【摘要】：本文提出一種新的阻止合謀的策略,即同時派出兩個審計師審計,讓他們陷入"囚徒困境",以保證其提交的審計報告真實,卻發(fā)現(xiàn)這一策略由于成本過高而無法實行。所以筆者分析能否以一定概率派出第二個審計師—這一低成本方式,來阻止審計合謀。研究表明:以ξ∈(0,1)的概率派出第二個審計師、強化剛性法律的"硬約束"和完善審計師的激勵機制,可以阻止審計合謀。同時還得出,審計師的道德約束、風(fēng)險厭惡有助于防止審計合謀,國有企業(yè)監(jiān)管者在阻止審計合謀中,可以發(fā)揮同企業(yè)真實所有者一樣的作用。這為國資局對國有企業(yè)實行審計公開招標(biāo)和抽查復(fù)審提供了理論支持。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a new strategy to prevent collusion is proposed, in which two auditors are sent to audit at the same time to make them fall into "prisoner's dilemma" to ensure that the audit report submitted by them is true. However, it is found that this strategy cannot be carried out because of the high cost. Therefore, the author analyzes whether the second auditor can be sent with a certain probability-a low-cost way to prevent audit collusion. The study shows that the second auditor can be sent out with the probability of 尉 鈭，

本文編號：2161168