【摘要】：本文提出一種新的阻止合謀的策略,即同時(shí)派出兩個(gè)審計(jì)師審計(jì),讓他們陷入"囚徒困境",以保證其提交的審計(jì)報(bào)告真實(shí),卻發(fā)現(xiàn)這一策略由于成本過高而無法實(shí)行。所以筆者分析能否以一定概率派出第二個(gè)審計(jì)師—這一低成本方式,來阻止審計(jì)合謀。研究表明:以ξ∈(0,1)的概率派出第二個(gè)審計(jì)師、強(qiáng)化剛性法律的"硬約束"和完善審計(jì)師的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,可以阻止審計(jì)合謀。同時(shí)還得出,審計(jì)師的道德約束、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡有助于防止審計(jì)合謀,國有企業(yè)監(jiān)管者在阻止審計(jì)合謀中,可以發(fā)揮同企業(yè)真實(shí)所有者一樣的作用。這為國資局對(duì)國有企業(yè)實(shí)行審計(jì)公開招標(biāo)和抽查復(fù)審提供了理論支持。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a new strategy to prevent collusion is proposed, in which two auditors are sent to audit at the same time to make them fall into "prisoner's dilemma" to ensure that the audit report submitted by them is true. However, it is found that this strategy cannot be carried out because of the high cost. Therefore, the author analyzes whether the second auditor can be sent with a certain probability-a low-cost way to prevent audit collusion. The study shows that the second auditor can be sent out with the probability of 尉 鈭，

本文編號(hào)：2161168