【摘要】：財務(wù)舞弊一直是實務(wù)界和學術(shù)界關(guān)注的話題。學者們普遍認同財務(wù)舞弊公司治理機制存在缺陷，但大多數(shù)學者都是從股權(quán)特征或是董事會治理的角度對財務(wù)舞弊進行了研究，而對于負有內(nèi)部監(jiān)督、制衡責任的監(jiān)事會的相關(guān)研究則簡陋很多。這種情況在我國也很常見，但我國企業(yè)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督職能被一分為二——分為監(jiān)事會機制和獨立董事機制。雖然獨立董事機制治理效用也不容樂觀，但是其從屬于地位舉足輕重的董事會，這就得到了眾多研究公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機制的學者們的青睞；相較于此，監(jiān)事會權(quán)力薄弱，治理效用較低，“形同虛設(shè)”的地位使其遭受學者們的長期忽視。這種回避的現(xiàn)象并不能說明我國企業(yè)的監(jiān)事會機制已趨于完善，恰恰相反，這種機制需要被深入剖析，需要得到更實質(zhì)的改善。監(jiān)事會機制起源于德國，后來也被日本采用，，其實際的監(jiān)督效用均高于我國的水平，這不得不引起我們的深思。另外，學者們總是不乏對于財務(wù)舞弊的成因分析，卻忽略了財務(wù)舞弊后的治理情況，這對于發(fā)生了財務(wù)舞弊行為的企業(yè)也缺少指導(dǎo)意義。鑒于此，本文從監(jiān)事會后續(xù)治理的角度切入，研究財務(wù)舞弊和外部審計，并進一步探討公司內(nèi)外兩種監(jiān)督機制間是否存在監(jiān)督職能互補的關(guān)系。 本文在文獻回顧和現(xiàn)狀分析的基礎(chǔ)上，參考相關(guān)理論，提出了假設(shè)，構(gòu)建了模型。本文選取2004-2008年被公開譴責的違規(guī)事件，研究區(qū)間為公告前一年至公告后第三年，報表涵蓋區(qū)間為2003-2011年。使用Excel2003篩選出滬深兩市符合條件的48家財務(wù)舞弊公司及與之對應(yīng)的48個控制樣本。然后運用Stata11.0對樣本進行配對樣本T檢驗和Logistic回歸，研究公告前一年至公告后第三年監(jiān)事會后續(xù)治理情況及其對外部審計的影響。主要研究結(jié)論如下：第一，財務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生后，監(jiān)事會的規(guī)模略有下降，持股比例極低，職工代表比例基本維持在法定水平上，獨立性有限，會議頻度提高，人員有小規(guī)模變更�？傮w來說，監(jiān)事會的后續(xù)治理雖然不能稱之為高效，但至少在某些方面采取了一定的措施來提高自身的監(jiān)督職能。同時，外部審計的變更比率較低，有可能存在合謀行為。第二，財務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生后，審計師變更比率與監(jiān)事會會議頻度顯著正相關(guān)。第三，財務(wù)舞弊可能是激發(fā)監(jiān)事會監(jiān)督效用的關(guān)鍵因素，財務(wù)舞弊發(fā)生后，公司內(nèi)外兩種監(jiān)督機制間更有可能存在一定程度上的監(jiān)督職能互補關(guān)系。 最后，結(jié)合本文的理論研究和實證分析結(jié)果，提出了進一步完善后續(xù)治理中的監(jiān)事會結(jié)構(gòu)、進一步規(guī)范后續(xù)治理中的監(jiān)事會行為、進一步提高舞弊前的監(jiān)事會治理效率以及明確外部審計師責任、進一步規(guī)范審計市場的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Financial fraud has always been a topic of concern in the field of practice and academia. Scholars generally agree that there are defects in the corporate governance mechanism of financial fraud, but most scholars have studied financial fraud from the perspective of equity characteristics or board governance, and have internal supervision. The relevant research on the board of supervisors with checks and balances is much simpler. This kind of situation is also very common in our country, but the internal supervision function of our country's enterprise is divided into two parts: the mechanism of board of supervisors and the mechanism of independent director. Although the governance utility of the independent director mechanism is not optimistic, it is subordinate to the board of directors, which is favored by many scholars who study the internal supervision mechanism of the company. Compared with this, the board of supervisors is weak in power and low in effectiveness of governance, and the status of "virtual" causes it to be neglected by scholars for a long time. This phenomenon of avoidance does not show that the mechanism of the board of supervisors of Chinese enterprises has been improved. On the contrary, the mechanism needs to be deeply analyzed and to be improved more substantially. The mechanism of board of supervisors originated in Germany and was adopted by Japan later. Its actual effectiveness of supervision is higher than that of our country, which has to arouse our deep thinking. In addition, scholars always analyze the causes of financial fraud, but ignore the governance after financial fraud, which is also lack of guidance for enterprises that have financial fraud. In view of this, this paper studies financial fraud and external audit from the perspective of the board of supervisors' subsequent governance, and further discusses whether there is a complementary relationship between the two supervision mechanisms inside and outside the company. On the basis of literature review and current situation analysis, this paper puts forward the hypothesis and constructs the model with reference to relevant theories. This paper selects the violations that were publicly condemned from 2004 to 2008. The research interval is from the year before the announcement to the third year after the announcement. The report covers the period of 2003-2011. Excel2003 was used to screen 48 financial fraud companies and 48 control samples. Then we use Stata11.0 to carry out paired sample T test and Logistic regression to study the follow-up governance of the board of supervisors from the year before the announcement to the third year after the announcement and its impact on the external audit. The main conclusions are as follows: first, after the financial fraud, the scale of the board of supervisors decreased slightly, the proportion of shareholding is very low, the proportion of staff representatives is basically maintained in the legal level, the independence is limited, the frequency of meetings is increased, and the staff has small scale changes. Generally speaking, the follow-up governance of the board of supervisors can not be called high efficiency, but at least some measures have been taken to improve its supervisory function in some aspects. At the same time, the change rate of external audit is low, there may be collusion behavior. Secondly, after financial fraud, the auditor change rate is positively correlated with the frequency of supervisors' meeting. Third, financial fraud may be the key factor to stimulate the supervisory effectiveness of the board of supervisors. After the occurrence of financial fraud, it is more likely that there is a certain degree of complementary relationship between the two supervision mechanisms inside and outside the company. Finally, combined with the theoretical research and empirical analysis results of this paper, proposed to further improve the structure of the Board of Supervisors in the follow-up governance, and further standardize the behavior of the Board of Supervisors in the follow-up governance. Further improve the efficiency of the board of supervisors before fraud and clarify the responsibilities of external auditors, further standardize the audit market policy recommendations.
【學位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F239.4;F272.91

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