越高,對政府在某些工作方面的不足質(zhì)疑聲此起彼伏。國家審計署已連續(xù)多年掀起“審計風(fēng)暴”,審計成為公眾了解和監(jiān)督政府的一個窗口。政府也越來越意識到了審計的重要性,審計也成為政府改進自身建設(shè)的一個手段。國務(wù)院對審計署查出的問題,責(zé)成相關(guān)部門整改,提高了政府工作效率,同時也贏得了公眾信任。如何更好的發(fā)揮審計的作用,如何更好的使審計充當(dāng)起公眾和政府彼此信任的橋梁,進一步作好政府績效審計工作成為亟待解決的課題。 本文依據(jù)委托代理理論、博弈論的方法,對委托人和代理人之間關(guān)系,運用博弈理論進行了分析,堅持理論聯(lián)系實際、實證分析和規(guī)范分析相統(tǒng)一的研究方法,立足于我國政府審計工作實際,借鑒國外的先進經(jīng)驗,盡可能用全新的視角審視和研究我國現(xiàn)階段行政府績效審計的理論和實踐問題。本文第一章在簡單介紹研究背景基礎(chǔ)上,明確本文所要研究的問題,并對相關(guān)概念、研究思路、研究方法、本文的創(chuàng)新點和不足進行簡要說明。第二章闡述政府績效審計的一般問題,對概念內(nèi)涵、與違規(guī)審計的區(qū)別、當(dāng)前目標(biāo)以及政府績效審計涉及的主體進行了論述。第三章著重闡述了西方及我國政府績效審計的發(fā)展過程。第四章分析政府績效審計中的委托代理關(guān)系,詳細論述委托代理理論概念同時,重點分析了委托代理關(guān)系是政府績效審計產(chǎn)生發(fā)展的根源、政府績效審計中委托代理關(guān)系的層次分析以及政府績效審計歸屬關(guān)系。第五章對博弈分析在政府績效審計中的作用進行了闡述,利用博弈理論對不同主體的博弈過程的分析。第六章通過用委托代理理論及博弈理論對政府績效審計的分析,得出促進政府績效審計健康發(fā)展必須推進公開、透明機制的建立。第七章利用上面的理論分引出討論確�？冃徲嫷脑u價標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問題。第八章對政府績效審計發(fā)展進行展望,提出積極推進公開透明機制的運行和增強審計獨立性的建議。 創(chuàng)新點和不足。本文對政府績效審計涉及的各方主體關(guān)系,應(yīng)用委托代理理論進行的詳盡的分析論述,這是以往文獻中沒有過的:應(yīng)用博弈論的觀點,對委托代理關(guān)系中不同博弈主體的博弈過程進行分析,從獨特的視角闡述了政府績效審計的必然;對審計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)做了深入系統(tǒng)的探討。但是,在例證某些事項時,有時并不十分充分:審計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)模式的建立也是比較粗淺的
[Abstract]:With the development of the socialist market economy and the continuous improvement of the democratic political system, the public demands the government more and more, and the lack of the government in some aspects has been questioned one after another. The National Audit Office has set off a "auditing storm" for many years, and audit has become a window for the public to understand and supervise the government. The government is becoming more and more aware of the importance of auditing, which has become a means for the government to improve its own construction. The State Council has ordered the relevant departments to rectify the problems identified by the Audit Office, thus improving the efficiency of the government and winning public trust. How to better play the role of audit, how to better make the audit as a bridge of trust between the public and the government, further better government performance audit work has become an urgent task to be solved. Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper analyzes the relationship between the principal and the agent by using the game theory, insists on the unified research method of integrating theory with practice, empirical analysis and normative analysis. Based on the practice of government audit in our country and drawing on the advanced experience of foreign countries, this paper tries to examine and study the theory and practice of government performance audit in our country from a new angle of view as far as possible. In the first chapter, on the basis of a brief introduction of the research background, the problems to be studied in this paper are clarified, and the related concepts, research ideas, research methods, innovations and shortcomings of this paper are briefly explained. The second chapter expounds the general problems of the government performance audit, discusses the connotation of the concept, the difference between the government performance audit and the illegal audit, the current goal and the main body involved in the government performance audit. The third chapter focuses on the development process of government performance audit in western and China. The fourth chapter analyzes the principal-agent relationship in government performance audit, and discusses the concept of principal-agent theory in detail. At the same time, it analyzes the principal-agent relationship is the root of the development of government performance audit. The hierarchical analysis of principal-agent relationship in government performance audit and the ownership relationship of government performance audit. The fifth chapter expounds the role of game analysis in government performance audit and analyzes the game process of different subjects by using game theory. The sixth chapter analyzes the government performance audit by using the principal-agent theory and the game theory, and draws the conclusion that to promote the healthy development of the government performance audit, we must promote the establishment of open and transparent mechanism. The seventh chapter discusses the evaluation standard of performance audit by using the above theory. The eighth chapter looks forward to the development of government performance audit, and puts forward some suggestions to promote the operation of open and transparent mechanism and enhance the independence of audit. Innovation points and shortcomings. In this paper, the relationship between the parties involved in the government performance audit, the application of principal-agent theory to the detailed analysis and discussion, this is not in previous literature: apply the point of view of game theory, This paper analyzes the game process of different game players in the principal-agent relationship, and expounds the necessity of government performance audit from a unique angle of view. The audit standard is discussed systematically. However, when illustrating certain matters, it is sometimes not quite sufficient: the establishment of the auditing standard model is also relatively superficial.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F239.44

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本文編號：2367228