本文選題：外部審計治理 + 審計治理效應�。� 參考：《內(nèi)蒙古財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著國民經(jīng)濟不斷增速發(fā)展,經(jīng)濟結構日趨優(yōu)化,作為市場經(jīng)濟重要組成部分的資本市場,向著多層次多方位的方向邁進。資本市場的良好有序發(fā)展為我國經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展奠定了重要基礎。而資本市場又是以投資者為核心的。如何切實維護好廣大投資者的根本利益,是一件關乎國計民生的大事。近年來,在資本市場快速發(fā)展的背后,是上市公司內(nèi)幕交易、操縱股價及披露虛假信息等的一系列破壞市場穩(wěn)定的惡性行為的發(fā)生。這些行為不僅破壞了我國資本市場正常有序的運行程序,更重要的是給廣大投資者帶來無法彌補的損失。如何切實有效地保護我國投資者的切身利益已然成為大眾關注的焦點。對代理理論進行研究發(fā)現(xiàn),外部審計作為現(xiàn)代公司治理機制所不可或缺的組成部分,其在降低代理成本和緩解利益沖突方面發(fā)揮著重要的治理和監(jiān)督作用,而這種監(jiān)督治理作用在很大程度上對投資者的知情權、參與權和獲利權進行了保障,最終起到保護投資者利益的作用。本文通過實證研究,以投資者保護為視角,探索外部審計治理在投資者保護方面所發(fā)揮的效應。本文選取2012-2015年滬深兩市A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)進行實證分析,分別選取類代理成本和公司績效作為投資者保護的替代變量,選擇審計意見類型和審計質(zhì)量作為外部審計治理的替代變量,同時選取公司規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負債率、公司成長性作為控制變量,通過描述性統(tǒng)計分析、各變量之間的相關性分析和多元回歸分析等方法的運用,實證研究基于投資者保護的外部審計治理效應。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),外部審計治理與代理成本呈現(xiàn)顯著負相關關系,與公司績效呈現(xiàn)顯著正相關關系,從而驗證了本文提出的假設,外部審計治理在投資者保護方面發(fā)揮了積極效應。最后,本文基于實證研究的結論,主要從提高獨立外部審計機構審計治理能力和提高投資者保護水平兩方面提出對策和建議,主要包括:提高審計從業(yè)人員的職業(yè)素養(yǎng)及道德水平;加強獨立外部審計機構對審計質(zhì)量的把控;推進監(jiān)督機制的建設與完善;重視股權激勵,提升經(jīng)營效率;優(yōu)化股權結構,防止股權失衡。
[Abstract]:With the development of the national economy and the optimization of the economic structure, the capital market, as an important part of the market economy, is marching towards the direction of multi-level and multi-direction. The good and orderly development of the capital market has laid an important foundation for the rapid economic development of our country. And the capital market is to investors as the core. How to protect the fundamental interests of investors is a matter of national economy and people's livelihood. In recent years, behind the rapid development of the capital market, listed companies insider trading, manipulation of stock prices and disclosure of false information, such as a series of destructive market stability. These actions not only destroy the normal and orderly operation procedures of China's capital market, but also bring irreparable losses to the majority of investors. How to effectively protect the vital interests of Chinese investors has become the focus of public concern. As an indispensable part of modern corporate governance mechanism, external audit plays an important role in reducing agency costs and mitigating conflicts of interest. To a large extent, this kind of supervision and governance function guarantees investors' right to know, participate and make profits, and finally plays a role in protecting investors' interests. From the perspective of investor protection, this paper explores the effects of external audit governance on investor protection through empirical research. This paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2015 to carry out empirical analysis, and selects agency costs and corporate performance as the alternative variables for investor protection. Choosing the type of audit opinion and audit quality as the alternative variables of external audit governance, and selecting the company size, asset-liability ratio and corporate growth as control variables, through descriptive statistical analysis, Using the methods of correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis among variables, this paper empirically studies the governance effect of external audit based on investor protection. It is found that external audit governance has a significant negative correlation with agency cost and a significant positive correlation with corporate performance, which verifies the hypothesis that external audit governance plays a positive role in investor protection. Finally, based on the conclusions of empirical research, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions from two aspects: improving the audit governance ability of independent external audit institutions and improving the level of investor protection. It mainly includes: to improve the professional quality and moral level of audit practitioners; to strengthen the independent external audit institutions to control the audit quality; to promote the construction and improvement of the supervision mechanism; to attach importance to equity incentives, to improve operational efficiency; to optimize the ownership structure, Prevent equity imbalance.
【學位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51;F239.4

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