【摘要】： 本文從審計(jì)法律制度安排角度,探討如何通過(guò)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的法律基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行調(diào)整與優(yōu)化,來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)投資者的有效保護(hù)。本文首先對(duì)中國(guó)的投資者法律保護(hù)實(shí)踐進(jìn)行回顧,然后闡述了兩種投資者保護(hù)理論,并分別從兩大法系角度分析了法律論觀點(diǎn)的淵源。作者認(rèn)為,投資者保護(hù)的核心在于保證投資者的知情權(quán)、提高會(huì)計(jì)透明度并確保會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,而上述因素的實(shí)現(xiàn)與否則依賴于審計(jì)質(zhì)量高低。正是基于此種考慮,本文通過(guò)建立模型說(shuō)明不同法律懲罰方式和損失計(jì)量模式對(duì)審計(jì)師工作激勵(lì)影響,及其對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量產(chǎn)生影響,進(jìn)而得出不同審計(jì)法律制度安排對(duì)社會(huì)福利和社會(huì)成本所產(chǎn)生的影響,并給出了可以實(shí)現(xiàn)最佳審計(jì)師努力程度和最佳投資水平的法律懲罰方式和損失計(jì)量模式,認(rèn)為在該最佳模式下社會(huì)總體福利水平可以達(dá)到最大化,同時(shí)社會(huì)成本最小。最后,論文從審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、法律責(zé)任和審計(jì)師財(cái)富角度,分析了有限責(zé)任制下和無(wú)限責(zé)任制下,當(dāng)客戶多于審計(jì)師時(shí),審計(jì)師對(duì)待審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的態(tài)度及對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的影響。
[Abstract]:From the angle of audit legal system arrangement, this paper discusses how to realize the effective protection of investors by adjusting and optimizing the legal basis of audit quality. This paper first reviews the practice of investor legal protection in China, then expounds two kinds of investor protection theories, and analyzes the origin of legal views from the perspective of two legal systems. The author believes that the core of investor protection is to ensure the investor's right to know, improve accounting transparency and ensure the quality of accounting information, and the realization of the above factors depends on the audit quality. Based on these considerations, this paper establishes a model to illustrate the impact of different legal penalties and loss measurement models on auditors' work incentives and their impact on audit quality. Then, the influence of different audit legal system arrangement on social welfare and social cost is obtained, and the way of legal punishment and loss measurement mode which can realize the best auditor's effort and the best investment level are given. It is considered that the overall social welfare level can be maximized and the social cost minimized under this optimal model. Finally, from the perspective of audit standards, legal liability and auditor wealth, the paper analyzes the auditor's attitude towards audit standards and its impact on audit quality under the limited responsibility system and the unlimited responsibility system, when the customer is more than the auditor.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.27

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