【摘要】： 2007年9月12號證監(jiān)會發(fā)文取消了B股市場雙重審計的強制性,從1996年B股雙重審計開始執(zhí)行到今年的取消已經(jīng)有十一年的時間,因此:(1)雙重審計不僅存在單一審計存在的問題,而且還存在雙重審計的特有問題值得深入研究,這些問題可能直接關(guān)系到雙重審計未來發(fā)展;(2)有必要對雙重審計模式的發(fā)展做一些回顧與總結(jié)。基于以上兩點,本文將主要探討雙重審計下的審計師與被審計單位、審計師與審計師之間形成的多重關(guān)系,以及這種關(guān)系對與上市公司高質(zhì)量的審計需求和對審計師選擇的影響。 本文以2004、2005和2006年三年同時發(fā)行A、B股上市公司及其A、B股審計師為研究樣本,考察了上市公司境外投資者持股、境外董事,A股審計師選聘等因素對B股審計師選聘影響,以及A、B股高質(zhì)量審計師對總審計費用的影響。在控制了公司規(guī)模、財務(wù)杠桿、盈利能力、審計風(fēng)險、審計意見以及其他因素以后,發(fā)現(xiàn):首先,境外投資者的持股與B股高質(zhì)量審計師之間呈倒U形結(jié)構(gòu);其次,董事會中外籍董事比例很低,對高質(zhì)量B股審計需求不明顯;上市公司在選擇了A股高質(zhì)量審計師后,表現(xiàn)出對B股高質(zhì)量審計師需求明顯不足,同時,在向A股審計師支付了高額審計費用后,也不傾向再為B股審計師支付高額審計費用;在B股審計市場上,高質(zhì)量的審計師更傾向于以審計集團的形式來獲得同一家上市公司的A、B股年報審計項目;最后檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn)了A、B股高質(zhì)量的審計師會導(dǎo)致上市公司總的審計費用的增加。 本文共分五章:第一章為緒論部分;第二章主要分析了B股市場雙重審計的政策革沿、B股市場雙重審計的市場現(xiàn)狀等,同時分析了A股補充審計的政策沿革,并對B股市場雙重審計和A股的補充審計做了對比分析,對雙重審計下審計關(guān)系異化和審計集團現(xiàn)象做了論述,還對B股雙重審計強制性取消的時機做了簡單分析,進一步對強制性取消后對我國證券審計市場的影響做了說明;第三章首先實證檢驗了B股市場雙重審計下的審計需求和審計師選擇情況,以及高質(zhì)量審計師與審計集團的關(guān)系;第四章對高質(zhì)量審計師和總審計費用的關(guān)系做了實證檢驗;第五章總結(jié)了研究的主要結(jié)論,提出了一些關(guān)于雙重審計模式發(fā)展政策建議,并對雙重審計的未來研究方向做了一些理論預(yù)期。
[Abstract]:On September 12, 2007, the Securities Regulatory Commission issued a letter canceling the mandatory double audit of the B-share market. It has been 11 years since the implementation of the double audit of B-share in 1996 to the cancellation of this year. Therefore: (1) there are not only the problems of single audit, but also the unique problems of dual audit, which may be directly related to the future development of dual audit; (2) it is necessary to review and summarize the development of dual audit mode. Based on the above two points, this paper will mainly discuss the multiple relationships between auditors and audited units, auditors and auditors under dual audit. And the impact of this relationship on the high-quality audit demand and auditor selection of listed companies. In this paper, based on the sample of A, B shares listed companies and their auditors of A and B shares issued simultaneously in 2005 and 2006, this paper investigates the influence of foreign investors' shareholding, overseas directors and A share auditors on the selection and appointment of B shares auditors. And A, B shares of high-quality auditors on the overall audit costs. After controlling the company size, financial leverage, profitability, audit risk, audit opinion, and other factors, it is found that: first, there is an inverted U-shaped structure between foreign investors' holdings and high-quality B shares auditors; Secondly, the proportion of foreign directors in the board of directors is very low, and the demand for high quality B shares audit is not obvious. After selecting the high-quality auditors of A-shares, the listed companies show that the demand for high-quality auditors of B-shares is obviously insufficient. At the same time, after paying high audit fees to the auditors of A-shares, Nor do they tend to pay high audit fees for B shares auditors; In the B share audit market, high quality auditors tend to obtain the A-, B-share annual report audit items of the same listed company in the form of audit group. Finally, it is found that high quality auditors of A and B shares lead to the increase of total audit cost of listed companies. This paper is divided into five chapters: the first chapter is the introduction part; The second chapter mainly analyzes the policy development of double auditing in B share market, the market status quo of double audit in B share market, and the policy evolution of A share supplementary audit. It also makes a comparative analysis of double audit of B share market and supplementary audit of A share, discusses the alienation of audit relationship and the phenomenon of audit group under double audit, and makes a brief analysis on the opportunity of mandatory cancellation of double audit of B share. Further explained the impact of mandatory cancellation on China's securities audit market; The third chapter empirically tests the audit demand and auditor selection under the double audit of B share market and the relationship between the high quality auditor and the audit group, the fourth chapter makes an empirical test on the relationship between the high quality auditor and the total audit cost. The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of the study, puts forward some policy recommendations on the development of dual audit mode, and makes some theoretical expectations on the future research direction of dual audit.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F832.51;F239.4;F224

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