【摘要】：作為公司盈余調(diào)節(jié)的經(jīng)常性行為,盈余管理一直頗受學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注,相關(guān)研究領(lǐng)域的文章也是百花齊放�？v觀國內(nèi)外盈余管理的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),可以發(fā)現(xiàn)如今涉及盈余管理的課題大都偏向?qū)C(jī)會(huì)主義主義動(dòng)機(jī)的研究,卻極少將注意力放在可能會(huì)有助于企業(yè)發(fā)展的其他盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)上。管理者會(huì)為了向市場(chǎng)傳遞公司利好的消息而運(yùn)用盈余管理手段來美化公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績,當(dāng)然在這個(gè)過程中,少不了管理層自利行為性質(zhì)的盈余管理。那么,管理層以自身利益放在第一位,進(jìn)而可能給公司及利益相關(guān)方造成損失的機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理,以及與企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化目標(biāo)一致的非機(jī)會(huì)主義盈余管理,對(duì)審計(jì)意見是否存在差異化影響呢?考慮到涉及盈余管理的兩種動(dòng)機(jī)分類的文獻(xiàn)并未深入研究兩種動(dòng)機(jī)的區(qū)分,因此本文在探究不同動(dòng)機(jī)盈余管理與審計(jì)意見關(guān)系之前,首先引入了企業(yè)價(jià)值這一變量對(duì)兩種動(dòng)機(jī)的盈余管理進(jìn)行分析對(duì)比。管理者可以基于自利動(dòng)機(jī)(投機(jī)主義)投機(jī)操縱應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目,以實(shí)現(xiàn)自身利益,自利行為下的盈余管理的程度越強(qiáng),企業(yè)價(jià)值越小,是一種“壞”的盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)。盈余管理對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值的影響,也可以通過應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目向市場(chǎng)傳遞企業(yè)信息來實(shí)現(xiàn),在這種“好”的盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)下,盈余管理的程度越強(qiáng),企業(yè)價(jià)值越大。伴隨著相關(guān)審計(jì)法律法規(guī)的完善及資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,對(duì)審計(jì)師的要求愈發(fā)嚴(yán)格,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向型審計(jì)促使審計(jì)師更加關(guān)注執(zhí)業(yè)過程中的各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn),對(duì)盈余管理活動(dòng)愈加關(guān)注。盈余管理與審計(jì)意見的關(guān)系是學(xué)術(shù)界較為常見的研究課題,然而對(duì)于二者之間的關(guān)系,至今也沒有較為準(zhǔn)確的結(jié)論。本文從機(jī)會(huì)主義和非機(jī)會(huì)主義兩種不同動(dòng)機(jī)盈余管理出發(fā),分別探究其與審計(jì)意見的相關(guān)性,實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明:機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī)的盈余管理更容易被出具非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)報(bào)告,而另一方面,審計(jì)意見的出具與非機(jī)會(huì)主義動(dòng)機(jī)盈余管理之間并不存在顯著的相關(guān)性。
[Abstract]:As a regular behavior of earnings regulation, earnings management has been paid much attention by academic circles. Looking at the relevant literature of earnings management at home and abroad, we can find that most of the topics involved in earnings management nowadays tend to focus on opportunistic motivation, but very little attention is paid to other earnings management motives that may be helpful to the development of enterprises. In order to convey the good news to the market, managers will use earnings management to beautify the business performance of the company, of course, in this process, the management of self-interest behavior of earnings management. Then, the management takes the self-interest as the first, and then the opportunistic earnings management, which may cause losses to the company and its stakeholders, and the non-opportunistic earnings management, which is consistent with the goal of maximizing the value of the enterprise. Is there any difference in the audit opinion? In view of the fact that the literature on the classification of the two motivations involved in earnings management has not thoroughly studied the distinction between the two motivations, this paper explores the relationship between earnings management with different motivations and the audit opinion. Firstly, this paper introduces the variable of enterprise value to analyze and compare the earnings management of two kinds of motivation. Managers can manipulate accrual items on the basis of self-profit motive (opportunism) in order to realize their own interests. The stronger the degree of earnings management under self-interest behavior, the smaller the enterprise value is, which is a "bad" earnings management motivation. The influence of earnings management on enterprise value can also be realized by transferring enterprise information to the market by accrual items. Under this kind of "good" earnings management motivation, the stronger the degree of earnings management is, the greater the enterprise value is. With the improvement of relevant audit laws and regulations and the development of the capital market, the requirements of auditors become more stringent. Risk-oriented audit urges auditors to pay more attention to various risks in the practice process, and pay more attention to earnings management activities. The relationship between earnings management and audit opinion is a common research topic in academic circles. However, there is no more accurate conclusion on the relationship between them. Starting from two different motivational earnings management of opportunism and non-opportunism, this paper probes into the correlation between earnings management and audit opinions. The empirical results show that earnings management with opportunistic motivation is more likely to be issued a non-standard audit report. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between audit opinion and non-opportunistic motivation earnings management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F239.4

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