非效率投資、政府審計與腐敗曝光——基于央企控股上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)
發(fā)布時間:2018-11-02 07:10
【摘要】:本文以2009~2014年接受政府審計的中央控股上市公司為樣本,以企業(yè)投資為著力點,從腐敗曝光視角分析非效率投資產(chǎn)生的社會后果,并進一步考察政府審計是否能促進非效率投資企業(yè)的腐敗曝光。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):央企控股上市公司非效率投資程度與腐敗被曝光的概率之間呈顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系,其中過度投資企業(yè)的腐敗曝光概率更高;政府審計能夠提高非效率投資企業(yè)的腐敗被曝光概率,進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中央實施的一系列嚴厲反腐行動能夠提高政府審計作用,尤其能夠提高投資不足企業(yè)的腐敗曝光概率。研究表明,非效率投資暗含著腐敗行為,政府審計能夠提高非效率投資企業(yè)的腐敗被曝光的概率,此外政府審計是作為中央反腐行動的配合手段發(fā)揮作用。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the central holding listed companies audited by the government from 2009 to 2014 as a sample, focuses on enterprise investment, and analyzes the social consequences of inefficient investment from the perspective of corruption exposure. And further study whether the government audit can promote the corruption exposure of inefficient investment enterprises. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of inefficient investment and the probability of exposure of corruption in the listed companies, and the exposure probability of corruption of overinvested enterprises is higher; Government audit can improve the exposure probability of corruption of inefficient investment enterprises. Further research shows that a series of severe anti-corruption actions implemented by the central government can improve the role of government auditing especially the exposure probability of corruption of underinvested enterprises. The research shows that the inefficient investment implies corrupt behavior, and the government audit can increase the probability of exposure of the corruption of the inefficient investment enterprises. In addition, the government audit plays a role as the cooperative means of the central anti-corruption action.
【作者單位】: 四川農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;中國政府審計研究中心;西南交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家自然科學(xué)基金項目(項目批準號:71702153)的階段性成果
【分類號】:F239.4;F276.1
[Abstract]:This paper takes the central holding listed companies audited by the government from 2009 to 2014 as a sample, focuses on enterprise investment, and analyzes the social consequences of inefficient investment from the perspective of corruption exposure. And further study whether the government audit can promote the corruption exposure of inefficient investment enterprises. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of inefficient investment and the probability of exposure of corruption in the listed companies, and the exposure probability of corruption of overinvested enterprises is higher; Government audit can improve the exposure probability of corruption of inefficient investment enterprises. Further research shows that a series of severe anti-corruption actions implemented by the central government can improve the role of government auditing especially the exposure probability of corruption of underinvested enterprises. The research shows that the inefficient investment implies corrupt behavior, and the government audit can increase the probability of exposure of the corruption of the inefficient investment enterprises. In addition, the government audit plays a role as the cooperative means of the central anti-corruption action.
【作者單位】: 四川農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;中國政府審計研究中心;西南交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟管理學(xué)院;西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)會計學(xué)院;
【基金】:國家自然科學(xué)基金項目(項目批準號:71702153)的階段性成果
【分類號】:F239.4;F276.1
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