本文選題：利益關(guān)系人 + 博弈��； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2008年碩士論文

【摘要】： 目前我國審計(jì)體制屬于行政型審計(jì)體制,圍繞著現(xiàn)階段審計(jì)體制,學(xué)術(shù)界展開了激烈的討論,主要有“立法論”,“升格論”,“垂直論”,“獨(dú)立論”和“雙軌制”等幾種觀點(diǎn)。本文基于國家審計(jì)中存在的多重委托代理關(guān)系,從受托責(zé)任理論的角度得出選擇國家審計(jì)體制的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為國家公民利益的最大化。由于國家公民利益難以衡量,我們用政府受托經(jīng)營管理者違規(guī)的概率大小來衡量。在委托代理理論、公共選擇理論、制度變遷理論的指引下,運(yùn)用博弈論,分析了國家審計(jì)中涉及的各方利益關(guān)系人的博弈,在此基礎(chǔ)上重點(diǎn)分析了影響審計(jì)體制選擇的兩個(gè)利益關(guān)系人在行政型審計(jì)體制和立法型體制下的博弈,即審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)和政府受托經(jīng)營管理者之間的博弈。通過兩種體制的關(guān)系人博弈,結(jié)合我國特殊的背景比較兩者的效果得出,現(xiàn)階段立法型審計(jì)體制并不一定比行政型審計(jì)體制更能保障國家公民的利益,通過提高審計(jì)報(bào)告的概率、加大對(duì)審計(jì)機(jī)關(guān)的激勵(lì)收益、提升審計(jì)組織和審計(jì)人員的地位,降低政府受托經(jīng)營管理者影響審計(jì)人員的能力,即降低審計(jì)人員合謀的概率,行政型審計(jì)體制下政府受托經(jīng)營管理者的違規(guī)概率將小于現(xiàn)階段變革的立法型審計(jì)體制。行政型審計(jì)體制目前仍然是我國審計(jì)體制的最優(yōu)選擇,但隨著國家公民民主意識(shí)的提高,立法模式下政府受托經(jīng)營管理者的違規(guī)概率將顯著小于行政型審計(jì)模式,我國審計(jì)體制最終應(yīng)向立法模式轉(zhuǎn)變。
[Abstract]:At present, the audit system of our country belongs to the administrative audit system. The academic circles have launched intense discussions around the current audit system, including "legislation theory", "upgrade theory", "vertical theory", etc. Several viewpoints, such as "independence theory" and "dual track system", etc. Based on the multi-principal-agent relationship in the state audit, this paper concludes that the criterion of choosing the national audit system is the maximization of the national citizen's interests from the perspective of the fiduciary responsibility theory. Because the national civil interest is difficult to measure, we measure it by the probability that the government's fiduciary managers violate the rules. Under the guidance of principal-agent theory, public choice theory and institutional change theory, the game theory is used to analyze the game of the stakeholders involved in the state audit. On this basis, the paper analyzes the game between the two stakeholders who influence the choice of audit system under the administrative audit system and the legislative system, that is, the game between the audit institution and the government entrusted management manager. Through the game between the two systems and the special background of our country, it is concluded that the current legislative audit system is not necessarily better than the administrative audit system to protect the interests of national citizens. By increasing the probability of audit reports, increasing the incentive income to audit institutions, improving the status of audit organizations and auditors, reducing the ability of government entrusted managers to influence auditors, that is, reducing the probability of auditors colluding. Under the administrative audit system, the probability of violation by the government entrusted managers will be less than that of the legislative audit system. At present, the administrative audit system is still the best choice of our country's audit system, but with the improvement of national citizen's democratic consciousness, the probability of violation of regulations of the government entrusted management manager under the legislative mode will be significantly smaller than that of the administrative audit mode. The audit system of our country should change to the legislative mode.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F224.32

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 李薇;我國政府審計(jì)體制改革研究[D];山東大學(xué);2010年

2 石磊;我國行政內(nèi)部監(jiān)督制度有效性研究[D];蘭州大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：2018322